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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
Using available NASA technology, many strip mine inspection functions
 
can, in principle, be done by satellite as well or better than by aerial
 
photography or by manned inspection on the ground. The key advantages of
 
environmental surveillance by satellite compared with other methods is
 
that a single, inexpensive ($200 per image for computer tapes), instan­
taneous, nearly undistorted image can be obtained up to forty (40) times
 
a year, depending on cloud cover for either the East Kentucky or the West
 
Kentucky coal fields. Furthermore, the labor-intensive functions of photo­
interpretation and map making can be done automatically by computer in­
cluding the print-out of audit data, such as acres disturbed and special
 
mans for field and office use.
 
Unfortunately, the high resolution equipment needed for thorough
 
environmental monitoring is not yet available on the Landsat series of
 
satellites, even though adequate technology exists and is being used for
 
other applications. This limits the value of Landsat-l and -2 data to
 
problems such as the percent vegetative cover of areas in excess of about
 
ten (10) acres. Despite the importance of the resolution problem, probably
 
the most negative factor in our attempts to use satellite imagery is the
 
long procedural delay between satellite overpass and user acquisition of
 
data. While NOAA routinely makes weather satellite imagery available to
 
television stations within no more than a few hours of observation, the
 
best we experienced was six (6) weeks for delivery of Landsat data.
 
While the size of waterway likely to be involved in a transient
 
"water quality" violation is so small as to preclude effective satellite
 
xi
 
detection by direct observation, there is NASA technology, not tested in
 
this study, which can be applied. Rapid detection of water quality
 
violations during strip mining can be done by the use of Landsat satellites
 
to relay data telemetered from in situ stream monitors.
 
It is anticipated that the enhanced resolution of the return beam 
vidicon sensor (RBV) of Landsat-C, scheduled to be launched late in 1977, 
will effectively solve the spatial resolution problem relating to re­
grading violations, to the detection of mining off of the permitted areas, 
and to the discovery of unpermitted "wildcat" strip mines. If some 
administrative means can be effected to make the RBV imagery available 
through a system similar to that of the NOAA weather data, then Landsat-C 
and subsequent satellites in the series could provide a valuable and cost­
effective means of routine monitoring for violations of surface mine 
regulations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
Coal mining generates costly disruptions to the environment. These 
costs can extend far beyond the temporal and spatial region in which the 
mining takes place unless adequate preventive measures are undertaken. 
Mining laws have been written to require mine operators to undertake 
such preventive measures. To enforce these laws, inspections are made 
frequently at those mines which have a permit. (Having no permit is 
also a violation.) Inspections are also costly. A measure of the effectiveness 
of an inspection-enforcement process is given by the total social cost of 
the coal mining violations under the process plus the inspection cost minus 
any benefit such as fines for violations. A new policy is cost-effective if 
it reduces the total costs. By careful analysis of inspection policies, an 
optimal policy can be derived. 
The Office of Planning and Research of the Department for Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection has undertaken a study to 
determine 'the cost effectiveness of employing satellite or aircraft photography 
together with man "ground truth" inspections for the detection of surface 
mining violations in western Kentucky. Working as consultants to this 
project are the firms of MATHEIMATICA, Inc., Environmental Research 
Institute of Michigan (ERIM), and Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. MATHEMATICA's 
task for this project has been to develop violation-inspection-enforcement 
cost models, estimate the parameters for these models, derive cost 
estimates for the alternative inspection processes, and determine an 
optimal cost-effective inspection policy. 
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There are four general inspection policies to be analyzed. One 
of these (satellite-air-man) is to use satellite photography followed by 
low altitude aircraft photography whenever a "detection" is made, which 
is then followed up by a man inspection if the low altitude photography 
results in a detection. The other three are satellite-man inspection, 
air-man inspection, and manned inspection only. Three further policies 
defined by the same models are given by replacing satellite inspection 
with high altitude aircraft inspection. Within these policy categories 
there are several options. For example, aerial photography can be 
made with a combination of one or more of black and white, color, b&w IR, 
and color IR. Also the choice of "data sets" from the Landsat 
satellites is extremely large, depending on the computer decision rules 
for interpreting the electronic signals. 
The effectiveness of satellite and aerial photography depends on 
the frequency with which the two types of nisclassifications occur. 
These misclassifications are: 
* "detecting" a violation which does not exist 
o missing a violation which does exist. 
As a preliminary research to this project, Maxim and Cullen [19] of 
MATHEMATICA developed a model which depends on these misclassification 
probabilities. Their model uses a single satellite and/or airplane pass 
under the assumption that N1 mines out of N have a violation. Their model 
determines which of s-a-m, s-m, a-m, or man inspections is optimal as 
a function of N . This paper is included in Appendix A, Volume II of this 
report. Their paper illustrates the effects of misclassification probabilities 
2
 
and other major components of the detection process. The final model used
 
in Chapter III is the same as this model except a time dimension has been
 
added to determine the frequency with which a mine should be visited. The
 
optimal policy is a saddle point involving, on the one hand, minimizing the
 
costs of N1 violations and, on the other hand, minimizing inspection costs.
 
We have also included time delays for violations to "die," time lags.
 
Because of misclassification probabilities are important in the
 
estimation of costs, an analysis of the effectiveness of satellite and
 
aerial photography depends strongly on the knowledge of the ground truth
 
status of the mines. Ground truth data was also used for another purpose.
 
The computer decision rules for satellite photographic interpretation are
 
more accurate if a sample of ground truth regions, "training sets," are used
 
for classifying the electronic surveillance data into the relevant categories.
 
It is very probably that Misclassifications are much higher at any time after
 
the initial "trained" photography because the photographic pixels depend on
 
conditions which fluctuate daily, and to a greater extent, seasonally. ERIM
 
used training sets as one of the options in the computer interpretation
 
of the Landsat data (Appendix C) to generate "recognition" maps of mined
 
areas (Appendix D). 
In November of 1975, photographs from Landsat, high altitude air­
craft, low altitude aircraft, and from the ground were all taken concurrently
 
(Appendix D). Because of several delays in the development of this data,
 
a meeting in Madisonville, Kentucky to analyze the results could not be
 
held until July, 1976, after the official end of the project. Results of
 
this meeting are summarized in the next section and in the conclusions of
 
this report.
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The effectiveness of an inspection-enforcement policy depends on 
the frequency with which violations occur under the policy. Of the many 
possible violations, four categories of violations have been used in the 
model. These are: 
" 	 Water quality. Water must be chemically treated before 
it is 	 drained from the pit in order to reduce its acidity and 
heavy metals solubility. 
* 	 Drainage Control. Diversion ditches must be constructed 
to divert water from running into the mining area. Sediment 
.ponds must be constructed when mining moves into a new 
drainage area. 
o 	 Grading. Grading must be kept current to within two 
spoil piles of the mining area. 
o 	 Revegetation. During each seeding season, which occurs for 
two-month intervals twlce per year, graded areas must be 
revegetated. 
Kentucky mining regulations applicable to strip mining are given in detail 
in Chapter II. 
There are several approaches to measuring the social costs of 
violations. One method, commonly used in the past, is to equate social 
costs with rehabilitation costs. It is now more common to include the 
cost of rehabilitation as only one component of the cost. The other 
component is a function of the time during which the environment is 
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affected. The first component is a terminal cost since once the violation
 
is corrected, it ceases to exist. The second component is an interim cost.
 
Of the two components, only the interim social cost is used. Annual.
 
permit renewal and bond release regulations in Kentucky are such that most
 
grading and revegetation violations do not require rehabilitation (see
 
Chapter IV). Water quality and drainage control violations have social
 
costs proportional to their durations. There is no significant additional
 
fixed cost of rehabilitation. Estimates of these social costs are given in
 
Chapter V.
 
Fines are benefits or negative costs of an inspection policy. In
 
the past, of the four major violation types, only fines for water quality
 
violations have had any significance. We assume that a violation results
 
in a fine at most once during its interim of existence. Estimates of the
 
average fine and frequency of fines per at least one detection of water
 
quality violation are given in Chapter V.
 
A good violation model must have at least two frequency parameters
 
to describe the frequency with which they start and the expected duration
 
after they have started. The cost model is very sensitive to these para­
meters. For examples, a satellite-man inspection policy is ineffective for
 
detecting water quality violations if water quality violations last only three
 
days and there is a two-month lapse between satellite and man inspections.
 
On the other hand, a satellite-man policy is effective for detecting lengthy
 
revegetaiton violations if there are no misclassifications. In Chapter III
 
the complete cost/benefit model for the inspection policies is developed.
 
This model describes all of the parameters used to define the violation
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frequences, the inspection frequencies, the resulting rate of detections,
 
and the total costs of violations plus inspection minus fines.
 
Estimates of violation frequences for the 1971-74 interval are not
 
sufficient because they depend upon the inspection rate; whereas the model
 
parameters for the occurence of violations are defined independently of
 
the inspection rate. To obtain these parameters, formulae which are de­
veloped in Chapter III were used. We first obtain the estimate of violation
 
frequences for the 1971-74 period and then solve the formulae of Chapter III
 
to estimate those model parameters which give the 1971-74 observed frequencies.
 
The optimal cost effective policy is determined in this report by
 
two methods:
 
* Mathematical formulae for the man-only inspection policy 
a Compurer simulation for the other three options.
 
The mathematical formulae given in Chapter III are necessary for deriving
 
estimates of the parameters for the computer simulation. They can be used
 
also to derive the optimal man inspection policy in terms of frequency of
 
inspection. This optimal policy is derived in Chapter V.
 
In Chapter VI we give the estimates of misclassification probabil­
ities resulting from the photointerpretation analysis done at the July, 1976
 
meeting in Madisonville, Kentucky. These estimates are used in the computer
 
simulation for the costs of satellite and air inspection policies.
 
In the following section, we summarize the conclusions of our study.
 
Conclusions about optimal inspection policies are covered more extensively
 
in Chapters V, VI, and VII.
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Overview of Conclusions
 
The first major finding with respect to satellite inspection policies
 
that significantly impacts the cost effectiveness of satellite or airplane
 
inspection policies is the estimated average durations, start frequencies,
 
and social costs of the four violation types. Estimates for the 1971-74
 
period are shown below.
 
Frequency and Costs of Violations During 1971-74
 
Number of Average Total Social
 
Starts Per Duration Costs Per
 
Permit Per in Weeks Permit Per
 
Violation Year Year
 
Grading 1.357 15.7 $ 525
 
Revegetation 0.338 20.2 164
 
Water Quality 0.055 1.0 2,785
 
Drainage Control 1.208 8.6 1,109
 
As can be seen from inspection of the above table, sixty-two percent
 
of the total social costs are due to water quality violations. A disappointing
 
result of the study is that, given the dimensions of the water areas on
 
surface mines and the image processing techniques employed by ERIM, water
 
quality violations were undetectable by satellite. A similar situation
 
exists for drainage control and grading violations. Only revegetation
 
violations could be detected with consistency - and, in terms of estimated
 
social costs, these are the least important of the violations.
 
The second consideration is the relative costs of satellite versus
 
air or man inspection. Our best estimate of the cost of satellite inspection
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of the western Kentucky active coal mining area is $2,000. The cost of
 
airplane inspection of 124 permitted areas is estimated to be $2,116 and
 
the cost of ground inspection of 124 permitted areas is estimated to be
 
$3,521.60. The cost estimate for airplane inspection is based on color IR
 
photography. Airplane inspection and satellite inspection are of comparable
 
cost for coverage of the known permit areas for surface mines in western
 
Kentucky.
 
Satellite photography is less expensive than airplane photography only
 
if the total required area coverage is increased. If the entire active coal
 
mining area in western Kentucky were covered by aerial photography, the
 
cost would be $6,110 not including photointerpretation. Such coverage might
 
be necessary for the detection of wildcat strip mining (mining without a
 
permit). However, if the airplane photographer were an inspector, photography
 
would be required only when mining was observed. The cost would remain at
 
$2,116. In any case, the question of whether a search for wildcat strip
 
mining in the future would be beneficial under any assumed inspection
 
costs is moot. (See Chapter VII.)
 
The future capabilities of satellite may include sharply reduced
 
misclassification probabilities and a short turn-around time for manned
 
inspections. -Because of the approximate equivalence of airplane and satellite
 
costs, airplane-man policies and satellite-man policies would be equivalent
 
given similar misclassification probabilities. Thus, the conclusions below
 
for airplane-man policies also apply to satellite policies. (Under no
 
misclassifications, obviously satellite-man is more effective than satellite­
air-man).
 
Airplane-man inspections are more cost effective than ground inspection
 
under the following conditions:
 
a There is no elapsed time between airplane and ground
 
inspection.
 
* 	 There are no violation misclassifications under aerial
 
inspection.
 
a Each ground inspection costs at least $30.89.
 
The computer simulation runs assumed that a ground inspection is made
 
after each airplane detection of a violation. In practice, inspection costs
 
could be decreased by having fewer ground inspections. Thus, a permit area
 
having only a revegetation violation would not need frequent ground inspection
 
during the off-seeding season. More than two ground inspections of grading
 
violations during a three-month period is unnecessary.
 
The optimal ground inspection rate is about once every ten days. The
 
optimal airplane-man inspection rate is about once per week per airplane
 
inspection, with follow-up man inspection within three days. If the only
 
benefits of detecting water quality violations are fines, and if these fines
 
can be made as a result of airplane inspection only, then the time between
 
airplane and man inspections can be decreased.
 
Because the optimal inspection rate is once per week, and because
 
satellite inspections can be made only about once every thirty days under
 
cloud-free conditions, airplane inspections are better. The high inspection
 
rate is only necessary to detect the short-lived water quality violations.
 
Stricter enforcement through stiffer penalties is another means of
 
reducing violations. Through higher fines it is possible that water quality
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violation frequences could be reduced to insignificance. In that case lower 
inspection rates would be optimal. Also, the elapsed time to a follow-up 
ground inspection would not be critical. Satellite policies would then be 
cost-effective.
 
There are additional benefits from using satellite or aerial inspections
 
which are not included in our cost/benefit analysis. Some of these benefits
 
are discussed in Chapter VII.
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II. 	 SURFACE MINING LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
 
IN WESTERN KENTUCKY
 
I. An Introduction to the Industry 
There are several distinct types of coal surface mining: open pit, 
area stripping, contour stripping, and auger mining. Each has a 
different effect on the land. Surface mining refers to those methods of 
mining in which overburden is removed in order to expose the coal 
deposit. Area strip mining, or simply strip mining, is surface mining-where 
the overburden is removed in narrow, consecutive strips, producing 
a surface of ridges called spoil piles. 
Area strip mining is used on gently rolling to relatively flat 
terrain where the coal bed is relatively flat. There are at least two tech­
niques for removing the overburden. The full cut technique removes 
the entire overburden with each pass of the equipment. The bench technique 
is used in areas of thick overburden. This technique uses two passes 
of equipment to remove the overburden. Under either technique, except 
for the first cut, the overburden of each succeeding cut is placed in 
the previous cut. Currently, few operations remove the overburden by 
strata or keep the topsoil for future rehabilitation use. 
In terms of tons of output, western Kentucky ranks approximately 
sixth in coal production in the nation. In 1974, 51. 8 million tons of 
coal were mined in the area: approximately nine percent of the U. S. total 
and 38 percent of the Kentucky total. Research at the University of 
Kentucky [1], shows that the coal production for both underground and 
surface mining has been growing over the past eight years. Total production 
has increased from 46.4 million tons in 1967 to 51.8 million tons in 1974. 
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Mining causes a disturbance of land and water in complex ways. Within
 
the base boundary, it affects the geology, topography, and physical and chem­
ican characteristics of the land. The cutting of impervious material has a
 
profound effect on the hydrologic characteristics of the land. Archeological,
 
historical, and cultural values of the land plus other special, unique
 
features are affected. But the major ecological effects of coal mining do
 
not stop at the base boundary. Acid water runoff, sedimentation, and the
 
alteration of natural drainage affect the water systems for miles around.
 
Plant and wildlife as well as aesthetic considerations must also be included
 
in the social costs of mining.
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has enacted legislation, Chapter 350 of
 
the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS 350) to control the extent of environmental
 
impacts caused by coal mining. Regulations derived from KRS 350 are published
 
under Title 402 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations. In the next
 
section we outline some of those regulations.
 
2. 	 Strip Mining Regulations
 
The following regulation 402 KRA 1:060 relates to KRS 350 is in
 
effect:
 
Sediment Control Planning
 
Section 1. (1) Prior to the issuance of a permit by the Division of
 
Reclamation for surface mining all the following conditions must be met:
 
(a) 	 A drainage, erosion, and sediment control plan for the
 
area to be permitted must be prepared by a registered
 
professional engineer or the local conservation district
 
and submitted to the division for approval.
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(b) 	Following approval by the division, the operator shall
 
construct water retarding structures, sediment dams, or
 
sediment ponds in those drainage areas to be immediately
 
affected by the operation.
 
(c) 	 Said construction must be certified by a registered
 
professional engineer or the local conservation district.
 
(2) Construction and certification shall be kept current after the issuance
 
of the surface mining permit until completion of the mining operation.
 
(3) No surface mine sediment dam shall exceed twenty (20) feet vertical
 
distance between the lowest point of the valley floor and the crest of the
 
emergency spillway.
 
(4) Following approval of the vegetative cover on the surface mining
 
operation, the division may require removal, backfilling and grading of water
 
retarding structures, sediment dams, and sediment ponds constructed by the
 
operator under this regulation. Removal shall consist of complete draining,
 
removal of collected silt and the constructed embankment, spreading the
 
material in a location away from streams and seeding the area involved.
 
(5) All areas disturbed in the construction of sediment dams, basins or
 
water retarding structures shall be revegetated.
 
(6) The director may, with approval of the secretary of the department,
 
after written request by the operator and justification therefore, provide
 
for exceptions to this regulation consistent with the requirements of KRS
 
Chapter 350.
 
The following regulation 402 KAR 1:055 relates to RRS 350 is in effect.
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Water Quality Criteria
 
Section 2. In order to establish and maintain an effective program for
 
assuring high quality water in the Commonwealth, operators shall comply
 
with the following requirements:
 
(1) Treatment facilities of sufficient size and number consisting of,
 
but not limited to, collection basins, water reLarding structures and silt
 
dams shall be constructed prior to the stripping operation for maintaining
 
a quality of water to specifications in subsection (3) of this section.
 
The location of all sediment control facilities shall be indicated on the
 
permit map(s) prior to issuance of the permit.
 
(2) All treatment facilities shall be kept in proper working order to
 
maintain those specification in subsection (3) of this section, until the
 
operator can demonstrate that these specifications can be met without such
 
treatment facilities. Records of treatment shall be maintained by the
 
operator on forms furnished by the division.
 
(3) The operator shall prevent discharge of drainage into the waters of
 
the Commonwealth from the area of land affected, the pH of which is less
 
than 6.0 or greater than 9.0 or which contains a concentration of iron in
 
excess of seven (7) milligrams per liter (mg/i). The total alkalinity of
 
the discharge must exceed the total acidity. The discharge shall contain
 
no settleable matter, nor shall it contain suspended matter in excess of
 
150 Jackson Turbidity units, except during a precipitation event, which the
 
operator must show to have occurred, in which case 1,000 Jackson Turbidity
 
units may not be exceeded. Suspended matter in parts per million (ppm)
 
may not exceed the Jackson Turbidity units multiplied by 2.20. Sampling
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and analyses are to be defined and performed to "Standard Methods for the
 
Examination of Water and Wastewater", Thirteenth Edition, unless otherwise
 
specified in writing by the division.
 
Under a study sponsored by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency,
 
Rittman Associates, Inc. (2) has conducted an in-field evaluation of the
 
effectiveness of silt structures in reducing the suspended solids in the
 
runoff from surface mining activities.
 
Field sampling programs were conducted by Hittman Associates at six
 
sedimentation ponds. The average suspende4 particle solids (mg/l) were
 
measured at inflow and outflow points under baseline and rainfall conditions.
 
The removal efficiency was made by comparing effluent with influent. The
 
results varied from a low efficiency of 36.4% to a high efficiency of 92.8%.
 
Rittman Associates were able to show that in casks of low efficiency, the
 
sedimentation ponds were poorly constructed or maintained. Causes of poor
 
water quality were unvegetated steep banks leading to the pond, insufficient
 
width, length, or depth, and poor inflow drainage systems. They conclude
 
that silt structures are adequate if proper construction and maintenance
 
procedures are followed.
 
Water Quality - Chemical
 
Low pH water is produced by coal mining in areas containing acid
 
producing overburden. At low pH levels, heavy metals such as iron, manganese,
 
copper and zinc are more soluble and further pollute the water. Water of
 
this type supports only limited water flora, such as acid-tolerant molds
 
and algae. The water will not support fish life, destroys and corrodes
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metal.piers, culverts, barges, etc., increases the cost of water treatment
 
for power plants and municipal water supplies, and leaves the water un­
acceptable for recreational use.
 
Control of acid mine drainage is done by using diversion ditches and
 
by sealing, impoundment or chemical treatment to neutralize acidity. When
 
water is to be drained from a pit or a pond it should be chemically treated.
 
The following regulations apply to acid mine drainage.
 
Acid Mine Drainage (Grading)
 
Section 4. When an-abandoned underground mine or acid mine drainage is
 
encountered in the operation, it shall be reported to the Division and
 
handled in accordance with 402 KAR 1:055.
 
Acid Materials (Grading)
 
Section 5. All acid-producing or toxic materials (including by way of
 
illustration, but not limited to, rider, rooster, blossom, honey, culm or
 
other'sulphur-bearing or aluminum-bearing substances) disturbed shall be
 
buried under at least four (4) feet of clean overburden.
 
Intermittent Streams
 
Intermittent streams in the area, of land affected shall be kept free
 
of spoil material for a minimum distance of fifty (50) feet on each side
 
of the channel. The division may grant permission to operate within these
 
limits provided all excavated materials are hauled beyond the fifty (50)
 
foot limit and proper sized cross drains are placed in the stream for
 
crossing purposes.
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Drainage
 
No drainage shall be discharged into underground mine workings. When
 
an underground mine or mine drainage is encountered, the operator shall report
 
this occurrence to the division and bring any discharge into compliance with
 
subsection (3) of this section immediately. Plans must be submitted within
 
five (5) days for permanent control. Upon approval by the division, the
 
operator shall comply to the plans within thirty (30) days.
 
Sudden release of large volumes of water onto outer slopes of spoil
 
banks is prohibited.
 
All drainage originating on the area of land affected must meet
 
the specifications in subsection (3) of this section or exit through treat­
ment facilities in accordance with subsection (1) of this section.
 
The following regulation 402 KAR 1:030 relates to KRS Chapter 350
 
is in effect.
 
Backfilling and Grading
 
Reclamation should follow closely behind the mining operation. The
 
bare spoil and pit should be reclaimed as fast as possible because the
 
freshly moved material is easier to grade, handle and plant than older
 
compact material. Bare spoils and pits are more susceptible to acid forma­
tion and erosion. Backfilling and grading should be kept current with the
 
strip mining operation. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has regulations which
 
require current grading. These are listed below.
 
Current Grading
 
Section 6. In order to be considered current, grading and backfilling
 
shall meet the following requirements:
 
17
 
(1) 	On lands where the method of operation does not produce a
 
bench (area strip mining), the grading and backfilling shall
 
not be more than two spoil ridges behind the pit being worked,
 
the spoil from this pit being considered the first ridge. All
 
backfilling and grading shall be completed within ninety (90)
 
days after the completion or suspension of an-operation.
 
Modifications to these requirements may be made by the Division
 
in connection with the backfilling of the final pit.
 
(2) 	 On lands where the method of operation produces a bench (contour
 
strip mining, auger mining and highwall mining), all coal must
 
be picked up within thirty (30) days following removal of the
 
overburden and the following requirements must be met:
 
(a) If the operation includes only stripping (no augering or
 
highwall mining), the grading and backfilling shall follow
 
the coal removal by not more than fifteen (15) days, but
 
in no instance shall an area be left ungraded more than
 
1,000 feet behind the removal of the coal.
 
(b) 	If the operation includes stripping and angering, the auger­
ing shall follow the stripping by not more than thirty (30) 
days and the grading and backfilling shall follow the 
augering by not more than fifteen (15) days, but in no 
instance shall an area be left ungraded more than 1,000 
feet 	behind the augering.
 
(c) 	If the operation includes stripping and highwall mining,
 
the highwall mining shall follow the stripping within
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sixty (60) days, and the grading and backfilling shall
 
follow the highwall mining by not more than fifteen (15)
 
days, but in no instance shall an area be left ungraded
 
more 	than 1,000 feet behind the highwall mining.
 
(d) 	If the operation includes only augering or highwall mining,
 
the grading and backfilling shall follow-the augering or
 
highwall mining by not more than fifteen (15) days, but in
 
no instance shall an area be left ungraded more than 1,000
 
feet behind the augering and highwall mining.
 
(e) Modifications to these requirements may be made by the
 
Division.
 
(3) 	If heavy rains or wet conditions make grading impracticable,
 
the period of time required to be current shall equal the number
 
of production days lost due to these heavy rains and wed con­
ditions.
 
Backfilling and Grading
 
Section 2. Backfilling-and grading as required by KRS 350.093 shall be
 
performed as follows:
 
(1) 	On lands where the method of operation does not produce a
 
bench (area strip mining):
 
(a) 	Complete backfilling shall be required,beginning at or
 
beyond the top of the highwall and sloped to the toe
 
of the spoil bank at a maximum angle not to exceed the
 
approximate original contour of the land with no de­
pressions to accumulate water, and all highwalls and
 
spoil peaks shall be eliminated.
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(b) Water diversion ditches or terraces shall be constructed
 
in the final grading to control water runoff and erosion
 
on long uninterrupted slopes and to remove surface water
 
runoff to a safe outlet. For the purpose of this regula­
tion, a diversion ditch shall be a channel constructed on
 
a continuous grade of one to two percent-(l%-2%) across
 
the slope with a supporting ridge on the lower side and
 
the entire ditch seeded to an adaptable grass or grass­
legume mixture. The depth and width of the diversion
 
ditch may vary depending on the length and degree of slope.
 
(c) Lands shall be deemed to have been completely backfilled
 
and graded to their approximate original contour when:
 
1. 	The contour of the land conforms approximately to
 
the contour of the original ground, but the final
 
surface of the restored area need not necessarily
 
have the exact elevations of the original ground
 
surface' However, where a flat surface or a surface
 
with less-slope than the original ground surface is
 
desired, such surface shall be deemed to comply with
 
backfilling and grading to the approximate original
 
contour.
 
2. 	Spoil abutting onto unstripped land has been graded
 
so as to blend into the adjoining unstripped lands.
 
In order to prevent excessive disturbance of the
 
adjoining unstripped lands through the placing of
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spoil onto already vegetated areas, spoil will be
 
considered as blending into the unstripped lands if
 
the angle between the spoil and the unstripped land
 
is twelve degrees (120) or less.
 
Section 3. (1) Where a water impoundment is desired under the provisions
 
of KRS 350.093(3), such impoundment shall be submitted for approval to the
 
Division of Reclamation and provide the following minimum standards:
 
(a) 	No leakage into and/or from old underground works.
 
(b) The surface area when filled shall not be smaller than
 
one-half acre.
 
(c) Seventy-five percent (75%) of the proposed impoundment
 
shall be at least six (6) feet deep.
 
(d) 	The ratio of the proposed impoundment surface area to
 
the watershed drainage area shall not be less than 1:5.
 
(e) If the watershed drainage area supplying the proposed
 
impoundment is composed of 50% spoil area, then the
 
impoundment surface area-ratio to the watershed drainage
 
shall increase from 1:5 to 1:10.
 
(f) No highwall shall exceed twenty-five (25) feet measured
 
from the permanent pool elevation. All shale and/or earth
 
above the solid rock line shall be reduced to a slope not
 
to exceed twenty-five degrees (250).
 
(g) Pool widths at normal pool elevation when measured at ninety
 
degrees (900) to the highwall face shall in all cases be
 
equal to and/or greater than two (2) times the combined
 
heights of the highwalls at that given point.
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(h) All grading done on highwalls above the twenty-five (25)
 
feet maximum height set out in Section 6 of this regulation
 
shall result in no slopes greater than twenty-five degrees
 
(250).
 
(i) 	The grading of spoil areas surrounding the proposed impound­
ment, shall be to a maximum slope of twelve degrees (120).
 
This slope shall continue into the proposed impoundment
 
area to a point where the slope blends into the bottom of
 
the pit, and/or the depth of the water becomes six feet (6')
 
whichever comes first.
 
(j) 	In areas where the approved highwall is closer than two
 
hundred (200) feet to a property line, shops, rental pro­
perties, public roads, or any other areas where the public
 
might be endangered, then a suitable fence shall be con­
structed along the top of the highwall.
 
(k) 	When the natural relief system has been obstructed by an
 
artificial embankment in order to aid in the creation of
 
an impoundment, the embankment section shall be approved
 
by the Division of Water Resources and a conservation permit
 
issued (in accordance with KRS 151.250) before Reclamation
 
approval will be considered.
 
(1) 	In areas where highwalls are reduced and the act of re­
duction causes a separation in the excavated pit resulting
 
in more than one impoundment, then these reduced highwalls
 
and their resulting outslopes may be reduced to a maximum
 
twenty degrees (200).
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(m) Requests for all proposedimpoundments shall be presented
 
in writing to the Division of Reclamation prior to the
 
beginning of the last cut.
 
(n) The written request shall be accompanied by maps compiled
 
by company engineers showing drainage area in acres,
 
percentage of the drainage area classified as reclaimed
 
spoil, points of minimum andmaximum width, surface area
 
of proposed impoundment, acre feet storage, and arguments
 
for the feasibility of requested impoundment.
 
(o) All impoundments (if approved) shall be on a tentative
 
basis of not less than one year nor more than two years.
 
If at the end of the tentative approval period the impound­
ment should fail to measure up to the laws, rules, and
 
regulations of the Division of Reclamation, then the
 
entire area involved shall be totally completely graded
 
in accordance withthe laws, rules and regulations of the
 
Division of Reclamation. The operator shall have 45 days
 
to submit a complete, detailed plan, indicating a comple­
tion date for all grading of the entire area.
 
(2) All spoil piles adjoining access roads to water impoundment shall
 
be reduced to the approximate original contour of the surrounding
 
area. Adequate drainage shall be provided and measures taken to
 
prevent erosion of the slope, including but not limited to,
 
terracing, vegetation, etc. The road bed must be adequately
 
drained and culverts provided so as to prevent it from being
 
eroded.
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(3) 	 The area above the highwall on any water impoundment shall be
 
planted with trees in order to provide a protective barrier
 
and screen. The trees to be planted are as follows:
 
(a) 	Three (3) rows of Locusts - 4' x 4' spacing, adjacent 
to the highwall. 
(b) 	Three (3) rows of Conifers - 4' x 4' spacing, in front 
of the Locusts. 
(c) 	The above trees are to be planted in such a way that they
 
will not be carried over the highwall by erosion but not
 
so far back that theywillnot provide a protective
 
barrier and screen for the top of the highwall. All such
 
planting will be subject to the approval of the area
 
supervisor.
 
The following regulation 402 KAR 1:040 relates to KRS Chapter 350
 
is in effect.
 
Revegetation requirements
 
Section 1. The operator shall submit with the application for a permit a
 
proposed revegetation plan compatible with these regulations. A chemical
 
analysis to determine potential acidity of the potential overburdens may be
 
required if deemed necessary by the Division of Reclamation. No portion of
 
the bond shall be released until the requirements of subsections (1) to (8) of
 
this section have been met and a detailed planting report submitted to the
 
division.
 
(1) 	 Revegetation shall include seeding and establishment of
 
permanent grasses and legumes as approved by the Division of
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Reclamation and at seeding rates as recommended by the division.
 
Temporary or quick cover species may be required in combination
 
with 	the permanent species on some areas to control erosion.
 
The seeding rates of these temporary species should not exceed
 
the rates approved by the division.
 
In the Western Kentucky coal field seeding shall be done
 
on all spoil or other disturbed areas, including access
 
roads within (45) days after grading is finished. This
 
requirement is suspended for the period from October 15th
 
through February 15th and from May 15th through August 1st.
 
Some method of erosion control may be required when an area
 
is ready to seed between seeding periods. Warm season
 
grasses may be seeded from April 15th to June 15th.
 
(2) 	A chemical analysis of the spoil material shall be made to deter­
mine the lime and fertilizer requirements. A chemical analysis 
of a minimum of one (1) composite spoil sample per ten (10) acres 
of disturbed surface shall be required. A composite sample shall 
consist of at least (10) thoroughly mixed sub-samples from the 
area. More samples may be required depending on the variability 
of the spoil and the size of the permit. The operator will be 
held responsible for meeting the above requirements. The chemical 
analysis must be done by laboratories operated under the super­
vision of the Kentucky Agriculture Experiment Station or other 
laboratories approved by the Division of Reclamation. Sufficient 
agricultural limestone or an approved substitute shall be applied 
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and incorporated into spoil to raise the water pH to a.minimum 
of 5.5 or 6.4 on those areas approved for grasses and legumes 
only. All limestone used shall be purchased from agricultural 
limestone dealers-licensed by the State Department of Agriculture. 
The SMP buffer p- method shall beused to determine the lime re­
quirement if the water pH is below 6.0. The potential acidity
 
tests or total sulfur analysis shall be required on areas where
 
acid problems are suspected to more accurately determine the lime
 
requirement. Where lime is required, it shall be incorporated
 
into the spoil to a depth of six (6) inches. No portion of the
 
bond 	shall be released until a stable water pH of at least
 
5.5 or 6.0 for grasses and legumes has been attained on at least
 
eighty (80) percent of the area.
 
(3) 	 Minimum fertilizer requirements for revegetation shall be 100 
pounds of available P205 per acre and sixty (60) pounds of 
available nitrogen per acre. The nitrogen application may be 
split, with one-half (1/2) put on at time of seeding and one-half 
(1/2) during first part of the next growing season. In those 
areas 	where grasses and legumes are approved, the operator shall
 
apply 	a minimum of 150 pounds of P205 per acre and a minimum of
 
sixty 	(60) pounds of 120 per acre in addition to the sixty (60)
 
pounds of nitrogen. The division may approve lesser amounts of
 
fertilizer if approved spoil test indicate lesser amounts are
 
needed for satisfactory revegetation.
 
(4) 	 Mulch shall be required on all disturbed areas where the slope
 
exceeds fifteen (15) degrees, on disturbed areas with a buffer
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pH below 5.0 prior to liming, on all areas where seedbed prepa­
ration is impossible and on all areas that are seeded to pre­
dominantly cool season species from June 1st to August 1st.
 
Mulch may be required by the Division of Reclamation on other
 
problem areas. A material to hold the mulch in place may be
 
required. The acceptable muching materials and minimum rates
 
are listed below:
 
Material 	 Rate/Acre
 
Straw 	or hay 1 1/2 tons
 
-Wood Bark 45 cubic yards
 
Wood Fiber 1,500 pounds
 
Other 	mulching materials may be approved if shown to be satis­
factory.
 
(5) 	 Trees shall be planted at no less than 800 seedlings per acre
 
on all disturbed areas except benches formed by contour mining,
 
level 	areas created by mountaintop removal, and areas in Western
 
Kentucky that are approved for grasses and legumes only. The
 
landowner must indicate his preference for grasses and legumes
 
before an area will be considered for approval without the es­
tablishment of trees. Kentucky grown nursery tree seedlings are
 
&ncouraged but seedlings acclimatized to Kentucky conditions may
 
be used. Direct seeding of Black Locust trees at the rate of
 
two (2) pounds per acre may be a satisfactory method of estab­
lishing trees, (See Section 5.)
 
(6) 	 Shrubs for wildlife may be planted in lieu of tree seedlings and
 
may be planted on any part of the mined area and may include border
 
,plantings, clump plantings, and intervening strips.
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(7) 	All legume seed, except Black Locust, shall be innoculated with
 
the proper strain of bacteria immediately prior to seeding.
 
The innoculation rate shall be increased four (4) times if a
 
hydroseeder is used.
 
(8) 	A seedbed shall be prepared by scarifying the spoil immediately
 
prior to seeding except where the seeding is done on freshly
 
graded material or on spoil loosened by frost action.
 
Section 2. At least twenty-four (24) hours prior to commencing any re­
vegetation activity, the operator may be required to notify the area supervisor
 
for the division and have invoices available for inspection as proof of purchase
 
for seed, seedlings, lime, fertilizer, mulch and spoil test report(s).
 
Section 3. Roads shall be seeded to legumes and permanent grasses. This
 
may be modified if, in the opinion of the division, the roadway will not
 
contribute off-site damage to the public or adjacent property owners.
 
Section 4. When seeding or planting is completed, the operator shall file
 
a detailed planting report with the exact amounts of lime, fertilizer, seed
 
and mulch'within two (2) weeks with the Division of Reclamation on a form
 
furnished by the division.
 
Section 5. Standards for permanent vegetation. Prior to complete bond 
release there shall be established at least a seventy (70) percent ground cover 
per acre of permanent vegetation on all surface mined areas and at least 
eighty (80) percent ground cover per acre of permanent vegetation on those 
surface mined areas which were approved for grasses and legumes only. The 
permanent vegetation shall consist of both permanent grasses and legumes which 
are recommended by the Division of Reclamation. 
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(1) Standards for Woody Plants: Prior to complete bond release
 
there shall be 600 or more living woody plants per acre, in­
cluding volunteers, with distribution of stems fairly uniform
 
on all areas except those mentioned in Section 1 (5) of this
 
regulation.
 
(2) 	 Inspection will be made by the division at the end of the first
 
and second growing season for purposes of determining vegetation
 
bond release. If the revegetation effort is unsatisfactory, a
 
new plan shall be required to include rates of mulch, seed,
 
fertilizer and lime based on new spoil tests. This revegetation
 
plan shall be submitted to and carried out with the direction
 
of the division. In order for vegetation to be considered
 
current, it shall be satisfactory for bond release by the end of
 
the second growing season. If vegetation is not current, the
 
permitted area shall be subject to bond forfeiture and additional
 
permits shall be denied the operator responsible for such areas
 
until the operator has complied with the remedial measures set
 
forth by the division.
 
Section 6. The Director of the Division of Reclamation may, with approval
 
of the secretary of the department, after written request and justification
 
therefor by the operator, provide for exceptions to this regulation consistent
 
with the requirements of KRS Chapter 350.
 
Method of Operation (Wildcatting)
 
Each mining operator is required to submit plans for the method of
 
operation. If this plan is approved and he posts an appropriate bond, he is
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granted an annual permit for the number of acres which he plans to mine during
 
the year within the area covered by the approved plan.
 
A method of operation violation is all encompassing since it includes
 
any violation of the regulations as well as any method of mining operation
 
which is not according to the approved plan. Most of these violations fall'
 
under a specific heading such as revegetation, grading, silt structure, access
 
road, etc. A unique category distinct from the other categories is mining
 
without a permit. A mine operator may be doing a satisfactory job in terms
 
of environmental considerations and still be in violation if he is mining
 
either outside of his permit or without a permit. These violations occur in
 
one of the three following ways:
 
* 	 mining method - of the miner augers into the highwall
 
when his plan calls for strip mining he is in violation
 
e 	 mining off the permit area - a miner may have a permit for 
one area but mine in an area for which he has no permit 
o mining with not permit - this is known as "wildcatting". 
The-following regulation 402 KAR 1:045 relates to KRS Chapter 350 
is in effect. 
Advance Planning of Contiguous 
Surface Mining Operations 
Section 1. 'An operator may submit plans for the method of operation plans
 
for grading and backfilling (including water impoundments) and reclamation
 
plans covering contiguous mining areas which may contain more acres than
 
will be mined within one (1) year. The requirements for such pre-planning
 
(herein called "area plans") shall be the same as those for plans for annual
 
permits.
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Section 2. If the Division of Reclamation approves an area plan and the
 
approved plan remains consistent with therequirements and purposes of
 
KRS Chapter 350 and regulations adopted pursuant thereto, the operator shall,
 
without submitting additional plans for the method of operation, backfilling
 
and grading, and reclamation, be granted an annual permit for the number of
 
acres which he plans to mine during the year within tliarea covered by said
 
area plan.
 
Section 3. If the Division of Reclamation approves an area plan, the op­
erator shall be obligated to conduct its method of operation, grading and
 
backfilling, and reclamation in accordance with said area plan which may be
 
modified providing the modified plan is consistent with the requirements and
 
purposes of KRS Chapter 350 and regulations relating thereto, with the approval
 
of the division.
 
The following regulation 402 KAR l:035 related to KURS Chapter 350
 
is in effect.
 
Permit and Reclamation Plan
 
Section i. Permits shall be issued pursuant to KRS 350.060 only on the 
condition that the reclamation plan approved pursuant to KRS 350.090 can be 
carried out. When conditions develop in the operation which show that an 
approved reclamation plan cannot be carried out as originally proposed or 
that additional measures must be taken to eliminate damage to the public 
and adjacent property owners from soil erosion, water pollution and hazards 
dangerous to life and property, the Division of Reclamation shall order, in 
writing, such action or inaction as will cause the operation to be in com­
pliance with the requirements of KRS Chapter 350 and the regulations of the 
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department. The order shall set forth the reasons for which the original
 
plan cannot be carried out and shall be served on the operator by registered
 
mail.
 
Section 2. If the operator does not agree to the division's order he may,
 
by filing written notice within twenty (20) days after the date of the order
 
of the division, request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of KRS
 
350.090 and 224.083. The hearing shall be held within twenty (20) days after
 
the request in Frankfort or at such other place as the Division orders, upon
 
reasonable written notice to the operator. The final order of the division
 
shall be issued within twenty (20) days subsequent to the hearing.
 
Section 3. The hearing provided for in Section 2 of the regulation shall
 
not suspend the order of the division under Section 1 unless so ordered by
 
the Division.
 
The following regulation 402 KAR 1:025 relates to KRS Chapter 350
 
is in effect.
 
Access Road
 
Coal haul and mine access roads can be a major source of sediment and
 
poor drainage. Upon completion, haul roads are usually abandoned. Area
 
mining, which is practiced in relatively flat terrain, presents fewer haul
 
road related environmental problems than other types of mining. These roads
 
must be well engineered because of the heavy equipment using them.
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky requires bonds on coal haul roads which
 
are not released until either the road is turned over to another party,
 
with adequate drainage, or the road is abandoned, with adequate drainage and
 
vegetative cover.
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Blasting
 
In many cases, houses and other buildings are located on properties
 
next to mining operations. Blasting causes air vibrations and pressures
 
which at the least create intolerably noisy, if not, unsafe conditions.
 
Structures are weakened by repeated vibrations from nearby quarry blasting.
 
Blasting may cuase serious atmospheric pollution when temperature inversions
 
exist.
 
33
 
III. COST/BENEFIT MODEL
 
1. 	 Introduction 
In this chapter we develop a violation-inspection-enforcement model. 
This model is an extended and modified version of a preliminary model 
given in Appendix A. The principal modification we make in the model 
is the inclusion of a time factor for the violation and inspection process. 
From the final model, the optimal frequency of inspections at a mine can 
be determined as a function of parameters defining the frequency of violations 
under the inspection process. There are several measures of the frequency 
of a violation: 
* 	 average fraction NI/N of mines which have a violation 
at any time 
* 	 average number of times that a violation begins at 
a mine during a year 
0 average duration of a violation once it has begun 
,0 	 average duration of a violation after it has been
 
detected.
 
Ifa violation had a duration of one unit of time, and if there were no 
time lag between a satellite pass and any follow-up air or ground inspection, 
the model given in the appendix could be used. However, time is an 
important element in the model for reasons such as the following: 
a. Lapse between satellite pass and detection 
By the time a man has inspected a mine, the violations first "seen" 
by a satellite inspection may have changed. This results in a decrease in 
fines. Also, between a satellite pass and photointerpretation, a ground 
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inspection may have been made as a result of a previous pass, thus 
voiding the need for a new inspection. 
b. Social costs 
We have defined social costs to be the costs per week per violation. 
Thus, the longer the period of time between detection and correction, the 
more the social costs. 
c. Frequency of violations 
The frequency of a violation type at a mine is the average number 
of mines for which the violation exists. If this is f, then the expected 
number of mines having this violation on a given day is: 
N fN 
Since a good inspection policy curtails the average length of violation, 
f is a function of the inspection policy. Thus, N i itself is a function of 
the inspection policy and cannot be assumed to be fixed when comparing 
various strategies.
 
d. Multiple inspections 
Although misclassifications occur, a violation massed during one 
satellite pass may be detected at a later pass. This assumes that 
detection probabilities of violations increase the longer they persist. This 
assumption is reasonable since the persistent violations tend to grow in 
size (revegetation and grading). 
e. Multiple violations 
When ground inspections are made, all violations are assumed to be 
detected at that time. This is not the case for satellite and air inspection. 
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Violations such as grading and revegetation are misclassified less frequently 
than other violations. This selectivity changes the characteristics of 
detected and nondetected violations. For this reason, violations cannot be 
simply pooled into one single category - the category of "at least one 
violation" has different characteristics depending on whether it is "detected" 
or "undetected. 11 
The two costs of a violation which persist during a period of time are 
the social costs while the violation exists and the terminal costs of 
rehabilitation or fines. Under the present Commonwealth of Kentucky 
regulations and enforcement, the social costs are the most important factor 
(for those mines which have a permit; wildcat mining will be discussed 
later). Permits are renewed, or bonds are released, on an annual basis. 
Decisions for permit renewals and bond releases are not made unless the 
mined area conforms to the statutes of rehabilitation plus other unique 
requirements specified in the approved method of operation plan. Thus, 
within an approximate time of one year, all violations within the mining 
areas are corrected by the mine operators - or bonds are forfeited. This 
method of control over mine operators assures that the Commonwealth has 
to pay at most a minimal amount for uncorrected violations. 
The positive benefits - or negative cost - entering into the total 
costs, is the amount of fines collected from detections. During the past few 
years, this benefit has been neglible relative to the social costs. We do, 
however, include fines in our cost/benefit model. 
Thus, the most significant factor in measuring the effectiveness of 
an inspection process is not the number of times a violation is detected, 
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but the 	amount which the average duration of a violation is reduced by the 
process.
 
Every model necessarily is lirnted in the accuracy with which it 
portrays real world conditions. Some characteristics which exist but are 
ignored due to complexity are: 
* 	 We assume a single detection of a violation has the 
same effect on the length of a violation as two or more 
detections. In practice, multiple detections lead to stiffer 
enforcement - ultimately leading to fines for non-compliance 
and/or court-ordered suspension of mining. We do, 
however, accumulate average fines with each detection. 
14 	 The frequency with which violations begin, and the 
average length of violations, may be voliintarily decreased 
by a mining operator if he has knowledge that the 
inspection process has improved and the penalties of 
detection are sufficiently severe. We have not included 
this possibility in the model. 
o 	 Obviously, the values of parameters in the model are not 
exact. Nor are assumptions such as independence of ­
detections on different days correct. A violation missed 
on a clear day has an increased probability of being missed 
again if it does not grow in magnitude. 
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Two methods of analysis are used in this report. First, for the 
ground inspection only policy, exact mathematical formulae are 
developed using the well-known theory of Markov chains. These formulae 
are necessary for developing estimates of the average length and 
frequency of each of the violation types. These formulae also can be used 
to derive total cost estimates under varying ground inspection rates. 
From these costs, optional ground inspection rates can be determined. 
Items (a) through (e) indicate the complexity of the model which 
defines a combination of satellite, air, and man inspection policies. 
Because of lag times between initial inspection and follow-up inspection, 
an "event" at time t defining the state of violations and detections at a 
permit area, depends in a complicated manner on all of the events which 
have occurred during a lag time. For example, a manned inspection 
may have already been made which voids the need for an additional one. 
Cloud-cover on the previous satellite pass may require an inspection at 
the next pass. A violation may end during a lag time. While exact 
formulae for violation costs, inspection costs, and fines are mathematically 
intractable, a computer algorithm for defining a simulation of these 
combined inspection policies is not difficult to develop. Thus, our second 
method of analysis is computer simulation. Simulations are conducted 
over a sufficiently long period of time to give accurate cost estimates for 
each policy. 
The events in the computer simulations are defined by a random 
number subroutine. The computer program was developed in such a 
manner that the same identical violations were generated with each 
simulation. (Thus, they are random only during the first simulation.) 
By this method, each simulated inspection policy is matched against the 
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same violations. This offers an accurate cost/effectiveness comparison 
of policies. 
All of the combinations s-a-m, s-m, a-m, and m are simulated 
by the 	same computer program. The parameters for the inspection policy 
are defined by 
s = elapsed time between satellite inspections 
or s = 0 if no satellite inspection 
a = elapsed time between satellite detections and 
airplane inspection 
or a = elapsed time between airplane inspections (s=O) 
or a = 0 if no airplane inspection 
and m = elapsed time from either satellite to man or 
airplane to man 
or in = elapsed time between manned inspections(a=O, s=0). 
Technically, when s=Q and a=O, the resulting manned only inspection 
costs should be equal to those defined by the mathematical formulae. 
This is indeed the case when simulations are made at daily units of times. 
To economize, computer simulations were made on weekly and 3. 5-day 
units of time. As explained in more detail in Chapter VII, this longer unit 
of time results in different fine rates, social costs, and detections of 
the short-lived water quality violations. Comparisons of the satellite and 
airplane policies are therefore made only with computer simulated ground 
inspection policies. 
The computer simulation program performs the following in order: 
a 	 For each week of the simulation, violations 
vi (i = 1, Z,..., n) begin with probability pi or, if 
already begun, end with probability 1 - rli. 
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* Every s days the weather is checked. If s > 0 and 
the weather is clear, a determination is made about 
whether or not a satellite detects a violation at the mine. 
* 	 If s = 0, or if a satellite detection has been made, after 
a lag of d days a determination is made if an airplane 
detects the violation. 
* 	 After a lag of m days, a man inspection is made if 
called for by a satellite or air detection. 
o 	 A second set of "true" violations is generated. The true 
violations Vi equal the original violations V1 iwith the 
exception that a man detection implies the violation v. 
ends with probability 1 - r.*1 The true violations 
always begin at the same time as the original violations. 
* 	 Social costs, fines, and inspection costs are accumulated 
and printed out. 
As can be seen, the above simulation accounts for each of the points made
 
earlier abbut time lags and violation duration curtailments. Details of the
 
simulation program and flowcharts are given in Section 3. Theoretical formulae
 
must be derived for estimating the violation probabilities in a meaningful way
 
from historical inspection data. These derivation are given in Section 2.
 
2. Violation Model
 
a. Mathematical formulae
 
In this section we develop mathematical formulae to define the frequencies
 
which which violation occur under different inspection frequencies and strat­
egies. Let Vl, V2 , .. Vn represent the n possible violation types which may
 
40
 
exist at a mine. To denote presence or absence of violations at any time, 
we use indicator variables vl, v 2 , ... , v n defined by 
1 l if Vi is present under the inspection process 
v0 [o- if Vi is absent under the inspection process. 
The length of a run of v. = 1 is the length of time that a particular 
violation incident, Vi lasts. The number of runs of vi = 1 is the fre­
quency with which a violation Vi begins. For example, the string of
 
values 0111110110 during a period of ten weeks gives two runs,whose
 
average duration is 3.5 weeks. At a randomly selected time, the prob­
ability the violation exists is 0.7. If a detection is made, the initial
 
string may be modified to 0111000110. In this case, the average duration
 
is decreased to 2.5 weeks, the frequency of occurrence is decreased to
 
0.5, but the number of runs is not changed.
 
Because a string of runs is dependent on the inspection system, we use
 
a second indicator function vi to denote violations when no inspection is made.
 
'Under manned inspection, the average duration of a violation can be
 
expressed as a function of the frequency with which inspections are made.
 
However, when multiple violations are assumed under a more complex system of
 
satellite-airplane-man inspection, the formulae for the average durations are
 
excessively complicated. We will, however, derive formulae for manned in­
spection in this section. We will use these formulae to derive estimates
 
of the violation frequencies and lengths of runs from an analysis of inspec­
tion data for 1971 - 1974.
 
Define the following:
 
P1 i = probability of an occurrence of vi at time t given 
no occurrence of v. at time t - i. 
1 
41 
rli = probability of an occurrence of at time tvi 
given an occurrence of v. at time t - 11 
fi = probability of an occurrence of at time tv i 

s i = probability a run of v begins at time t
1 1
 
L average length of a run of vi .
 
When ground inspections are made at a mine, all of the variables 
except si are changed. Denote the new variables by pi, ri, fi, si, and 
Li.
 
Also, define the following: 
PD = probability a mine is inspected during any given'week 
r 2 i = probability of an occurrence of vI at time t given 
IIan occurrence of v. at time t - 1 and a detection 
1 
of v. during this run. 
The following relations hold: 
L l= (I -r li ) (1 + 2 • r li + 3 rrl + . .)( ) 
1 
- 1 - r 
and 
L2 i = 1 (2) 
where L is the average duration of a violation after a detection is 
made. Thus, r li and r21 are known when these average durations are 
known. 
The average duration of a violation under an inspection process is
 
an average of the durations of undetected and detected violations. This can
 
be derived from a recurrence forumla,
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L +-.ri(-P) ((1-PrD) + (LI +1) r u ) 
1 -'rzi + rZiPD 
or ii + riPD ) (I - r2 i) (3) 
Thus, can be estimated from Ll, Lat, and PD. An estimation-Li 
of the frequency of occurrences of violations -vi under ground inspections, 
f is simply the ratio of detections of vi to the number of inspections.
 
This estimate assumes that the selection of mines to be inspected is 
*equivalent to random sampling. The value of r.1 is estimated from Li by 
i."()1i 1 -r. r.a = 1 L (4)L. or 
1 1 
Now, f£1 and r.1 are related to _pi by the equation 
f. r. + (1 - fi)pi = f 
Thus, p, is estimated by 
f. (1- ri) 
Pi = 1- fi 
The start frequency s.1 is given by 
s i = (1 - f) pi 
Since s.1 
given by 
is assumed to be independent of the detection system, s.1 is also 
( fli)P 
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(6) 
It can be shown that the above equations also give 
f = Li s. (7) 
and 
f li = Lli Si "(8) 
Equation (7) can be used to obtain s..1 Equation (8) can be used to 
obtain fli" Equation (6) can be used to obtain pli. 
The above formulae are used to estimate the transition probabilities 
pli rli, and rzi' 
b. Computer simulation 
Violations vi are generated during each week of the simulation 
according to the transition probabilities pli and r,,. An indicator 
variable is used to indicate if the violation is detected at time t - 1. Prior to 
detection, the true violations -vi are equal to the vli. After detection, a 
v i is set equal to zero if vli equals zero. If vli is not equal to zero, vi 
is set equal to zero with probability 1 - r.. Because v has two chances 
to equal zero, r i is related to the transition probabilitiy rZi by 
rirli = r 2 i or r i = rZi/rlIf 
Once vi is zero, vi remains at zero until a new run of vi = 1 begins. 
Flowcharts for the computer simulation of violations and detections are 
given in Section 3. 
3. 	 Detection Model 
The inspection-enforcement model depends on the inspection plan. 
These plans were discussed in the previous chapter. The four options which 
can be used are satellite-airplane-man, satellite-man, airplane-man, 
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and manned inspection. Also, high altitude photography can be used as a 
surrogate for satellite photography. Because all of the options are similar, 
we will define the satellite-airplane-man inspection simulation. All of the 
options are included in a single computer program. 
Assume a satellite inspection is made at the end of every period 
of s days. If the resulting electronic data gives a detection, assume 
that an aerial inspection is made a days after the satellite inspection. If 
the aerial inspection detects a violation, a surface inspection is made m 
days after the aerial inspection. The inspection procedure is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
Landsat I and Landsat II orbit in such a way that mines in western 
Kentucky can be accessed every nine days. Thus, when a satellite inspection 
procedure is used, the unit of time must be changed from one week to nine 
days. However, weather in Kentucky is such that only 30% of the accesses 
are 70% or better cloud-free. In the computer simulation, we have altered 
the nine-day access to a seven-day access and adjusted the frequency 
0.30 by 7/9 to maintain the same expected number of cloud-free accesses. 
The probability of a detection under satellite-airplane-man inspection 
depends on the violation. If this probability were known for &achviolation, 
then previously derived formulae could be used to analyze the costs. 
Because a detection does not take place until a man inspection is made, 
and because there is a lag between satellite and man inspection, simulation 
is necessary. Because satellite and airplane "detections" serve only as a 
pointer for further inspection, airplane and satellite "detections"i are 
denoted by quotes.
 
A violation can be misclassified by a satellite in two ways (see 
Figure 1, Appendix A) with the following misclassification probabilities: 
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ai = p ("detect" a nonexistent violation vi) 
= p (miss an existing violation v.) 
The probability of a "detection" of vi is given by 
Yi = a if v. does not exist1 1 
y1 = I - P if v. exists. 
The probability of a "detection", if independence is assumed among 
violations, is 
n 
-p("detection") = 1- II (I- Y) 
i-i 
Because the probability of "detection" depends on whether a 
satellite or airplane is used, and also depends on which violations a, .2 
present, i.e., the state w of the mine, we have denoted this "detection" 
probability in Figure 1 by ps (w) for a satellite and by pa (w) for an airplane. 
In the simulation, we have avoided using an airplane or man inspection 
when a satellite "detection" has occurred for those cases where an airplane 
or man inspection has already been made since the satellite pass. Such 
cases' occur frequently when s is small (such as nine days) and a or m 
is large. A single airplane pass voids all satellite "detection" from satellite 
passes prior to the airplane pass. In Figures 2 and 3 we give flow-charts 
for the computer simulation. The flow-chart includes all four options of 
s-a-m, s-m, a-m, or man inspections. This flow-chart is for a single mine. 
In the next section, we show how the results of the simulation for a single 
mine are used to calculate the costs of an inspection plan for all the mnnes 
in western Kentucky. The flow-chart for the main simulation program of the 
cost/benefit study is given in Figure 4 of the next section. 
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4. Total Costs Under an Inspection Program 
As explained earlier, random numbers are used to determine 
the violation-inspection-detection state of a mine during any week. If a 
sufficiently long period of time is simulated, the average yearly cost 
should be approximately that which would be given by exact mathematical 
formulae, if such formulae were to be developed. 
To calculate the costs, a tally is kept of the necessary parameters. 
The total cost is given by 
Cost = (CvF)XN+ c XN s + c aX N a +ca X Na X N 
+ CmX NmX N (9) 
where 
N = number of mines 
c v = total social costs of the violations for a 
single mine 
F = total fines collected from a single mine 
c = fixed cost of satellite inspection 
N = number of cloud-free satellite inspections 
c = fixed cost of airplane inspectiona2
 
N = number of airplane passes
a 1 
c = unit cost per mine for airplane inspection 
N = number of airplane inspections at a singlea 2 
mine 
Cm = cost per mine for man inspection 
N = number of man inspections at a single mine 
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All of the variables above except Na1 are computed by the 
simulation program. The total number of airplane passes differs from 
the number of aerial inspections at a single mine because only a 
portion of the mines are inspected at any time. An exact formula for 
N is derived below. 
a 1 
The fraction of times a cloud-free satellite inspection requires 
an aerial inspection at a given mine is 
N 
a 2 
I. J= N 
s 
NThe probability none of the mines requires an inspection is 1L An 
airplane pass is required if at least one mine requires an inspection. 
The expected number of airplane passes is, therefore 
/LN ) NNa1 = (1 - s 
The most general method of calculating c is to assign weekly 
costs to each of the Zn possible violation states (v 1 ,V 2 , ... , Vn). 
No assumption about additivity of costs is made. By additive we mean 
the cost of simultaneously occurring violations is the sum of the individual
 
costs of each violation. Additivity depends on the dissimilarity of vio­
lations. For example, the concurrence of a grading violation and a pit
 
drainage violation probably represents additive costs. Vegetation "current"
 
and vegetation "to plan" violations are so similar that the cost of one is
 
equal to the cost of both.
 
After talking with inspectors, we have concluded that additivity 
can be assumed for the four violations revegetation, grading, drainige 
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control, and water quality. Accordingly, the simulation program has 
been modified to this assumption. The value of c is defined by 
c =Ic X 	 N. 
V V. 	 I1 
where 
c weekly cost of violation V. 
vi 1
 
N = number of weeks of occurrence of V.
 
1 	 1 
The total fine 	 F is similarly defined by 
F =IF. XN. 
1 1 
where 
F.Xa.F. 	 xS1 	 1. 
F. = 	 average amount of fine for V. 
1 	 1 
a1 = 	 frequency which a fine is collected
 
after detection
 
Because a variable number of weeks can be simulated (for 
example, 10 years), all of the costs printed out are scaled down to yearly 
costs, using the scale 52/(no. of weeks). In anticipation of further 
mathematical modelling for developing an optimal inspection procedure, 
the computer is also programmed to print out other variables such as the 
average number of runs of violations per year, their average duration, and 
the number of runs detected. A flow-chart of the main program for the 
costs of violation-inspection-enforcement processes is given in Figure 4. 
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INSPECTION OF STRIP MINES
 
IN WESTERN KENTUCKY, 1971-74 
1. Violation Durations
 
In a separate report for this contract (Appendix B), "2TATHEMATICAhas
 
done a detailed analysis of mine inspection data for the years 1971-7A. An
 
analysis of such data is important in estimating the frequency of violations
 
at strip mine. The cost/benefit model developed in Chapter III depends on
 
such frequencies. In the inspection process report, inspection and violation
 
frequencies were calculated for each of twelve types of violations. Because
 
the estimation of rehabilitation and social costs and the estimation of
 
detection probabilities becomes increasingly more complex as more violation
 
types area used, Claude Downing of the Western Kentucky Area Reclamation office
 
in Madisonville was asked to select the four most important categories from
 
the twelve. These are as follows:
 
Violation Type 	 Original Violation Type 
Revegetation 	 Vegetation Current 
Vegetation Regulation 
Grading 	 Grading Current 
Grading to Plan 
Water Quality 	 Water Quality Chemical 
Drainage Control 	 Silt Structure 
Drainage Plan 
Not considered 	 Access Road 
Water Impoundment 
Water Quality Physical 
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Appendix B, presents ananalysis of the inspection and violation fre­
quencies for the period 1971-74. Tables in this Appendix can be used for
 
estimating the frequencies of the occurrence of violations in Section 3.
 
These tables can also be used to determine if the four major violation types
 
listed above are sufficient for the model. Referring to table 11A (Appendix
 
B), ignoring the Method of Operation and Discrepancies, the sum of the marginal
 
probabilities of all the violations is 0.8301. The violation types not con­
sidered in the model are marginal probabilities adding to 0.0626. About seven
 
percent of the violations are,therefore, ignored; however, this is perhaps an
 
over-estimate because the ommitted violation types are correlated with the
 
others. Also referring to Table 15 (Appendix B), it can be seen that the three
 
pairs listed above under Revegetation, Grading and Drainage Control rated the
 
highest of all interaction pairs. (Interactions with Method of Operation
 
must be excluded because, by definition Method of Operation violations occur
 
whenever other violations occur.)
 
To estimate the frequencies of violations from the inspection analysis
 
report (Appendix B), two of the following three expected durations must be
 
known for each of the four major violations:
 
L1 = Expected duration of a violation under no
 
inspection process
 
L = Expected duration of a violation under the 1971-74 
inspection process
 
= Expected duration of a violation after it has
L2 

been detected.
 
Claude Downing of Madisonville and Bill Kelly at 4THERATICA have
 
aided in supplying the following expected durations of violations.
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Violation Type Expected Duration Expected Duration* 
No Inspection After Inspection 
LI L 2 
Grading 6 months 3 months 
Revegetation 8 months 4 months 
Water Quality 1 week 1 week 
Drainage Control 6 months I month 
The annual permit regulations are such that all violations can be
 
presumed to last a year. If violations begin randomly, under the assump­
tion that the miners do not correct the violations until neessary, the
 
expected duration is six months or 180 days. This explains the 6 month
 
expected duration for grading and drainage control. The water quality
 
expected duration of violation of 7 days is only approximate. If there
 
is an improper chemical treatment of the water, the resulting poor water
 
quality occurs only during period of heavy rainfall runoff or pit drainage.
 
Revegetation violations last longer than other violations because
 
seeding takes place during two-month intervals followed by four-month
 
non-seeding intervals. Thus, the minimum duration of a revegetation
 
violation is four months.
 
*The expected duration of detected violations is not to be confused with
 
L9 . Detected violation have an expected duration L2* equal to the sum
 
oF L2 Plus the expected duration prior to detection. Because some vio­
lations may not be detected, the expected duration L under a policy is
 
between LI and L2*.
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We will use the above expected durations to calculate theoretical 
frequencies for the four major violation types in the next section. 
Because inspections are made separately at each permit area, the total 
number of permitted areas are used in the estimates and in the detection 
model. Figures from the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals, 
1974 	Annual Report give the following: 
Surface Mining in Western Kentucky 
87 strip mines 94 new permits 
3 auger strip mines 104 supplements 
90 surface mines 34 renewals 
20 deferrals 
The total number of permitted areas in 1974 is the sum of the 94 new 
permits plus 34 renewals, or 128. 
a. 	 Violation Frequencies Under the 1971-74 Ground Inspection 
Process 
The relative frequencies and number of detected occurrences of 
each of the four violation types are computed from-the tables in Appendix 
B by using the formulae 
P(AB) = P(A)P(B given A) 
#(AB) = P(AB) X #(inspections) 
For example, the number of times grading current and grading to plan 
were detected simultaneously is 
0. 2493 X0. 3982 X 2760 = 274 
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Similar calculations give the following: 
Violation Type 
Grading Grading Number of 
Current? to Plan? Detections 
Yes Yes 274 
Yes No 825 
No Yes 32 
No No 1,629 
Total Inspections Z, 760 
Thus a grading violation was observed with frequency 
f 1,131 0.4098
 
g 2,760
 
Some adjustments were made on the remaining three observed 
violation frequencies. These adjustments account for observed 
correlations and an increasing trend in detections during the 1971-74 
period. The purpose of adjustments for correlations is to make the 
assumptions of cost additivity and independence more plausible. 
Yearly Trends 
in Appendix B, it is shown that water quality and revegetation incidents
 
increased-during the years 1971-74. By multiplying the frequencies 
by the number of inspections for each year, we get the following table: 
Method of Water Number 
Year Operation Quality Vegetation Inspections 
1971 389 34 0 721 
1972 361 86 4 745 
1973 180 122 31 525 
1974 262 242 101 769 
Total 1,192 484 136 2,760 
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Revegetation and vegetation violations probably did not increase 
during 1971-74. On the contrary, interviews with inspectors suggest 
that the reason more incidents are occurring is that inspections are 
becoming more rigorous. 
Thus, at the 1974 rate, we estimate that revegetation violations were 
observed with 'frequency
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fv 769 - 0.1313 
Revegetation violations were found to vary seasonally (Appendix B). This
 
can be explained by the fact that violations can begin or end only in the
 
Spring or Fall seeding seasons. Thus, no adjustments need be made for any
 
seasonal inconsistency of the reporting of incidents.
 
Water quality chemical and drainage control both fall under the
 
category "water quality" in the inspection analysis report [3 ]. Assuming 
some violations were not reported as rigorously during 1971-73 as 1974, 
the frequencies of these violations for 1971-74 should be scaled up by the 
factor 
Z4Z 484 
769 2,760 
From Table-1IA (Appendix B), we estimate the 1974 rate of water quality
 
chemical violations to be
 
f = 0.0308X1.7945 = 0.0552 
wq
 
Besides scaling by the factor 1.7945, drainage control violations must be 
adjusted further to account for correlations with other violation types. 
The adjusted frequencies are developed next. 
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Drainage Control 
Drainage control consists of the two violation types "silt structure" 
and "drainage plan. " Silt structure was observed to be highly correlated 
with revegetation. Drainage plan is highly correlated with grading. 
Because there is no obvious causal relation between silt structure and 
revegetation, this correlation is ignored. However, drainage plan in some 
cases is more closely associated with grading than with drainage control. 
The table below illustrates this correlation. 
Number Number Observed Expected Number 
Violation Observed with Drainage Plan Under Independence 
Grading 1,099 106 80 
Current 
Grading 
To Plan 306 52 22 
Total 1,405 158 102 
Grading 1,131 127 82 
The values 127 and 82 are estimated by scaling 158 and 102 by 
1131/1405.
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To obtain independence, the original 127 observed drainage 
plan violations which occurred with grading violations must be 
reduced. This is done by adjusting the first column in the following 
table to values 3 and 1131- p in such a manner that 
P 73 +/ 
1131 77 (solution: 8 = 51) 
Parentheses denote the original values. 
Violation Grading No rading 
Type iViolation Violation Total 
fDrainage (127) (73) (200) 
Plan 51 73 124 
Violation 
No Drainage (1, 004) (1, 556) (Z, 560) 
Plan 1,080 1,556 2,636 
Violation 
Total 1,131 1,629 Z, 760 
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Then, for example, the conditional probability 1, 131 is equal to the 
marginal probability 124 To obtain the table below, we have 
modified the original marginal probability for drainage plan to 124/Z760. 
Parentheses denote the original values. 
Violation Type 
Silt Drainage Observed 
Structure? Plan? Number 
Yes Yes 45 (73) 
No Yes 79 (127) 
Yes No 182 (154) 
No No 2,454 (2, 406) 
Total Number Drainage Control Violations = 306 
Scaled-up = 549 
The scale-up factor for adjusting all 1971-74 water quality violations to 
the 1974 level is 1. 7945. The estimated frequency for drainage control 
violations for use in our model at the 1974 inspection rate is thus 
306.
 
fdc -2,760 X 1.7945 = .1990. 
The frequencies fg, f dc' and fwq are estimates of the 
probabilities of the existence of violations at any time under man inspection 
rates given by the 1971-74 inspection data. Other parameters for this 
inspection rate are given by equations (1)-(8) of Chapter III. For example, 
the frequency of starts of runs of grading violations is estimated by 
s XL =f = 0.4098g g g 
where the average length L is defined by equations (1)-(3). Note that 
g 
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s and L are dependent on the unit of time while f is not. For example,g g g 
if the unit of time is changed from one week to one day, s is divided byg 
seven and L is multiplied by seven. To estimate the frequencies ofg 
violations for different inspection processes, we need the 1971-74 
inspection rate. During 1971-74 there were 301/4 mines per year in 
operation. This number is scaled up by 124/90 to obtain an estimate 
of the number of permitted areas. (There were 90 mines operating at 
124 permitted areas in 1974). Thus the frequency of inspection per 
permit area per week in 1971-74 is estimated to be 
2760 90
~D0X2X 0.127985.-PD =301~ 5  X124-
Table 1 Lists the violation parameters calculated from equations (1)-(10) 
and the inspection rate PD and the estimated violation parameters L,, L 2 , 
and f. These parameters are given for the one week time intervals 
used in the computer simulation. In Chapter V, units of time are refined 
to one-day intervals to estimate the optimal manned inspection rate. The
 
violation parameters when the unit of time is one day are given in Table 9.
 
Social costs of violations are defined in this report as the cost of'
 
the damage to the environment while the violation type persists. Thus, the
 
total social cost is known if the frequency and cost per unit time for the 
violations is known. In Chapter V, Section 1, social cost estimates are
 
given. Yearly social costs corresponding to the 1974 inspection rate
 
(average duration = L), daily inspection rate (average duration = L2 ) and year­
ly inspection rate (average duration = LI) are given in Tables 6, 7, and 8.
 
The total costs include, of course, not only the social costs, but 
also the inspection costs plus any terminal costs or benefits such as 
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Table 1. Estimated Prior and Posterior Frequencies for Detection Model* 
When Violations Generated 
Description of Parameter 
Prior expected length under 
no inspection 
Expected length for inspection 
process 1971-74
 
Posterior expected length 
after detection 
Prior transitionprobability 
given violation previous week 
Transition probability given 
violation previous week for 
inspection process 1971-74 
Posterior transition 
probability given violation 
and detection 
Prior transition probability 
given no violation previous week 
Transition probability given no 
violation previous week under 
inspection process 1971-74 
Frequency of violations 
under no inspections 
Frequency of violations 
under inspection process 
1971-74 
Frequency of start of newrusofvoatos00261runs of violations 
* 	 Estimates are based on 1971-74 
assumed rate of inspection of PD 
Parameter 
Li 
L 

L 
r 
1 
r 
r 2 
Pl 
p 
£ 
Grading 
26.00 
15.70 
13.00 
0.9615 
0.9363 
0.9231 
0.081Z 
0. 04,12 
0.6787 
0.4098 
inspection process with an 
= 0. 12798529 permitted areas 
Each Week 
Revegetation 
34.67 
ZO. 18 
17.33 
0.9712 
0.9504 
0.9423 
0.0084 
0.00749 

0,2256 
0.1313 
0. 00651 
Inspected 
Drainage Water 
Control Quality 
26.00 1.0 
8.57 1. 0 
4.00 1.0 
0.9615 0.0 
0.8833 0.0 
0.7500 0.0 
0.0586 0.0584 
0.0290 0.0584
 
0.6039 0.0552 
0.1990 0.0552 
0.0232 0. 0552 
rehabilitation costs to the Comonwealth, fines, and bond forfeitures.
 
In Section 3 of Chapter V, these costs are included to determine an
 
optimal manned inspection policy.
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V. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS - MANNED INSPECTION 
1. Social Costs 
There are several approaches to measuring the social costs arising 
from mining violations. For example, Howard [16] apportions U. S. Public 
Health Service estimates of social costs of acid mine water for mining 
in Appalachia into percentages for different categories. In his economics 
model, Howard allows for changes in mining practices, he discounts all 
years to a base year, and he allows for decreasing costs as nature 
corrects damages. The coefficients used in his model are necessarily 
subjective estimates obtained from consultation with personnel of the 
Kentucky Reclamation Division and others. 
The University of Kentucky is currently doing a social cost study 
of strip mining for the Environmental Protection Agency, but, as yet, 
no data is available from this study. (The data for Appalachia in Howard' s 
study was derived by the U. S. Public Health Service from a projection of 
a survey done in 1940. More recent studies such as the University of 
Kentucky's will be useful for future cost/benefit analyses based on methodology 
similar to that developed by Howard.) 
Another method of estimating social costs, commonly used in the 
past, is to equate social costs with the costs of removing the source 
of the damage. Social costs are now recognized to have the cost of re­
habilitation as only one component. The other component is a function 
of the amount of time during which the damaging effects take place. For 
example, as an estimate of the cost of sedimentation, Howard estimates 
the cost of removal of such material. Unless the sedimentation had 
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no effects on the environment before its removal, Howard's estimate is
 
only one component of the cost.
 
Dials and Moore (12) give a report on the cost of coal in terms of
 
damages to the environment and the health to individuals. Their article
 
is very thorough in describing the types of damages and in giving some
 
subjective gross figures for the costs of surface and deep mining in the
 
United States. Dials and Moore, for example, estimate from Department of
 
Interior 1970 data the cost of treating the then-existing 1970 acid mine
 
drainage to be $0.392 per ton for surface mined coal. Unfortunately, we
 
are not interested in the cost of abating acid mine drainage, but instead
 
in the social cost to the environment while water quality or drainage
 
violations persist.
 
Non& of the literature which we have researched can be used to 
assess the cost of violations on a permit area and on a per week basis for 
mines in western Kentucky. The available costs are in terms of abatement 
and rehabilitation. If per day costs were available for mines in an area 
similar to western Kentucky, it would still be necessary to know the violation 
characteristics (frequency, duration, seriousness) and the components of 
the costs due to these violations, to estimate the required social costs. 
For this reason, MATHEMATICA has developed estimates through subjective 
scores assigned to the violations by inspectors from western Kentucky. 
With these scores, it is only necessary to know the cost of any one of the 
violations in order to estimate all of them. 
Of the four violation types, the cost of a revegetation violation 
is the simplest to assess. We can ignore revegetation costs to the 
Commonwealth because permit renewal and bond release regulations 
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force most mine operators to revegetate. One cost of a revegetation 
violation is the added expense in revegetation because of soil compaction 
and erosion. But this is a cost to the mine operator and not to the Common­
wealth. Lack of vegetation increases acid mine drainage and sedimentation, 
but such costs are included in the water quality and drainage control costs 
and should be ignored to avoid double counting. We can also ignore the 
cost from aesthetic considerations because this value is constant for a 
mining area independent of the number or type of violations. If topsoil 
were required to be saved and replaced after mining, erosion and soil 
degradation would be important. This is not required at the present. The 
remaining cost is the delay in the land being useable for plant and/or 
wildlife. While mining operators do not usually rent their land, land in the 
active mining regions is rented at a rate of about $50 a year per acre. 
Revegetation violations average about 25 acres. (Estimated by Claude 
Downing.) Thus, an average revegetation violation costs $24.04 per week. 
The figure of $Z4. 04 per week for a revegetation violation is used 
as a base to estimate the costs of other violations. WThen still at the 
Department for Natural Resources and Envi-onmental protection, William 
Kelly asked the then ten inspectors of western Kentucky to rank violations 
according to the degree of seriousness, by values from zero to ten. The sum 
of the scores made by the inspectors gives total scores whose values are 
between zero and one hundred. Table 2 gives these total scores. 
Assuming that the danger to life and property and environmental 
scores are weighted proportionately to the inspector's subjective estimates 
of social costs, each of the costs of violations can be estimated from 
the total cost of a revegetation violation. The scale factor used 
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to determine the social costs depends on the average duration of violation
 
the inspectors had in mind. Three alternative social costs are given in
 
the following tables. In each table, the total costs are proportional to
 
the total scores.
 
Unique social costs do not exist. Because social cost estimates
 
vary among people, it is useful to use several costs to ascertain the
 
sensitivity of the analysis to the costs. While we will use as costs the
 
values in Table 3, we will use the costs in Tables 4 and 5 as a check for
 
the robustness of the optimal strategy. Grading and revegetation costs are
 
known with higher accuracy than the remaining two. Because the assumption
 
is made in the initial application of the model that water quality violations
 
are not affected by the inspection process (except in the amount of fines),
 
the optimal inspection strategy is not sensitive to the social costs of
 
water quality. Thus, the unknown cost variable is drainage control. The
 
range of $60.67 to $197.17 per week should adequately cover this cost.
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Table 2. Violation Scores by Western Kentucky Inspectors 
,Danger to Deliberateness Ability 
Life or Environmental by Mining to be 
Violation Property Impact Operators Corrected 
Grading not current Z3 44 61 87 
Water quality regulation 80 88 80 24 
Exposed Reject Material (acid shale) 39 71 47 65 
Revegetation not current 26 58 60 75 
Violation of 100 ft. zone 79 58 86 33 
MateriaL off permit area 75 5Z 66 20 
W orking off permit area 58 56 69 44 
Access Road 48 35 46 58 
No silt structure 66 93 70 44 
Table 3. Estimated Social Costs Based On Inspector's Scores 
Using Average Duration of Violations During 1971-74 
Violation 
Average 
Duration 
(Weeks) 
Danger to 
Life and 
Property 
Environmental 
Impact 
Total 
Score 
Total 
Cost 
Cost per 
Week 
H 
Grading 
Revegetation 
Drainage Control 
Water Quality 
15.7 
20.18 
8.57 
1 
23 
26 
66 
80 
44 
58 
93 
88 
67 
84 
159 
168 
$386.92 
$485.10 
$918. zz 
$970. 19 
$24,64 
$24.04 
$107. 14 
$970.19 
Table 4. Estimated Social Costs Based On Inspector's Scores 
Using "Worst-Case" Average Duration 
Violation 
Grading 
Revegetation 
Drainage Control 
Water Quality 
Worst-Case 
Average 
Duration(tgeks,_ 
26 
34.67 
26 
1 
Total Total Cost per 
Score Cost Week 
67 $ 664. 68 $ 25.56 
84 833.33 -24. 04 
159 1577.38 60.67 
168 1666.67 1666.67 
Table 5. Estimated Social Costs Based on Inspector's Scores
 
Using Average Duration After Detection
 
Violation 

Grading 
Revegetation 
Drainage Control 
Water Quality 
(weeks) 	 -

Duration after Total Total Cost per
 
Detection Score Cost Week
 
13 67 $332.34 $25.56 
17.33 	 84 416.67 24. 04 
4 159 788.69 197.17 
1 168 833.33 833.33 
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The total costs of a violation type during the year are obtained from 
the formula 
cost per year of violation type = {cost per week of violation} 
X 
X 
frequency of occurrence) 
per week per permitted 
area 
{ number of permitted areas} 
X 1 52 weeks per year} 
For the number of permitted areas, we will use the value of 124 for 1974. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 illustrate cost computations using the cost estimates 
given' in Tables 3, 4, and 5 and the frequency estimates given in Table 1. 
In Tables 6, 7, and 8 a viblation is counted once per week of occurrence. 
If a violation occurs during L consecutive weeks and does not occur 
+ I) s t on the (L week, then one run of length L has occurred. The total 
social cost of a violation is defined by 
- cost = (cost per week of violation) X number of violations 
and 
number of violations number of runs X average length of a run 
Similar computations are necessary to compute the optimal 
inspection strategy. Formula computations, and results are given in 
the next two sections. 
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Table 6. The Frequency and Costs of Violations 
Under 1974 Inspection Process 
Number of Runs 
of Violation Per 
Average Length 
of a Violation 
Number of Weeks 
of Violation 
Total Cost 
of Violation 
Total Cost 
of Violation 
Year Per Permit Run Per Year Per Permit Per Year Per Year 
Violation s ) 52 L (weeks) 52 X f Per Permit Per 124 Permits 
Grading 1.357 15. 699 21.310 $ 525.07 $ 65, 108 
Revegetation 0. 338 20. 180 6.827 164. 13 20, 352 
Water Quality 0.055 1.000 2. 870 2,784.83 345, 319 
Drainage Control 1.Z08 8. 568 10.348 1,108.70 137, 749 
Total $568,258 
Table 7. The Frequency and Costs of Violations 
Under Daily Inspection. 
Number of Runs Average Length Number of Weeks Total Cost Total Cost 
,of Violation Per of a Violation of Violation of Violation of Violation 
Year Per Permit Run Per Year Per Permit Per Year Per Year 
Violation s X 52 L (Weeks) 52 X f Per Permit Per 124 Permits 
Grading 1.357 13.000 17.646 $ 434. 79 $ 53,914 
Revegetation 0.338 17. 333 5.864 140. 97 17,481 
Water Quality 0.055 1.000 2.870 2,784.83 345,319 
Drainage Control 1,208 4.000 4.831 517v'59 64, 182 
Total 480,896 
violation 
Grading 
Revegetation 
Water Quality 
Drainage Control 
Total 
Table 8. 
Number of Runs 
of Violation Per 
Year Per Permit 
s <52 
1.357 
0.338 
0.055 
1.208 
The Frequency and Costs of Violations 
Under Yearly ("Worst-Case') Inspection. 
Average Length 
of a Violation 
Number of Weeks 
of Violation 
Run Per Year Per Permit 
L 52 X f 
z6.000 35. Z91 
34. 667 11.728 
1.000 2.870 
26.000 31. 402 
Total Cost 
of Violation 
Per Year 
Per Permit 
$ 869.58 
281.94 
2, 784.83 
3, 364.36 
Total Cost 
of Violation
 
Per Year
 
Per 124 Permits
 
$107,827 
34, 961 
345, 319 
417, 181 
$905,288
 
2. Ground Inspection Parameters 
Two sets of parameters for the frequency of violations will be 
used in the cost/benefit study. For computer simulations, the time axis 
must be partitioned into units of one week intervals. For ground inspec­
tion only a unit of time equal to one day will be used. Using a daily rate 
for computer simulations would entail seven times as much cnputer 
time, with insignificant changes in the results for aircraft or satellite 
inspection strategies. Significant differences occur between daily rate 
and weekly rate calculations only when the weekly inspection rate is close 
to or greater than one. (A value of PD = 3.5 inspections per week must 
be changed to . 5 inspections per day to define a probability. ) In Table 9, 
we have given the daily rates for the generation of violations. These 
are obtained from knowLedge of LI, LZ, f and the formulae of Chapter III. 
A variable which affects the optimal inspection frequency is the 
average duration of a water quality violation. The average duration may be as -. 
short as three days. As a sensitivity analysis, we have used both three 
days and seven days for water quality violations. At the three day rate, the 
total number of runs is increased, the cost per week is increased (total 
cost per run remains the same), and the detection probability of a run is 
decreased.
 
By using the formulae in Chapter III, an optimal manned inspection 
policy can be determined -without computer simulation. A sensitivLty analysis 
is also made to determine the effects on the optimal policy of changes in 
the cost parameters and violation frequencies. 
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Table 9. 	 Estimated Prior and Posterior Frequencies 
for Detection Model When Violations are 
Generated Daily 
Drainage Water Water 
Parameter Grading Revegetation Control Quality If Quality If 
C 3 Days 7 Days 
L 182.00 242.67 182. 00 3 7 
L 1[09.90 141.26 59.98 3 7 
L 2 91.00 121. 33 28.00 3 7 
r 0.9945 0.9959 0.9945 0.6667 0.8571 
r 0.9909 0.9929 0.9833 0.6667 0. 8571 
0. 9890 0. 991'8 0. 9643 0.6667 0. 8571rz 

0.0116. 0.000120 . 00838 0.0195 0.00835p1 
p 0.00632 0.00107 .00414 0.0195 0. 00835 
fl 0. 6787 0.2256 0. 6039 0. 0552 0. 0552 
f 0.4098 0.1313 0.1 0.0552 0.0552 
s 0. 00373 0.9294 X 10-4 0.0033 0.0184 0. 00788 
Fines are important because they partially cover the costs of 
inspection. The only fines collected in the past, which have any significance, 
for the four violations are the fines for water quality violations. As an 
estimate of the frequency and amount of such fines, Claude Downing suggests 
about twelve fines per year at the 1974 inspection rate, with an average 
of $5, 000 per fine. We will assume a fine is collected at most once per 
detection of a run of violations. If a water quality violation lasts L units 
of time, and inspections are made at a frequency PD' then the probability 
of detecting a water quality violation at least once is 
w L = 1-(-pD )LWL L 
The probability of detecting a water quality violation at least once is 
cc L-1 
w= w Lr (- -r = PD (10) 
L=1 r +PDr 
At the 1971-74 inspection rate, 
PD = 0. 018Z836 inspections per permit per day 
r = I - 117 = 0.857143 
w = 0.115333 
0. 0552 
s 0.55- 0.0078867 
The frequency of detections of water quality violations when detections are 
counted once per run is 
wvXsX5ZX7 XIZ4 = 40.91656 
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Of this number, 12 fines were collected. Thus, the probability that a 
water quality run of violations results in a fine is estimated to be 
121 = 0.2932798
40. 91656
 
For every detection of a run of water quality violations, we therefore 
estimate the average fine collected to be 
5000 X 0.2932798 = 1466.3989 
By using this a verage fine, the total fine collected under different man 
inspection frequencies PD can be calculated using equation (10) for w. 
The total fine collected is w X s X 52 X 7 X 124 . 
The cost of man inspections for the base year 1974 is determined 
from the following figures: 
1974 Division of Reclamation Budget 
excluding research $1,085,141 
Travel, gas and oil, vehicle maintenance 139,141 
Total personnel and overhead 
excluding research, travel & vehicles $ 945,559 
Personnel salaries plus fringe benefits $ 785,306 
Fringe benefit rate 16.1% 
The total amount of salaries is then 
785,306 $676,405
 
1.161 -$7,0 
and the overhead rate is 
945.59 = 1.397184 
676. 405
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The average inspector salary in 1974 was about $750 per month. Claude 
Downing estimates that each inspector can inspect 40 mines per month at a 
rate of 3/4 time for inspection and 1/4 time for other activities such as 
permitting. This gives a cost per inspection plus overhead to be 
750' ~
 
750' X x 1.397184 = $19.64
 
The total vehicle miles per month per inspector is approximately 2500 miles 
or 65 miles per inspection. At an allowance of 13. 5 per mile, this gives 
travel costs of $8. 77. Thus, the total cost per inspection is estimated to be 
c = $28.40 
The cost $28.40 is, based on the assumption that ten inspectors can make 
a total of 400 inspections per month per permit area. This inspection rate 
may be high. During 1971-74 an average of only 57.5 inspection reports 
were filed each month for Western Kentucky. An estimated 149.5 additional
 
inspections per month were not reported. (See Section 4, Chapter V for an
 
explanation of the adjusted estimate of 207 inspections per month.) In­
spection reports are now required to be written for each inspection.
 
Because this is an extra burden on the inspector, future inspection rates
 
could be less than 207 inspections per month. An alternative estimate of
 
the cost per inspection is
 
$19.64 X 400 + $8.77 = $46.72 
207
 
As a senstitivity analysis, we will use an upper value of cm = $50.00.
 
81
 
3. Optimal Ground Inspection Policy and Sensitivity Analysis 
For any inspection rate, the average duration L of a violation is
 
given by equation (3 ). The total yearly cost of a violation is given by 
s X L X 365 Y 124 -where s is the frequency of runs and the value 124 is 
the assumed number of permitted areas. For determining the optimal 
frequency of inspections of mines, the value of IZ4 permitted areas is not 
important because all costs are proportional to this number. Hence, 
the minimum costs are obtained at the same inspection frequency per 
permit area independent of the total number of permitted areas. Other 
costs needed are fines and costs of inspections. The formula for the total 
yearly amount of fines has been defined in Section 2. The cost of man 
inspection is given by c Xr Nm where Nin is the number of inspections. 
If inspections are made on the average once every d days per permit then: 
N = pDX 365 X124 
where PD = lid 
is the inspection frequency per permit. 
To determine the optimal value of pD, costs are calculated by the 
computer until a minimum total cost is obtained where: 
total cost = cost of violations + costs of inspection - fines 
The optimal value of pD has been calculated using five social cost options, 
two water quality violation rates, and two costs per inspection. The 
purpose for generating several optimal values for PD is not because of 
uncertainty of the best estimates, but instead to measure the sensitivity 
of the optimal value of pD when departures from these estimates occur. 
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The five social cost options for the tables are defined in Table 10 
and have been held fixed, the optimal rate of inspections d has varied 
less than one day. In Tables 11-16 the minimum cost for the inspection 
process is between seven and eight days. Thus under the assumptions 
made in Tables 9 and 10, a rate of 7.5 days between inspections is 
optimal under any of the five definitions of social costs. 
Because of the robustness of the 7. 5-day inspection rate, it appears 
that the inspection process is very sensitive to water quality violations. 
All other violations are less costly, are of much longer duration, and thus 
do not start as frequently. The high frequency of starts of water quality 
violations is important because each new start requires a new detection. 
Communications with Claude Downing have led to the conclusion 
that a seven day length for water quality violations is maximum and that 
average lengths of three days should be used both for comparison and for 
better estimates of costs. 
At the three-day length, water quality violations are more costly. 
That is, each run still costs the same total amount, but there are more 
runs. The last column of table gives the cost per week (not per 
length of violation) of water-quality violations under the three-day 
assumption. 
The rate of fines collected, defined in Section 2, for seven-day 
violations must also be adjusted when the duration is changed to three days.
 
The assumed rate of 12 fines of $5, 000 each for 1974 implies the average 
rate of collection of fines decreases when the number of runs increases. 
These calculations are automated by a computer. 
The optimal inspection policy, calculated under the five social 
costs options again shows robustness. The optimal frequency in every 
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Method ofI 
Estimation Used 
in Tables 
Option I 
Best Estimate: 
Costs Scaled to 
Average Duration 
During 1974, L 
Option Z 
Costs Scaled to 
Duration After 

Detection, 	 L 
Option 3 
Costs Scaled to 
Worst-Case 
Duration, L1
 
Option 4 
Best Case: 
All Costs at 
Minimum Bound 
Option 5 
Worst Case: 
AllCosts at 
Maximum Bound 
Table 10. 	 Optional Estimates of Social Costs 
Used in the Sensitivity Analysis 
Cost Week 
Drainage Water Quality 
Grading Revegetation Control @ 7-Day 
Duration 
24.64 24.04 . 107.14 970.19 
197. 	 833.1325.56 24.04 	 17 
25.56 24.04 	 60.67 1666.67 

24.64 24.04 	 60.67 833.13 
25.56 24.04 197.17 1666.67 

Water Quality 
@ 3-Day 
Duration
 
2263.78
 
1943.97
 
3888. 90 
1943.97 
3888.90
 
Table 11. Costs of Violations and Inspections -

Social Costs Scaled to 1974 Average Durations
 
Option 1 
NO. IN:P.- CUT OF COCT OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETWEEN
 
PEP DAY VIOL3 INEPECTION ItCPECTIOH:
 
1.000 480895. 1281861. 520232. 1242524. 1.
 
0.500 483190. 640931. 455203. 668918. 2.
 
0.333 485461. 42728?. 404625. 508122. 3.
 
0.250 487707. 320465. 364163. 444009. 4.
 
0.200 489929. 256372. 33105?. 415245. 5.
 
0.167 492128. 213644. 303469. 402202. 6.
 
0.143 494303. 183123. 280125. 397301. 7.
 
0.125 496456. 160233. 260116. 396572. 8.
 
0.111 498586. 142429. 242775. 398240. 9.
 
0.100 500694. 128186. 227602. 401279. 10.
 
0.091 502780. 116533. 214213. 405100. 11.
 
0.083 504845. 106822. 202312. 409354. 12.
 
0.077 506888. 93605. 191664. 413829. 13.
 
0.071 509911. 91561. 1M01. 418391. 14.
 
NO.IMNP. SPADING REVEGATION DPAINAGE WATER Q. TOTAL
 
PER DAY
 
1.000 53914. 17481. 64182. 345319. 480895.
 
0.500 54208. 17552. 66111. 345319. 483190.
 
0.333 54500. 17623. 68019. 345319. 485461.
 
0.250 54788. 17694. 69906. 345319. 487707,
 
0.200 55073. 17764. 71773. 345319. 489929.
 
0.167 55355. 17833. 73620. 345319. 492128.
 
0.143 55634. 17902. 75448. 345319. 494303.
 
0.125 55911. 17971. 77256. 345319. 496456.
 
0.111 56184. 18138. 79045. 345319. 498586.
 
0.100 56454. 18106. 80815. 3459319. 500694.
 
0.091 56722. 18172. 82567. 345319. 502780.
 
0.083 56987. 16239. 84301. 345319. 504845.
 
0.077 57249. 18304. 86017. 3459319. 506868.
 
0.071 57508. 18369. 87715. 345319. 508911.
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Table 12. Cost of Infrequent Inspections 
Social Costs Scaled to 1974 Average Durations 
Option 1 
NO. IN:P. CWCT OF COST OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETWEEN 
PEP DAY VIOLS IMPECTION INSPECTIOI 
0.143 494303. 183123. 280125. 397301. 7.
 
0.071 508911. 91561. 182081. 418391. 14.
 
0.048 522514. 61041. 134875. 448680. 21.
 
0.036 535212. 45781. 107107. 473886. 28.
 
0.029 547094. 36625. 88820. 494898. 35.
 
0.024 558234. 30521. 75867. 512888. 42.
 
0.020 568702. 26160. 66211. 528651. 49.
 
0.018 578556. 22890. 58736. 54E710. 56.
 
0.016 587848. 20347. 52777. 555417. 63.
 
0.014 596625. 18312. 47916. 567021. 70.
 
0.013 604930. 16648. 43875. 577702.
 
0.012 612798. 15260. 40462. 587595. 84.
 
0.011 620264. 14086. 37542. 596809. 91.
 
0.010 627358. 13080. 35016. 605422. 98.
 
0.010 634107. 12208. 32807. 613508. 105.
 
0.009, 640536. 11445. 30861. 621119. 112.
 
0.008 646666. 10772. 29133. 628305. 119.
 
0.008 652519. 10174. 27588. 635104. 126.
 
0.008 658113. 9638. 26199. 641551. 133.
 
0.007 663463. 9156. 24943. 647677. 140.
 
0.007 668587. 8720. 23801. 653505. 147.
 
0.006 673498. 8324. 22760. 659061. 154.
 
0.006 678210. 7962. 21806. 664365. 161.
 
0.006 682733. 7630. 20929. 669434. 168.
 
0.006 687080. 7325. 20119. '674285. 175.
 
0.005 691259. 7043. 19370. 678931. 182.
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Table 13. Costs of Violations and Inspections 
Social Costs Scaled to Duration After Detection
 
Option 2 
NO. IMP. CD2T OF CO:T OF FINES TOTAL DRYi PETWEEN
 
PEP DAY VIOL, IhPECTION It-EPECTIOH:
 
1.000 488056. 1281861. 520232. 1249685. 1.
 
0.500 491983. 640931. 455203. 677711. 2.
 
0.333 45868. 427287. 404625. 518530. 3.
 
0.L50 499711. 320465. S64163. 456014. 4.
 
0.200 503513. 256372. 331057. 428828. 5. 
0.167 507274. 213644. 303469. 417449. 6.
 
0.143 510995. 1331??. 280125. 41393. .
 
0.125 514678. 1602D3. 260116. 414794. 8.
 
0.111 51SS21. 142429. 242775. 417975. 9.
 
0.100 521927. 128186. 227602. 422512. 10.
 
0.01 525496. 116533. 214213. 427815. 11.
 
0.033 529037. 106822. ,0312. 433536. 12.
 
0.077 532522. 98605. 191664. 439462. 13.
 
0.071 535982. 91561. 182081. 445462. 14.
 
NO.IN-P. WPADING REYEGATION UPAINAGE WRTER 0. TOTAL 
PEP DAY 
1.000 55927. 17481. 118114. 296535. 488056.
 
0.500 56232. 17552. 121663. 296935. 491983.
 
0.333 56535. 17623. 125175. 296935. 4956.
 
0.250 56834. 17694. 128648. 296535. 499711.
 
0.200 57129. 17764. 132064. 296535. 503513.
 
0.167 57422. 17833. 135483. 296535. 507 74.
 
0.143 57712. 17902. 138346. 296535. 510995.
 
0.125 57998. 17971. 142174. 296535. 514678.
 
0.111 58282. 18038. 145466. 296535. 518321.
 
0.100 58562. 18106. 148724. 296535. 521927.
 
0.0.1 58840. 18172. 151948. 296535. 525496.
 
0.083 59114. 18239. 155139. 296535k 529027.
 
532522.
0.07 59386. 18304. 158297. 296535 ­
0.071 59655. 18369. 161422. 296535. 535982.
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Table 14. Costs of Violations and Inspections 
Social Costs Scaled to Maximum Durations
 
Option 3
 
/
 
NO. IN:P. COOT OF CoT OF FINES TOTAL LAYT BETWEEN
 
PEP DAY IOLS It4PECTION INEPECTIOMS
 
1.OOG 702968. 1281861. 520232. 1464596. 1.
 
0.500 704437. 640931. 455203. 890165. 2.
 
0.333 705891. 427287. 404625. 728553. 3.
 
0.250 707329. 320465. 364163. 663632. 4.
 
0.200 708753. 256372. 331057. 634068. 5.
 
0.167 710161. 213644. 303469. 620335. 6.
 
0.143 711553. 183123. 280125. 614551. 7.
 
0.125 712932. 160233. 260116. 613049. 8.
 
0.111 714297. 142429. 242775. 613951. 9.
 
0.100 715647. 128186. 227602. 616232. 0.
 
0.091 716984. 116533. 214213. 619300. 11.
 
0.083 718305. 106a22. 202312. 622814. 12.
 
0.077 719615, 98605. 191664. 626555. 13.
 
0.071 720911. 91561. 182081. 630391. 14.
 
NO,.INP. GPADING PEYEGRTION DPAIMAGE UJTEP 0. TOTAL
 
PER DAY
 
1.000 55927. 17481. 36344. 593216. 702968.
 
0.500 56232. 17552. 37436. 593216. 704437.
 
0.333 56535. 17623. 38517. 593216. 705891.
 
0.250 56834. 17694. 39586. 593216. 707329.
 
0.200 57129. 17764. 40643. 593216. 708753.
 
0.167 57422. 17833. 41689. 593216. 710161.
 
0.143 57712. 17902. 42724. 593216. 711553.
 
0.125 57998. 17971. 43747. 593216. 712932.
 
0.111 58282. 18038. 44761. 593216. 714257.
 
0.100 58562. 18106. 45763. 593216. 715647.
 
0.091 58840. 18172. 46755. 593216. 716984.
 
0.083 59114. 18239. 47737. 593216. 718305.
 
0.077 59386. 18304. 48708. 593216. 719615.
 
0.071 59655. 18369. 49670. 593216. 720911.
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Table 15. Costs of Violations and Inspections 
Social Costs Scaled to Maximum Durations 
Option 3 
NO. INEP. COST OF COST OF FINES TOTAL DRYS BETWEEN 
PER fAY VIOL: IN:PECTION IriFECTIONS 
1.000 784737. 1281861. 520232. 1546366. 1. 
0.500 788664. 640931. 455203. 974392. 2. 
0.333 792549. 427287. 404625. 815211. 3. 
0.250 796192. 320465. 364163. 752695. 4. 
0.200 800194. 256372. 331057. 725509. 5. 
0.167 803955. 213644. 303469. 714130. 6. 
0.143 807676. 183123. 280125. 710674. 7. 
0.125 811359. 160233. 260116. 711475. 8. 
0.111 015003. 142429. 242775. 714657. 9. 
0.100 818608. 128186. 227602. 719192. 10. 
0.091 822177. 116533. 214213. 724496. 11. 
0.083 825707. 1068E2. 202312. 730216. 12. 
0.077 829203. 98605. 191664. 736143. 13. 
0.071 832663. 91561. 182081. 742143. 14. 
NO.IriP. PABDIfG PEVEGATION DPAINRGE WATER '. TOTAL 
PEP DAY 
1.000 55927. 17481. 118114. 593216. 784737. 
0.500 56232. 17552. 12166 . 5993216. 788664. 
0.333 56535. 17623. 125175. 593216. 792549. 
0.250 56834. 17694. 128648. 593216. 796392. 
0.200 57129. 17764. 132084. 593216. 800194. 
0.167 57422. 17833. 135483. 593216. 803955. 
0.143 57712. 17902. 138846. 593216. 807676. 
0.125 57998. 17971. 142174. 593216. 811359. 
0.111 58282. 18038. 145466. 593216. 815003. 
0.100 58562. 18106. 148724. 593216. 818608. 
0.091 58840. 18172. 151948. 593216. 822177. 
0.083 59114. 18239. 155139. 593216. 825707. 
0.077 59386. 18304. 158297. 593216. 829203. 
0.071 59655. 18369. 161422. 593216. 832663. 
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Table 16. Costs of Violations and Inspection
 
Minimum Estimates of Social Costs
 
Option 4 
NO. INEP. COOT OF CUCT OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETWEEN
 
PEP DAY YIOL INSPECTION IN:PECTIUH:
 
1.000 404274. 1281861. 520232. 1165902. 1.
 
0.500 405732. 640931. 455203. 591460. 2.
 
0.333 407175. 427287. 404625. 429837. 3.
 
0.250 408603. 320465. 364163. 364906. 4.
 
0.200 410015. 256372. 331057. 33521. 5.
 
0.167 411413. 213644. 303469. 321568. 6.
 
0.143 412795. 183123. 280125. 315793.
 
0.125 414164. 160233. 260116. 314281. .
 
0.111 415518. 142429. 242775. 315172. 9.
 
0.100 416858. 128186. 227602. 317443. 10.
 
0.091 418185. 116533. 214213. 320504. 11.
 
0.083 419497. 106822. 202312. 324006. 12.
 
0.077 420797. 98605. 191664. 32777. i.
 
0.071 422083. 91561. 182081. 331563. 14.
 
ND.IIIP. GPAIING PEYEGATION DPAINAGE WATEP 0. TOTAL 
PER DAY 
1.0u 53914. 17481. 36344. 296535. 404274. 
0.500 54208. 17552. 37436. 296535. 405732.
 
0.333 54500. 17623. 38517. 296535. 407175.
 
0.250 54788. 17694. 39586. 296535. 408603.
 
0.200 55073. 17764. 40643. 296535. 410015.
 
0.167 55355. 17833. 41689. 296535. 411413.
 
0.143 55634. 17902. 42724. 296535. 412795.
 
0.125 55911. 17971. 43747. 296535. 414164.
 
0.111 56184. 18038. 44761. 296535. 415518.
 
0.100 56454. 18106. 45763. 296535. 416858.
 
0.091 56722. 18172. 46755. 296535. 418185.
 
0.083 56987. 18239. 47737. 299535. 419497.
 
0.077 57249. 18304. 48708. 296535. 420797.
 
0.071 57508. 18369. 49670. 296535. 422083.
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case is about 3.5 days. Table 17 is our best estimate of the total costs, 
while Tables 18 and 19 give best and worst-case costs. 
The ,optimal policy is also sensitive to the cost of inspection. When 
the cost of inspection is increased from $28.40 to $50. 00, the optimal 
7.5 days per inspection jumps to 15 days (Table 20). At an average water 
quality violation of three days, a $50. 00 inspection cost pushes the 3. 5 
days optimal inspection rate to once every 7.5 days (Table 24). 
The options of man inspection cost, social cost and water quality 
violation lengths can be combined to give the worst-case situation in terms 
of costs. This occurs when water quality violations last three days (start 
frequently), social costs are maximum, and inspection costs are $50. 00. 
Under this case, the optimal inspection rate still occurs at once every 
7.5 days. (See Table 26. This is also the optimal rate given in Tables 24 
and 25 when water quality violations last three days and inspections cost 
$50.00.) 
.The shortest optimal rate of inspection occurs once every 3.5 days 
under the options considered in this report. The other extreme of the 
factors which combined to give the highest inspection rate, will give the 
lowest inspection rate. This occurs if water quality violations last seven 
days, social costs are at a minimum, and inspection costs 150. 00. Under 
these options, inspections are less attractive because 
o water quality violations last longer - fewer 
inspections are necessary
 
o other violations are less costly
 
o inspections are more costly. 
This maximum optimal frequency rate occurred at once every 16. 5 days 
(Table Z2). This is not much greater than the 15 day rate of Table Z0. 
91
 
Table 17. Costs of Violations and Inspections
 
If Water Quality Violations Last Three Days
 
Option 1 
MO. IHEP. C0T OF COOT OF FINE TOTAL DRYS BETWEEN 
PER DAY VIOLS IMiPECTION INIPECTIONS 
1.000 941320. 1281861. 1133874. 1089306. 1. 
0.500 943615. 640911. 850406. 734140. 2. 
0.333 945885. 427287. 680225. 692848. 3. 
0.250 948132. 320465. 566937. 701659. 4. 
0.200 950353. 256372. 485946. 720779. 5. 
0.167 952553. 213644. 425203. 740993. 6. 
0.143 954728. 183123. 377958. 759892. 7. 
0.125 956880. 160233. 340162. 776950. 8. 
.0.111 959011. 142429. 309238. 792201. 9. 
0.100 961118. 128186. 283468. 805835. 10. 
0.091 963204. 116533. 261663. 818074. 11. 
0.083 9652C9. 106822. 242973. 829118. 12. 
0.077 967313. 98605. 226775. 839142. 13. 
0.071 969336. 91561. 212601. 848296. 14. 
NO.IHP. GRADING REVEERTION DPAIfAGE WATER 0. TOTAL 
PEP DAY 
1.000 53914. 17481. 64182. 805746. 941321. 
0.500 54208. 17552. 66111. 805745. 943616. 
0.333 54500. 17623. 68019. 805745. 945886. 
0.250 54788. 17694. 69906. 005745. 948133. 
0.200 55073. 17764. 71773. 805745. 950355. 
0.167 55355. 17833. 73620. 805745. 952554. 
0.143 55634. 17902. 75448. 805745. 954729. 
0.125 55911. 17971. 77256. 805745. 956881. 
0.111 56184. 18038. 79045. 805745. 959012. 
0.100 56454. 18106. 80815. 805745. 961120. 
0.091 56722. 18172. 82567. 805745. 963206. 
0.083 56987. 18239. 84301. 805745. 965270. 
0.077 57249. 18304. 86017. 805745. 967314. 
0-071 57508. 18369. 87715. 805745. 969337. 
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Table 18. Costs of Violations and Inspections 
f.Nater Quality Violations Last Three Days 
"Best-Case" Option 4 
NO. INP. COOT OF COST OF FINES TOTAL DAYO BETbEEM 
PEP DAY YIOL IH!PECTION IMHPECTIUMH 
1.000 799654. 1281361. 1133874:- 947640. 1. 
0.500 801112. 640931. 850406. 591636. 2. 
0.333 802555. 427287. 680325. 549517. 3. 
0.250 803983. 320465. 566937. 557510. 4. 
0.,200 805396. 256372. 485946. 575821. 5. 
0.167 806793. 213644. 425203. 595233. 6. 
0.143 808176. 183123. 377958. 613340. 7. 
0.125 803544. 16023S. 340162. 629614. 8. 
0.111 810898. 142429. 309238. 644098. 9. 
0.100 812238. 128186. 283468. 656955. 10. 
0.091 813564. 116533. 261663. 668433. It. 
0.083 84877. 106822. 242973. 678725. 12. 
0.07 816177. 98605. 226775. 688006. i3. 
0.071 817463. 91561. 212601. 696423. 14. 
NO.INWP. G'RADING PEVEGATION DPAIMAGE WATER 0. TOTAL 
PER DAY 
1.000 93914. 17481. 36344. 691916. 799654. 
0.500 54208. 17552. 37436. 691915. 801112. 
0.333 34500. 17623. 38517. 691915. 802555. 
0.250 54788. 17694. 39586. 691915. 803983. 
0.200 55073. 17764. 40643. 691916. 805396. 
0.167 57. 7833. 4168?. 691916. 806793. 
0.143 55634. 17902. 42724. 691916. 808176. 
0.125 55911. 17971. 43747. 691915. 809544. 
0.111 56184. 18038. 44761. 691915. M1088. 
0.100 56454. 18106. 45763. 691915. 812238. 
0.091 56722. 18172. 46755. 691915. 813564. 
0.083 56987. 18239. 47737. 691915. 814877. 
0.077 57249. 18304. 48708. 691916. 816177. 
0.071 57508. 18369. 49670. 691916. 817463. 
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Table 19. Costs of Violations and Inspections 
If Water Quality Violations Last Three Days 
"Worst-Case" Option 5 
H. INSP. CD:T OF COT OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETIEEN
 
PEP DAY YIOL! IHMPECTION INIPECTIONS
 
1.000 1575692. 1281861. 1133874. 1723678. 1.
 
0.500 1579618. 640931. 850406. 1370143. 2.
 
0.333 1583503. 42728?. 680325. 1330465. 3.
 
0.250 1587346. 320465. 566937. 1340874. 4.
 
0.200 1591149. 256372. 485946. 1361574. 5.
 
0.167 1594910. 213644. 425203. 1383350. 6.
 
0.143 1598631. 183123. 377958. 1403796. 7.
 
0.125 1602312. 160233. 340162. 1422383. 8.
 
0.111 1605956. 142429. 309238. 1439147. 9.
 
0.100 1609562. 128186. 283468. 1454279. 10.
 
0.091 1613131. 116533. 261663. 1468000. 11.
 
0.083 1616662. 106022. 242973. - 1480510. 12. 
0.077 1629158. 98605. 226775. 1491987. 13.
 
0.071 1623618. 91561. 212601. 1502578. 14.
 
MO.IHSP. GPADIHG PEVEGATION DPAIHAGE WATEP 0. TOTAL
 
PER DAY
 
1.000 55927. 17481. 118114. 1384173. 1575693.
 
0.500 56232. 17552. 121663. 1384171. 1579619.
 
0.333 56535. 17623. 125175. 1384171. 1583504.
 
0.250 56834. 17694. 128648. 1384171. 1587347.
 
0.200 57129. 17764. 132084. 1384173. 1591150.
 
0.167 57422. 17833. 135483. 1384173. 1594911.
 
0.143 57712. 17902. 138846. 1384173. 1598633.
 
0.125 57998. 17971. 142174. 1384171. 1602313.
 
0.111 58282. 18038. 145466. 1384171. 1605957.
 
0.100 58562. 18106. 148724. 1384171. 160956.
 
0.091 58840. 18172. 151948. 1384171. 1613131.
 
0.083 59114. 18239. 155139. 1384171. 1616663.
 
0.077 59386. 18304. 158297. 1384173. 1620159.
 
0.071 59655. 18369. 161422. 1384173. 1623619.
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Table 20. Costs of Inspection Process If Inspection 
Costs $50 and Water Quality Violations Last Seven Days 
Option I 
NO. INSP., :O;T OF COST OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETWEEN
 
PER DAY VIOL! INSPECTION IriPECTIONM
 
1.000 480895. 2256800. 520232. 2217462. 1.
 
0.500 483190. 1128400. 455203. 1156386. 2.
 
0.333 485461. 752266. 404625. 833102. 3.
 
0.250 487707. 564200. 364163. 687744. 4.
 
0.200 489929. 451360. 331057. 610232. 5
 
0.167 492128. 376133. 303469. 564791. 6
 
0.143 494303. 322400. 280125. 536578. 7
 
0.125 496456. 282100. 260116. 518439. 8.
 
0.111 498586. 250755. 242775. 506566 9
 
0.100 500694. 225680. 227602. 498772. 10.
 
0.091 502780. 205164. 214213. 493730. 11.
 
0.083 504845. 188067. 202312. 490599. 12.
 
0.07? 506888. 173600. 191664. 488824. 13.
 
0.071 508911. 161200. 182081. 488030. 14.
 
0.067 510913. 150453. 173411. 487956. 15.
 
0.06, 512895. 141050. 165528. 488417. 16.
 
0.059 514856. 132753. 15832. 489279. 17.
 
0.056 516800. 125378. 151734. 490443. 18.
 
0.053 518723. 118779. 145665. 491837. 19.
 
0.050 520628. 112840. 140062. 493406. 20.
 
0.048 522514. 107467. 134875. 495105. 21.
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Table 21. Costs of Inspection Process If Inspections
 
Cost $50 and Water Quality Violations Last Seven Days
 
Option 1 
til. IH;P. CODT OF 

PEP DAY VIOL! 
0.143 494303. 
0.071 508911. 
0.048 522514. 

0.036 535212. 
0.029 547094. 

0.024 558234. 

0.020 568702. 
0.018 578556. 

0.016 587848. 

0.014 596625. 

0.013 604930. 

0.012 612798. 

0.011 620264. 

0.010 62735.: 

0.010 634107. 

0 .009 640536. 
0.003_ 6466b6. 
0.00: 652519. 

0.008 658113. 

0.007 63463. 

0. 6'ITE-68587. 

0.006 673498. 
0.006 678210. 

0.006 682733. 

0.006 687080. 

0.005 691259. 

COT OF 

IM-PECTIOi 

322400. 
161200. 
107467. 

80600. 

64480 

5373. 

46057. 
40300. 

35822. 

32240. 

29309. 

26867. 

24800. 

23029. 

21493. 

20150. 

18965. 

17911. 

16968. 

16120. 

15352. 

14655. 

14017. 

13433. 

12896. 

12400. 

FINES 
280125. 
182081. 
134875. 

107107. 

8820. 

75867. 

66211. 
58736. 

52777. 

47916. 

43875. 

40462. 

37542. 

35016. 

32807. 

30861. 
29133. 

27588. 

26199. 

24943. 

23801. 
22760. 

21806. 

20929. 

20119. 

19370. 

TOTAL DAY BETWEEN 
INEPECTIONE 
536578. 7. 
488030. 14. 
495105. 21.
 
508705. 23.
 
522753. 35. 
536100. 42.
 
548548. 49. 
560119. 56.
 
570893. 63.
 
580948. 70.
 
590364. 77.
 
599201. 84.
 
60721. 91.
 
615370. 98.
 
622793. 105.
 
629824. 112.
 
636457. 119.
 
642842. 126.
 
648882. 133.
 
654640. 140.
 
660138. 147.
 
66532. 154.
 
670421. 161.
 
675238. 168.
 
679856. 175.
 
. 684288. 182. 
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The Longest Optimal Days Between InspectionsTable 2Z. 
Water Quality Violations = 7 Days 
Minimum Social Costs = Option 4 
Maximum Inspection Cost = $50 
NO. INIP. COST OF CEDT OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETIEEN 
PEP DAY VIOLS IH-EPECTION INEPECTIONW 
1.000 4042T4. 2256800. 520232. 2140841. 1. 
0.500 405732. 1128400. 455203. 1078928. 2. 
0.333 407175. 752266. 404625. 754816. 3. 
0.250 408603. 564200. 364163. 608640. 4. 
0.200 4100315. 451360. 331057. 530318. 5. 
0.167 411413. 376133. 303169. 481077. 6. 
0.143 412795. 322400. 280125. 455070. 1. 
0.125 414164. 282100. 260116. 436148. 8. 
0.111 415518. 250755. 242775. 423498. 9. 
0.100 416858. 225680. 227602. 414937. 10. 
0.091 418185. 205164. 214213. 409135. 11. 
0.083 419497. 188067. 202312. 405251. 12. 
0.077 420797. 173600. 191664. 402732. 13. 
0.071 1 4220a3. 161200. 182081. 401202. 14. 
0.067 423356. 150453. 173411. 400399. 15. 
0.063 424616. 141050. 165528. 400138. 16. 
0.059 425:65. 132753. 158332. 400286. 17. 
0.056 427100. 125378. 151734. 400743. 18. 
0.053 428323. 118779. 145665. 401437. 19. 
0.050 429535. 112840. 140062. 402312. 20. 
0.048 4301734. 107467. 134875. 403326. 21. 
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Table 23. Costs of Violations and Inspections if Water
 
Quality Violations Last Seven Days and Inspections
 
Cost $50. Maximum Social Costs - Option 5 
NO. IMP.' COOT OF COOT OF FINES TOTAL DAYS BETbEEN 
PEP DAY VIOLS INMPECTION IMNPECTIOME
 
1.000 784737. 2256800. 520232. 2521304. 1.
 
0.500 788664. 1128400. 455203. 1461860. 2. 
0.333 792549. 752266. 404625. 1140190. 3. 
0.250 796392. 564200. 364163. 996429. 4. 
0.200 800194. 451360. 331057. 920497. 5. 
0.167 8039955. 376133. 303469. 876619. 6.
 
0.143 807676. 322400. 280125. 849950. 7
 
0.125 811359. 282100. 260116. 833342. 8
 
0.111 815003. 25 0755. 242775. 8228. 9 
0.100 818608. 2-5680. 227602. 816686. 10. 
0.091 822177. 205164. 214213. 813127. 11. 
0.083 825797. 188067. 202312. 811461. 12. 
0.077 SE9263. 173600. 191664. 811138. 13.
 
0.071 892663. 161200. 182081. 811781. 14.
 
NO.INEP. GPADING PEVESATION DPAINAGE WATEP 0. TOTAL 
PER DAY 
1.000 55927. 17481. 118114. 593216. 784737. 
0.500 56232. 17552. 121663. 593216. 788664.
 
0.933 56535. 17623. 125175. 593216. 792549.
 
0.250 56834. 17694. 128648. 593216. 796392.
 
0.200 57129. 17764. 132084. 593216. 800194.
 
0.167 57422. 17833. 135483. 593216. 803955.
 
0.143 57712. 17902. 138846. 593216. 807678.
 
0.125 57998. 17971. 142174. 593216. 811359.
 
0.111 58282. 18038. 145466. 593216. 815003. 
0.100 58562. 18106. 148724. 593216. 818608.
 
0.091 58840. 18172. 151948. 593216. 822177.
 
0.083 59114. 18239. 155139. 593216. 825707.
 
0.077 59386. 18304. 158297. 593216. 82903. 
0.071 59655. 18369. 161422. 593216. 832663.
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Table 24. Costs of Inspection Process If Man Inspections
 
Cost $50 and Water Quality Violations Last Three Days
 
Option 1 
NO. ItEP. CO:.T OF 
PEP DAY VIOL: 

1.000 941320. 

0.500 943615. 
0.333 945885. 

0.250 948132. 

0.200 950353. 

0.167 952553. 

0.143 954728. 

0.125 956880. 
0.111 959011. 
0.100 961118. 

0.091 963204. 

0.083 965269. 

0.077 967313. 

0.071, 969336. 

0.067 971338. 

0.063 973320. 

0.059 975282. 

0.056 977225. 

0.053 979149. 

0.050 981053. 

0.048 982939. 

COUT OF 
INEPECTION 

2256800. 

1128400. 
752266. 

564200. 

451360. 
376133. 

322400. 

282100. 

250755. 

225680. 

205164. 

188067. 

173600. 

161200. 

150453. 

141050. 

132753. 

125378. 

118779. 

112840. 

107467. 

FINES 

1133874. 

850406. 

680325. 
566937. 

485946. 

425203. 

377958. 
340162. 

309238. 

283468. 

261663. 

242973. 

226775. 

212601. 

200095 

188979. 

179033. 

170081. 

1619382. 

154619. 

147897. 

TOTAL DAY- BETWJEEN 
IN:PEETIONi 
2064244. 1.
 
1221608. 2.
 
1017827. 3.
 
945394. 4.
 
915767. 5. 
903482. 6. 
89169 T. 
898817. 8. 
900527. 9. 
903329. 10. 
906704. 11. 
910362. 12. 
914137. 13. 
917934. 14.
 
921695. 15.
 
925390. 16.
 
929002. 17.
 
9325 1. 18.
 
935945. 19.
 
939273. 20.
 
942508. 21.
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Table 25. Costs of Violations and Inspections 
If Water Quality Violations Last Three Days 
and Inspections Cost $50. 
Minimum Social Costs - Option 4 
TOTAL DAY! BETIEEN
NO. INCP. OCT OF COZT OF 

PEP DAY VIOL: IN:PECTION 

1.000 799654. 2256800. 

0.500 801112. 1128400. 

0.333 802555. 

0.250 803983. 

0.200 805396. 

0.167 806793. 

0.143 ,808176. 

0.125 809544. 

0.111 810898. 

0.100 812238. 

0.091 *13564. 

0.083 814877. 

0.077 816177. 

0.071 817463. 

PEP DAY 
1.000 53914. 

0.500 54208. 

0.333 - 54500. 
0.250 54788. 

0.200 55073. 

0.167 55355. 

0.143 55634. 

0.125 55911. 

0.111 56184. 

0.100 56454. 

0.091 56722. 

0.083 56987. 

0.077 57249. 

0.071 57508. 

752266. 

564200. 

451360. 

376133. 

322400. 

282100. 

250755. 

225680. 

20564. 

188067. 

173600. 

161200. 

17481. 

17552. 

17623. 

17694. 

17764. 

17833. 

17902. 

17971. 

18038. 

18106. 

18172. 

18239. 

18304. 

18369. 

FINE 

1133874. 

850406. 

680325. 

566937. 

485946. 

425203. 

37795. 

340162. 

309238. 

283468. 

261663. 

242973. 

226775. 

212601. 

36344. 

37436. 

38517. 

39586. 

40643. 

41689. 

42724. 

43747. 

44761. 

45763. 

46755. 

47737. 

48708. 

49670. 

1922578. 

1079105. 

874496. 

801245. 

770809.' 

757723. 

752618. 

751481. 

752414. 

754448. 

757064. 

759970. 

763001. 

766061. 

IIATEP 0. 

691916. 

691915. 

691915. 

691915. 

691916. 

691916. 

691916. 

691915. 

691915. 

691915. 

691915. 

691915. 

691916. 

691916. 

NO.: ;:P. GRADING PEVEGRTIOH DRAINAGE 

IN:PECTION7
 
1.
 
2.
 
3.
 
4.
 
5.
 
6.
 
7.
 
S.
 
9.
 
10.
 
11.
 
12.
 
13.
 
14.
 
TOTAL
 
799654.
 
801112.
 
802555.
 
803983.
 
805396.
 
806793.
 
808176.
 
809544.
 
810898.
 
812238.
 
813564.
 
814877.
 
816177.
 
817463.
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Table 26. The Most Expensive Assumptions 
Water Quality Violations = 3 Days 
Maximum Social Costs = Option 5 
Maximum Inspection Cost = $50 
HO. IH;P. CDT OF 

PEP DAY YIOL--

1.000 1575692. 

&.500 1579618. 

0.333 1583503. 

0.250 158734P. 

0.200 1591149. 

0.167 1594910. 

0.143 1598631. 

0.125 1602312. 

0.111 1605956. 

0.100 1609562. 

0.091 1613131. 

0.083 1616662. 

0.0 1620158. 

0.071, 16E3618. 

0.067 1627042. 

0.063 1630431. 

0.059 1633787. 

0.056 1637110. 

0.053 1640399. 

0.050 1643654. 

0.048 - 1646880. 
COCT OF 

INEPETJON 
2256800. 

1128400. 

752266. 

564200. 

451360. 

376133. 

322400. 

282100. 

250755. 

225680. 

205164. 

183067. 

173600. 

161200. 

150453. 

141050. 

13275. 

125378. 

113779. 

112840. 

107467. 

FINES 

11S3874. 

850406. 

680325. 

566937. 

485946. 

4 5203. 

37795. 
340162. 

309238. 

283468. 

261663. 

242973. 

226775. 

212601. 

200095. 

188979. 

179033. 

170081. 

161982. 

154619. 

147897. 

TOTRL DAYS BETIEEN 
IhE PECTIONS 
2698617. 1.
 
1857612. 2.
 
1655445. 3.
 
1584609. 4.
 
1556562. 5.
 
1545839. 6.
 
1543072.
 
1544250. 8.
 
1547473. 9.
 
1551773. 10.
 
1556631. 11.
 
1561755. 12.
 
1566982. 13.
 
1572216. 14.
 
1577400. 15.
 
1582502. 16.
 
1587507. 17.
 
1592406. 18.
 
1597196. 19.
 
1601875. 20.
 
1606449. 21.
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Summarizing, Table 27 compares the minimum inspection process 
costs with the costs under the 1974 inspection rate and the worst-case 
yearly rate. These costs depend on the social costs, inspection costs, and 
frequencies of violations. The least savings in using the optimal rate 
occurs under the assumption that water quality violations last seven days. 
As a "best" optimal plan, MATHEMATICA recommends the social cost 
option 1, water quality violations of length 3 days, with man inspection 
costs of $50. 00 to give an optimal rate of inspection of 7. 5 days with a 
total estimated savings over the 1974 inspection rate (once in every 55 days) 
of $1,048,448 - $898, 817 = $119, 631. 
The total cost of violations under the optimal rate can be found in 
Table 17. These costs are 
Grading $ 55,911
 
Revegetation 17,971
 
Drainage 77,256
 
Water Quality 805,745 
Total $956,881 
The total fines collected for water quality violations at the optimal 
inspection rate is estimated to be $340, 162. 
It is likely that water quality violations would decrease at a 7. 5 
day inspection rate. As a result, the total of fines collected would also 
decrease. However, because the total fines collected are less than the 
cost of water quality violations, a decrease in water quality violations 
would lower the estimated cost of $898, 817. The estimated savings would 
thus be greater than $119, 631 if water quality violations decreased with 
increasing inspection rates. 
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Table 27. Comparison of Optimal Inspection Costs 
With Yearly and 1974 Inspection Rates 
Social Water 
Cost QualityOption Duration 
Cost of 
Manned
Inspection 
Optimal 
Time Between 
Inspections 
Inspections 
1974 Rate CAV E 
at Inspections at 
Yearly Rate 
COPX 
Inspectiorls at 
Optimal Rate 
COPT 
Percent of Costs 
of 1974 Rate 
100 COPT /CAV E 
Maximum 
Savings
C AVE-COP T 
_______(days) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
$28.40 
28.40 
28.40 
28.40 
28.40 
7.5 
7.5 
8.0 
8.0 
7.5 
$ 531,695 
615,393 
727,850 
428,698 
97Z,075 
$ 905,Z88 
1,211,093 
969,269 
675, 56Z 
1,507,774 
$ 396,572 
413,993 
613,049 
314,281 
710,674 
74.6 
67.3 
84.3 
73.3 
73.1 
$135,393 
201,400 
114,801 
114,417 
261,401 
0 
1 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
$28.40 
Z8.40 
Z8.40 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
$1,000,625 
824,078 
1,703,031 
$1,365,717 
1,070,942 
2,298,731 
$ 692,848 
549,517 
1,330,465 
69.2 $307,777 
Z74,561 
372,566 
1 
4 
5 
7 
7 
7 
$50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
15.0 
16.0 
13.0 
$ 558,023 
465,282 
929,899 
$ 905,288 
675,562 
1,507,774 
$ 487,956 
400,138 
811,138 
48.8 
86.0 
$ 70,067 
65,144 
118,761 
1 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
$50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
7.5 
8.0 
7.5 
$1,018,448 
841,903 
1,720,856 
$11 365,717 
1,070,942 
z,z98,731 
$ 898,817 
751,481 
1,543,072 
88.Z $119,61 
90,422 
177,784 
4. Optimal Ground Inspection Under Adjusted 1971-74 Inspection Rates 
Estimates of the frequency of occurrence of violations depend 
on the frequency of inspections made during 1971-74. After the analysis 
of the previous section was presented to the Kentucky Division of Rec­
lamation, MATHMATICA was given new information on this inspection 
rate. Prior to 1975, inspectors were not obligated to file an inspection 
report for each inspection. As a result, the total number of inspections 
is significantly higher than the value Z760 derived from the inspection 
reports. Claude Downing has records which show an average of 244 
inspections per month, during fiscal year 1975. A subjective estimate 
of the rate of inspections prior to 1975 is 85 percent of this value. Thus, 
an estimate of the true rate of inspections per permit per week in 1974 is 
244 X.85 X 12 
= 0.373918
'D 128 '52 
This value gives an average revisit time per permit of 18.72 days; a 
value significantly less than the 55 days used in Section 3. 
While this adjusted value of PD does change the estimates of 
violation frequencies, (Table 28) the most significant effect, which 
considerably lengthens the optimal revisit time, is the rate of fines for 
water quality violations. The adjusted value of PD im0rplies the average 
fine collected per water quality violation is only one-third of the original 
estimated average fine. 
Fines are only one benefit of inspections. As noted in the 
previous section, it can be expected that water quality violations will 
decrease with increasing inspections. If the ratio of fines is to be
 
considerably reduced, the model should be adjusted to allow for decreasing 
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Table 28. Estimated Frequencies for Detection Model 
When 1971-74 Inspection Rate is Once Every 19 
Drainage 
Control 
(per week) 
26.00 
5.33 

4.00 

0.9615 
0.8124 

0.7500 

1.2683 
0.0466 

0.9706 

0.1990 

0.0373 

Days 
Water 
Quality 
(per week) 
7.00
 
5.87
 
3.00
 
0.8571 
0.8296
 
0.6667
 
0. 0101 
0.00996
 
0.0659
 
0.0552
 
0.00941
 
Grading 
Parameter (per week) 
LI 26.00 
L 13.79 
L 2 13.00 
r 0.9615 
r 0.9275 
r2 0.9231 
p 1 0. 1309 
p 0.0504 
fI 0.7728 
f 0.4098 
s 0.0297 
Revegetation 
(per week) 
34.67 

18.13 

17.33 

0.9712 
0.9448 

0.9423 

0.00967 
0.00834 

0.2510 

0.1313 

0.00724 
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water quarlity violations. Because the optimal inspection policy is much 
more sensitive to any assumptions about fines, costs, and frequencies 
of the relatively short water qualities than it is sensitive to the parameters 
of the other three violation types, correct modelling of water quality 
violations is important. The following adjustments have been made on 
the parameters for water quality violations: 
Original Model Adjusted Model 
Water quality violations'last Water quality violations last 
a fixed average length inde- an average of 7 days if no 
pendent of the inspection fre- inspections are made; the viola­
quency. Two estimated lengths tions last 3 days after detection. 
are 3 days and 7 days. 
Fines for water quality viola- Fines for water quality violations 
tions are collected at a rate are collected at a rate such that 
such that if inspections are if inspections are made every 19 
made every 55 days, an average days, an average of 12 fines of 
of IZ fines of $5000 each are $5000 each are collected. 
collected. 
The violation parameters L 1 , L 2, and f used to estimate the 
remaining parameters remain unchanged. The remaining parameters 
depend on D" The adjusted parameters are given in Table 28. 
The same methodology as used in Section 3 was used to determine 
the optimal ground inspection frequency under three social cost options. 
Option 4 and 5, identical to options 4 and 5 of Table 10, are derived by 
scaling the total estimated social costs by the shortest and longest dura­
tions, L2 and Ll, respectively, to obtain costs per week. Option 6 uses
 
the average duration L under the adjusted inspection rate. Because L is
 
approximately the minimum duration L2 for three of the violations, only
 
water quality costs differ significantly from option 4.
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Table 29. Social Cost Options for Sensitivity Analysis
 
Under Adjusted Inspection Rates
 
Cost/Week of Violation 
Option Grading Revegetation 
Drainage 
Control 
Water 
Quality 
Option 4 24.64 24.04 60.67 833. 13 
Option 5 Z5.56 24.04 197. 17 1666.67 
Option 6 24. 64 24.04 60.67 997.73 
Social costs are low under either options 4 or 6. Fines are 
collected at a much lower rate than assumed in Section 3. Yet, the 
optimal inspection rates are about the same as in Section 3. This occurs 
because, unlike Section 3, there are two benefits accrued by detecting 
poor water quality. Detections increase fines and shorten the length. 
Under option 4 or 6, the optimal rate is about one inspection per permit 
every ten days when ground inspections cost $Z8.40. When inspections 
cost $50, the optimal rate is approximately the 18 day rate actually conducted 
during the 1971-74 period. 
The $28.40 cost of inspection has been calculated by assuming 
ten inspectors make 400 inspecttons per month. If 124 permitted areas 
are to be inspected, this is equivalent to ten inspectors inspecting a permit 
area once every 9. 4 days. 
The $50. 00 cost of inspection is the approximate cost if ten 
inspectors make 207 inspections per month. At this inspection rate, 
124 permitted areas are inspected every 18 days. 
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Thus, very surprisingly, under our cost model, ten inspectors 
is optimal over a broad range of estimated costs per inspection. The 
invarinace of the optimal number of ten inspectors occurs because the 
optimal average days between ground inspections is approximately 
proportional to inspection costs. For a fixed number of inspectors, 
the cost per inspection is indeed proportional to the number of days 
between inspections. Thus, the optimal number of inspectors is fixed. 
If social cost option 6 is used, violations are more costly and, 
hence, inspections are more beneficial. At the $28.40 inspection cost, 
the optimal inspection rate is once per six days. The solution to 
the equation 
xinspectors _ 9.4 days 
10 inspectors 6 days 
is 16 inspectors per 124 permits. When inspections cost $50 the 
optimal inspection rate is once per 10. 5 days. The optimal number of 
inspectors at the $50 rate is also-f6. 
In this section, we have kept the optimal inspection rate high by 
using a model which assumes water quality violation frequencies decrease 
with increasing inspection rates. In Section 3, the optimal inspection 
rate is high because we have used a high rate of fines per inspection. 
Neither one of these cases need be true. However, it is certain that 
if sufficiently high fines are collected, water quality violation frequencies 
will decrease both in average duration and in frequency of starts. 
When start frequencies are lowered, inspection rates can be lowered. The 
development of an optimal rate of fines as well as optimal inspection 
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policy using dynamic start frequencies depending on these rates is very 
important, but beyond the scope of this report. 
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Social 
Cost Cost of Man 
Option Inspections 
4 $28.40 
5 28.40 
6 28.40 
4 $50.00 
5 50.00 
6 50.00 
o 
Table 30. Comparison of Optimal Adjusted Costs
 
With Yearly and 1974 Adjusted Costs
 
Inspedtions Inspections Inspections at 
optimal Time at 1974 Rate at Yearly Rate Optimal Rate 
Between 
Inspections (days CAVE MAX opt 
10.5 $479,547 $895, 163 $462,647 
6.0 974, z68 Z, 107, 939 872,011 

9.5 536,793 968,047 513, 67Z 

19 531, 629 $895, 163 $531, 608 

10.5 i, 026, 350 2, 107,939 993,485 
18 588,875 968,047 588,715 
Percent of Costs 
of 1974 Rate 
C100 opt/ AVE 
96.5 
89.5 
95.7 
100.0 
96.8 
100.0 
Maximum
 
, Savings
 
0 AVE- opt
 
16,900
 
102, 257
 
23, 121
 
z1 
32,865 
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Table 31. Costs of Violations and Inspections Under Adjusted Rates 
NO.INSP. 

PER DAY 
1.000 

0.500 

0.333 

0.250 

0.200 

0.167 

0'.143 

0.125 

0.1%1 

0.100 

0.091 

0'.003 
0.077 

0.071 

FOR VIOLS.
 
(4) 
7
 
IF OLD COSTS
 
NO. INSP. 

PER DAY 
1.000 ." 
0.500 
0.333 
0.250 --
0.200 
0.167 
0.143 
0.125 
0.11.1 
0.100 
0.091 
0.083 
0.077 
0.071 
Option 4. 
GRADING REVEGATION DRAINAGE 

61395. 

61730. 

62062. 

62390. 

62715. 

63036. 

63354. 

63669. 

63980. 

64288. 

64592. 

64894. 

65192. 

65488. 

COST OF 

VIOLS 

290882. 

318323. 

340125. 

357973. 

372940. 

385740. 

396869. 

406680. 

4,15433. 

423324. 

430500. 

4 707g 

4 3148 

448786. 

19455. 

19535. 

19614. 

19693. 

19771. 

19848. 

19925. 

20001. 

20076. 

20151. 

20225. 

20299. 

20372. 

20445. 

COST OF 

INSPECTION 

1281861. 

640931. 

427287. 

320465. 

256372. 

213644. 

183123. 

160233. 

142429. 

128186. 

116533. 

log6922. 

9 05. 

91561. 

58412. 

60168. 

61904. 

63622. 

65321. 

67002. 

68666. 

70311. 

71939. 

73551. 

75145. 

762. 

78285. 

79830. 

FINES 

241200. 

187600. 

159283. 

140700. 

127084. 

116441. 

107770. 

100500. 

94276. 

88863. 

84096. 

79857. 

7 054. 

72619. 

ill
 
WATER Q. TOTAL
 
151620. 290882.
 
176890. 318323.
 
196544. 340125.
 
212268. 357973.
 
225132. 372940.
 
235853. 385740.
 
244924. 396869.
 
252699. 406680.
 
259438. 415433.
 
265334. 423324.
 
270537. 430500.
 
-27162. "37 78. 
279299. -443f,48.
 
283023. 448786.
 
TOTAL DAYS BETWEEN
 
INSPECTIONS
 
1331543. 1. 
771653. 2. 
608129. 3. 
537738. 4. 
502228. 5. 
482942. 6. 
472222. 7. 
466413. 8. 
463586. 9. 
462647. 10. 
-462936. ---11.
 
464243. 12.
 
4 5 99. 13.
 
467728. -14. 
Table 32. Cost of Violations and Inspections Under Adjusted Rates 
Option 5. 
-­ NO.I:P. GPADING REYESATIO?IPAINAGE WATEP 0. TOTAL 
PER DAY 
1.000 63687. 19455. 189833. 303314. 576290. 
0.500 64035. 19535. 195538. 353866. 632974. 
0.333 64379. 19614. 201182. 393185. 67S360. 
0.250 64720. 19693. 206764. 424640. 715816. 
0.200 65057. 19771. 212286. 450376. 747489. 
0.167 65390. 19848. 217750. 471822. 774809. 
0.143 65720. 19925. 223155. 489969. 798768. 
0.125 66046. 20001. 228503. 505523. 820073. 
0.111 66369. 20076. 233794. 519004. 839243. 
0.100 66688. 20151. 239031. 530799. 856669. 
0.091 67004. 20225. 244212. 541207. 872649. 
0.083 67317. 20299. 249340. 550459. 887415. 
0.077 67626. 20372. 254415. 558736. 901150. 
0.071 67933. 20445. 259439. 566186. 914002. 
>1 14 1 
FYPE 0 FOR VIOLS. 
>1 
PERDALM4' 
>5.86727 
FYPE 0 IF OLD COC 
> 
NO. INIP. COT OF MOET OF FINES TOTAL DAYE BETWEEH 
PER DAY VIOLS INIPECTION INSPECTION­
1.000 576290. 1281061. 241200. 1616950. 1. 
0.500 632974. 640931. 187600. 1086304. 2. 
0.333 678360. 427287. 159283. 946364. 3. 
0.250 715816. 320465. 140700. 895581. 4. 
0.200 747489. 256372. 127084. 876777. 5. 
0.167 774809. 213644. 116441. 872011. 6. 
0.143 798768. 183123. 107770. 874120. 7. 
0.125 820073. 160233. 100500. 879805. 8. 
0.111 839243. 142429. 94276. 887396. 9. 
0.100 856669. 128186. 88863. 895992. 10. 
0.091 872649. 116533. 84096. 905084. 11. 
0.083 887415. 106822. 79857. 914379. 12. 
0.077 901150. 98605. 76054. 923700. 13. 
0.071 914002. 91561. 72619. 932944. 14. 
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Table 33. Cost of Violations and Inspections Under Adjusted Rates 
ND.IMNP. 
PEP DAY
 
1.?00 

0.500 

0.333 

0.250 

0.200 

0.167 

0.143 

0.125 

0.111 

0.100 

0.091 

0.083 

0.07? 

0.01 

>1
 
>I 14 1
 
TYPE 0 FOR VIOCS.
 
PERAL'4. 
5.86727 
TYPE 0 IF ULD CflTZ
 
NO. IM:P. 
PER ]DAY 
1.000 

0.500 

0.333 

0.250 

0.200 

0.167 

0.143 

0.125 

-0.111 

0.100 

0.091 

0.083 

0.077 

0.071 

GRADING 
61395. 

61730. 

62062. 

62390. 

62715. 

63036. 

63354. 

63669. 

63980. 

E-42%, 

64592. 

64894. 

65192. 

65488. 

CUT OF 

VIULS 
320153. 

352472. 

378069. 

398952. 

416402. 

431272. 

444152. 

455465. 

465519. 

474548. 

482728. 

490199. 

497069. 

503425. 

Option 6.
 
PEVEGTIUN DPRIASE 

19455. 

19535. 

19614. 

19692. 

19771. 

19848. 

19925. 

20001. 

20076. 

20151. 

20225. 

20299. 

20372. 

20445. 

58412. 

60168. 

61904. 
63622. 
6521. 

67002. 

68666. 

70311. 

71939. 

73551. 

75145. 

7672S. 

78285. 

79830. 

CDST OF FINES 
IMRPECTION 
1281861. 241 00. 
640931. 187600. 
427287. 159283. 
320465. 140700. 
256372. 127084. 
213644. 116441. 
183123. 107770. 
160233. 100500. 
142429. 94276. 
128186. 88869. 
116533. 84096. 
106822. 79857. 
98605. 76054. 
91561. 72619. 
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WATEP 0. TOTAL
 
180891. 320153.
 
211039. 352472.
 
234488. 378069
 
2593247. 390952
 
268595. 416402.
 
281385. 431272.
 
292208. 444152.
 
301484. 455465.
 
309524. 465519.
 
316558. 474548.
 
22766. 4.2728.
 
328893. 490199.
 
323220. 497069.
 
337662. 503425.
 
TOTAL DAYS BETIWEEN 
IMPECTION: 
1360814. 1.
 
805803. 2.
 
646073. 3.
 
578717. 4.
 
545691. 5.
 
528474. 6.
 
519505. 7.
 
515197. o.
 
513672. 9.
 
513871. 10.
 
515165. II.
 
517164. 12.
 
519619. 13.
 
522367. 14.
 
Costs of Violations and Inspections Under Adjusted RatesTable 34. 
If Man Inspections Cost $50.
 
Option 4.
 
DAYS BETWEEN
TOTAL
FINES
COST OF
COST OF
NO. INSP. INSPECTIONS
PER DAY VIOLS INSPECTION PER AY,23o681.1. 2306481.
1.000 290882. 2256800. 241200. 2.
1259122.
187600.
1128400.
318323.
0.500 

933108. 3.
 0.333 340125. 752266. 159283. 

781473. 4.
0.250 357973- 564200. 140700. 
 5.
0.200 372940. 451360. 127084. 697215. 
645431.
116441.
376133.
385740.
0.167 7.
611498.
322400. 107770.
396869.
0.143 
-8.
588280.
100500.
282100.
406680.
0.125 
 9.
94276. 571913-
250755.
415433.
0.111 10.
560140.
88863.
225680.
423324.
0.100 11.
551567.
84096.
205164.
430500.
0.091 12.
545287.
79857.
188067.
437078.
0.0,183 13.
540694-
76054.
173600.
443148.
0.077 14.
72619. 537367.
161200.
448786.
0.074 
 15.
69498. 535004-
0.067 454049. 150453. 16.
66647. 533390-
0.063 458987. 141050. 
0.059 463641. 132753. 64031. 532363- 17.
 
18.
61620. 531799.
125378.
468042.
0.056 19.
531608.
59391-
118779.
472220.
0.053 20.
531716.
57322.
112840.
476199.
0.050 21.
55397. 532069.
107467-
479999-
0.048 
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Table 35. Cost of Violations and Inspections Under Adjusted Rates 
If Ground Inspections Cost $50. 
Option 6. 
TOTAL DAYS BETWEEN
COT OF FINES
"O.-INEP.-CST OF 
PEP DAY VIOL, IWPECTIOPI I1.PECTIOit 1.
C335753.
320153. 2256800. 	 241200.
1.000 
 2.
187600. 12-93272.
352472. 1128400.
0.500 
 3.
52266. 159283. 97105 .
378069.
0.333 
 4.
 
398952. 564200. 	 140700. 822452. 5.
127084. 740678.

0.250 

0.200 416402. 451360. 	 6 3
 
. 
6.
690'3
0.167 431272. 376133. 116441. 

-.
658782.
444152. 322400. 	 107770.
0.143 
 8. 
0.125 455465. 282100. 100500. 637065. 94276. 621999.
0.111 465519. 250755. 	
9.
 
10.
88863. 611369.
0.100 474548. 225680. 	 4 484U9 . 6 037.95 . 
. 482728. 205164. 	 12..01qI 
 598409. 

-.- 490199. 188067. 79857. 	 13.083 594614.
0.077 	 497069. 173600. 76054. 

726_19 992006. 
 14.
 0.071 903429. 161200. 
 15.
69498. 590294.
0.067 509339. 150453. 

666 4 7. 589271. 16. o. 063 514868. 141050. 17.
 
0.059 520061. 132753. 	 64031. 58783. 18.8. 61620. 58715.
0.056' 924997. 12537, 
 59391. 588979. 19.
 0.053 529591. 118779. 
 0. 20.
57-3 2. 98
533990. 112040.
0.050 
 590249. 1.0.048 538179. 107467. 	 55397 . 
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Table 36. 
NO. IN:P. 
PEP DAY 
1.000 

0.500 

0.333 

0.250 

0.200 

0.167 

0.143 

0.125 

0.111 , 
0.100 

0.Ofr1,,, 
", 

f. 077,
0 .
 
o .il 
-J 

0.056 
0.u53 

u.U50, 

.48 

Cost of Violations and Inspections Under Adjusted Rates 
If Ground Inspections Cost $50. 
Option 5. 
DAYS BETWEENOF FINES TOTALCOT OF CU T 
IH:PECTIONEVIOLS IMPECTION 1.241200. 2591889.
576290. 2256800. 

1573774. 
 2.
632974. 1128400. 	 187600. 

159283. 1271342. 
 3.
678360. 752266. 
 4.
1139315.
715816. 564200. 	 140700. 
 5.
127084. 1071764.
747489. 451360. 
 6.
1034500.
774809. 376133. 	 116441. 
 7.
107770. 1013297.
7987M8. 322400. 

82 0C0. ;, 0!'2 8.SO.,
G60[73. 
339243. p50755.. 942q, 1995722. 9. 
_993485j,, 10.856669; 22568(k. 99345. ll.
8726,.< 205164. 84090. 

?95624. 12.
887415. 180067. 7985i. 

90119, 173600. 76054. 998695. It.
 1. 1002582., 	 1.
914002. 16120u. 

926090. 1i 69498. 1007044 w 19....
 
q510. 141. 
 6664". IUH9it. 16M.2.9..
 
17~.9=.o948344., , -MC53. 64031. 	 18. 
102 417. 18,958660. in53, . b16 2 0. 	 19.fZ901.
968514. 118779. 5939U 1_,, 

20.,,,
97953.' 112340." 57322., I,, 

55397. 1 3j90. 21.....
9802.1 0 
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VI. AERIAL AND SATELLITE POLICIES 
1. Satellite and Aircraft Detection Parameters 
a. Satellite Parameters 
The benefits of aerial or satellite inspection policies depend 
critically on the costs of inspection and on'the ability to correctly 
classify mining violations under such policies. Several options are 
available for satellite inspection. Among these are: 
* Black and white prints for each channel (Appendix D) 
* Color coded ozalids for each channel
 
" Grayrnaps for each channel (Appendix D)
 
* Graymaps for channel ratios (Appendix D) 
o Recognition maps (Appendix D) 
* Lnksquirts 
Of the above, recognition maps provide the least misclassification
 
errors. This is necessarily true because recognition maps are formulated
 
from ground truth data. Through acluster analysis of the electronic data
 
in areas where ground truth is known, signatures are developed for each of
 
the categories of interest (Appendix C). These signature are computer de­
cision rules for classifying the vector of channel voltages for each pixel.
 
After this report through Section 3 of Chapter V was completed, 
an analysis of the LANDSAT data sets developed by ERILM was conducted 
in Madisonville. The man inspection policy costs developed in Section 3 
of Chapter V were also presented at this meeting. MATHEMATICA was 
given a new estimate of the true inspection rate for 1971-74 which is 
considerably higher than the rate of inspections reported during this period. 
Adjusted rates and corresponding adjusted cost estimates of man 
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inspection policies have been given in Section 4, Chapter V. In this 
Chapter, we will give two analyses for aerial and satellite policies. One 
analysis, with parameters d6fined by the.inspection reports only, can be 
compared to the optimal ground inspection only policy of Section 3, 
Chapter V. This analysis is given in the next section. The other 
analysis, given in Section 3, uses the adjusted rates. 
It was determined at Madisonville,that only the recognition -mapwas 
of use in detecting coal mining violations. The recognitibn map was 
excellent for distinguishing between greater than 70% and less than 70% 
revegetation. None of the other violation types were detectable. While 
there were several cases where large areas were misclassified, such as 
the identification of bare agricultural areas as strip mines, the primary 
reason a zero probability must be assigned to the detection of violations 
other than revegetation is low resolution. In Chapter VII, we recommend 
a minimal resolution for the detection of other violations. 
ERIM has provided the following estimates of costs of each data 
set developed by ERIM for this project: 
COLOR CODED OZALIDS 
Labor (Photo) $ 145.00 
Mtls (Photo) 20. 00 
$ 165. oo 
GRAYMAPS OF RATIOS AND SINGLE CHANNELS 
Labor (Wagner, Rebel, Thomson) $1,51Z. 00 
7094 and 1401 Computer 1,196.00 
470 Computer 80.00 
Tapes 138.00
 
Mailing Costs 24.00 
$2,950.00
 
1:1 
RECOGNITION MAP PROCESSLNG 
Labor (Wagner, Rebel, Colwell, Thomson) $Z, 936. 00 
7094 and 1401 Computer 1,698,00 
470 Computer 80.00 
Tapes 138.00 
Mailing Costs Z4. 00 
$4, 876.00 
As an estimate of the cost of recognition map processing, we will use 
the fixed cost of $Z000. This estimate is the sum of $350 for labor (six 
man-days at $15, 000 including overhead) and $1,650 for computer costs. 
This 	figure is speculative. Factors considered were 
* The computer is state-owned 
" The computer is possibly more efficient than the 7094 or 1401 
* 	 'The computer algorithms could be simplified 
* 	 The costs are for a 4300 sq. mile coverage. The products 
developed by ERIM have a 190 sq. mile coverage. 
o 	 A portion of ERIM's costs are initial costs which would not be 
duplicated in later processing costs. 
',The misclassification probabilities for recognition maps are 
estimated by the following: 
o 	 For all four violations, 
P (violation is "detected"I violation does not exist) = 0. 
o 	 For revegetation violations only, 
P 	 (revegetation violation not detected 
revegetation violation exists) = 0. 
o 	 For grading, drainage control and water quality violations,, 
P (violation is not "detected" violation exists) = 1. 
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b. Low Altitude Parameters 
Birney I. Fish, the Principal Investigator has estimated the costs
 
of low altitude photography for photographing and interpreting the 
entire active mining area of western Kentucky. The calculations are as 
follows:
 
" Active Mining Area = 4300 square miles. Each roll of 
film covers 170 linear miles. 
" To cover an area, the center to center flight lines 
must be 3. 386 miles. 
" Allowing for over-lap, 9 rolls of film are required. 
o These 9 rolls of film require 1530 data miles of 
flight. 
" At 90 per data mile, 1530 data miles cost $1377. 
" The fixed cost for two hours flight to Madisonville 
is $240. 
" Total cost of aircraft $1617. 
The c6sts for film and processing are as follows: 
Cost per Processing Total Cost 
Film Roll Costs Shipping Per Roll 
Color IR $341.50 $123.75 $34.00 $499. Z5 
Color 
Transparency 229.70 123.75 34.00 387.45 
B&W Print 63.45 Z76.50 339.95 
BaW Positive 
Transparency 63.45 291.05 34.00 388.0 
B&W IR 118.35 353.55 34.00 505.90 
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Because of the expense of processing, Color IR and Color 
Transparencies are preferred to B&W IR and B&W Transparencies. 
The total costs for nine developed rolls of film plus aircraft are: 
Color IR = S6110 
Color Transparency = 5104 
B&W print = 4677 
These costs are relevant when low altitude photography is used 
as a surrogate for satellite photography. In this case, the entire active 
coal mining area is photographed. If only the permitted areas are 
photographed, the inspection costs can be considerably reduced. The total 
areas of permitted strip mining regions during 1971-75 averaged less than 
20 square miles per year. The acreage of active mines at any time is less 
than this value. 
Table 36A. Yearly Acreage of Permitted Strip Mining 
(1971-75) 
Year Number Mines Number Permits Total Acreage Square Miles 
1971 85 140 6104 9.54 
1972 71 103 7935 12.40 
1973 55 77 10272 16.05 
1974 90 128 12765 19.95 
1975 --- 176 10361 16.19 
Thus, at most one roll of film is necessary for photographing strip 
mining permits. The unit cost per permit is estimated to be $1Z (13. 33 
miles between mines at 90 per mile). Thus, for the s-a-m model, low 
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altitude costs for color IR are estimated to be 
Color IR = (240 + 499. 25) + 12 n 
where n = number of permits inspected. When 124 permits are inspected, 
the total costs for color IR are 
Color IR = $2227. 25. 
In the cost analysis; we have used the costs of permit inspections for 
low altitude photography. In the next chapter, we show that frequent coverage 
of the entire 4300 square mile mining area is not justified. 
Low altitude photography is excellent for detecting coal mining 
violations.' With color IR, different shades of color for water, defining 
physical and chemical water quality, can be seen. The precision of 
estimating water acidity, iron content, or turbidity by color IR is not known. 
It is possible that chemically treated mine drainage can be distinguished 
from non-treated drainage. Certainly, the condition of silt structures is 
detectable. Thus, we have assumed no misclassification errors for mining 
violations under low altitude color IR. 
b. High Altitude Costs 
Mark Hurd Aerial Survey of Minneapolis uses a Lear Jet with 
photography scaled at 1:80, 000. This is larger than the scale from 
NASA overflights of 1:130, 000. The cost per linear mile of photo­
graphy is $20 to $30 depending on the type of film, and more important, 
the frequency with which photography is to be taken. For the active 
mining area of 4, 300 miles, it is estimated that 700 linear miles are 
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needed. The total cost is in the range $14,000 to $21,000.
 
A comparison between the low and high altitude costs shows that low
 
altitude aircraft photography should be preferred for covering the entire
 
active mine area. The savings in developed film costs is at least $8,000.
 
The scale of low altitude photography is 1:24,000. To cover the
 
same area as 1:80,000 film, (3.33)2 or 11.1 low altitude photos must be
 
interpreted for every high altitude photo. But at a savings of $8,000,
 
expensive methods of interpretation can be used for low aircraft photo­
graphy and still be cost effective.
 
Because the option of high altitude photography is not cost effec­
tive, it will be dropped from further consideration.
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2. Computer Simulations 
Tables 31-41C are computer printouts of simulated satellite 
and aircraft inspection policies. The simulation period used was 4,000 
weeks. A constant "seed" was used in each simulation run for generating 
the violations. This gives identical violation frequencies for each run. 
Thus, the simulations can legitimately be compared for cost effectiveness 
even though the simulated violation frequencies differ from the theoretical 
frequencies because of random error. The simulated period of 4,000 
weeks was necessary to obtain accurate estimates of the low transition 
probabilities. For example, only ZI runs of revegetation violations 
averaging length of 42. 95 (theoretical value is 34. 67) weeks were ob­
served during this period. Because violations were simulated at a 
single permit area, the equivalent simulation of violations for 124 per­
mitted areas is 4, 000/124 = 32 weeks. The boundary effects of initializing 
and ending the simulation make a single-permit area, 4, 000-week simulation 
more accurate than a 124-permit, 32-week simulation. 
', The fraction of satellite accesses over Kentucky which were 7076 
or greater cloud-free was precisely .30 over a four year period. The 
average revisit time for satellites if accesses occur once every 9 days and'­
photography is made under 70% or greater cloud-free coverage is 30 days. 
Erroneous computer input, however, for Tables 37-41C resulted in an 
average revisit time of 9 days. Thus, cloud-cover is ignored. 
The social costs used in the model are defined by option i, in Table 10. 
A comparison of the total costs defined by the simulations shows that 
ground inspections are much less costly. 
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Over and above questions of cloud cover, there are two important
 
reasons why satellites are not cost effective at this time. One is the
 
high rate of misclassification of violations. The other is the large delay
 
between a satellite pass and a manned inspection.
 
Although airplane inspections are less costly per unit inspection
 
than manned inspections, a strategy employing only manned inspection is
 
still the least costly. At the highest possible rate of inspection there
 
are two cases:
 
* 	 aircraft inspections are made once per week and manned
 
inspections aremade during the same week when necessary.
 
* 	 manned inspections are made once per week.
 
The total of social costs and fines are identical in the two cases.
 
Only 2,700 manned inspections per year are required in the first case;
 
6,448 manned inspections per year are required in the second case. But the
 
cost of 52 airplane inspections plus 2,700 manned inspections is greater than
 
6,448 manned inspections.
 
More simulations should be made to estimate-the future cost of
 
satellite or aerial inspection under more optimistic assumption for
 
satellites. This is done in Section 3 using the adjusted violation model
 
defined in Section 4, Chapter V.
 
125
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 37 
AS-_urPTIDN: 9. DAYS BETWEEN CAT. PA%.SES 
.56. DAY 2 TO AIRPLANE 
* DAYC. TO MAN IN:PECTION 
YEARLY EZTIMATES PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBEP PRIOR 
OF PUtrl LENGTH DETECTED AYERPAGE 
OF PUi: LENGTH 
GRADING 1.08 20.76 0.48 23.13 
REVEGETATION 0.2? 23.24 0.66 42.95 " 
DPRAINAGE 0.77 23.27 0.23 27.98 
WATER Q. 2.98 1.00 0.04 1.00 
Cit 
-s 
YEAPLY CLDIJ-FPEE -AT. PASSES,= 39.6 AT COST OF S 79,200.
 
YEARLY 39.1 AIRPLANE PAS-',ES INtEFECTING 174.1 MINE; AT COST OF ' 30994.
 
YEARLY 112.8 MAN INSPECTION; AT COT OF $ 3205.
 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IT S 682621.
 
TOTAL OF FINE! IS $ 6370.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS $ 789650.
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Table 38 
RS:UMPTIoN;: 9. DAYS BETJEEN ciT. RAh ZES 
N AIPPLAHE 
56. flAYC', TO MAN INCPECTION 
YEARLY ESTIMRTE, PER PEPMIT 
t VIOLATION NUMBER AVEPRAGE NUMBEP 
OF pUN: LENGTH DETECTEDI-
OF PUNH' 
C---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRABING 1.08 21.49 0 .32 
PEVEGETATION 0.27 23.2 9 0.65 
DRAINAGE 0.77 23.49 0.19 
WATER '. 2.98 1.00 0.01 
PP IOP 
AVERAGE 
LENGTH 
31 
23.13 
42.95 
27.98 
1.00 " 
ik 
YEARLY CLOU-FPEE SAT. PASCES 
YEARLY 0.0 AIRPLANE PR_-iES 
= 39.4 AT COT OF S 
IN-PECTING 0.0 MINE-S 
78800. 
AT COT OF $ 0. 
YEARLY 
YEARLY 
112.- MAN IN PECTION- AT COST OF 
;OCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 687329. 
S 3205. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS s 2123. 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS s ,67210....... 
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Table 39 
A::UMPTION_: 	18. DAY- BETWEEN --AT. PA SES
 
NO AIRPLANE
 
56. DfAYZ TO MAN IH:PECTIOH 
YEAPLY ESTIMATES PEP PEPMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBEP PRIOP 
OF PUIHZ LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF PUNS LENGTH 
GAPRDING 	 1.08 21.20 0.26 23.13
 
REVEGETATION 0.27 24.95 0.70 42.95
 
DPAINRGE 0.77 24.03 0.16 27.Q2
 
MATER 0. ' 2.98 1.00 0.02 1.00
 
'EARPLY CLUD-FPEE SAT. PA..E_ = 22.8 AT COST OF S 45600. 
YEARLY AIRPLANE PASES INSPECTING MINES AT COT OF s {
 
YEARLY 109.6 MAN IN:PECTIONS AT COST OF $ 3113.
 
)EARLY SOCIAL CO-T OF VIOL IS 693250.
 
TOTAL OF FINEZ IS $ 2593.
 
TOTAL YEARLY 	COST IS $ 739379. 
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Table 40
 
Ar--UMPTIOri.: 	 NOU SATELLITE 
NO AIRPLANE 
56. IAY TO MAN INSPECTION 
YEARLY ECTIMATE- PEP PERMIT 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBER PRIOP 
OF FUNE LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF PUNS LENGTH 
GRADING 1.08 12.07 1.68 23.13 
PEVEGETATION 0.27 27.90 0.94 42.95 
DlRINAGE 0.77 6.78 0.74 27. 98 
IATEP 0. 2.98 1.00 0.38 1.00 
YEARLY CLOUD-FPEE SAT. PA&:ES = AT COCT OF 	 0. 
YEARPLY - AIRPLANE PRASES INCPECTING MIHES AT COCT OF s
 
YEARLY 806.0 MAN INSPECTIONS AT 'O:T OF S 22890.
 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 48q-935.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 61656.
 
TOTAL YEARLY OST IS 490970.
 
129
 
Table 41A 
HS-UMPTION -: NO CATELLITE
 
7. DAY- TO AIPPLANE 
7. DfAY TO MAN IM:PECTIO 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PEP PERMIT
 
YI DLAT I OH NUMBEP AVEPRAGE NUMBEP PPIOP 
OF PUN? LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF P'Jri_ LENGTH 
GRADING 1.08 11.37 12.43 23.13
 
REYEGETRTION 0.2? 25.00 6.91 42.95
 
DRAINAGE 0.77 4.51 3.50 27.98
 
WATER I. 2.98 1.00 3.02 1.00
 
YERPLY CLOUD-FREE L-T. PASSES 0.0 AT 00nZT OF Is 0. 
115793.YEARLY 52 AIRPLANE PAKES INFPECTING 6448.0 MINES AT CO-UT OF  
YEARLY 2700.1 MAN IW:PECTIONS AT CMlT OF S 76683-. 
YEARLY SOCIAL COVT OF VIOL IS 1' 461925. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 492535.
 
P TOTAL YEARLY CS:T IS 161866.
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A;;UMPTIONC: NO SATELLITE
 
iO AIRPLANE
 
7. DAYS TO MAN INCPECTION
 
YEAPLY ESTIMATES PEP PEPMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBEP AVEPAGE NUMBEP PPIOP.
 
UP PUN- LENGTH DETECTED AVEPRAGE
 
OF PUN- LENGTH
 
GPADING 1.08 11.31 12.43 23.13
 
REVEGETATION 0.27 25.00 6.91 42.95
 
DP3INAGE , 0.7 4.51 3.50 27.98
 
WATEP Q. 2.98 1.00 3.02 1.00
 
YEAPLY CLOUD-FPEE SAT. PAISEZ = 0.0 AT LOT OF s 0. 
YERPLY 0.0 AIPPLANE PASSES ILPECTING 0.0 MINES AT LOCT OF $ 0
 
YEARPLY 6448.0 MAN IWEPECTIOMS AT COST OF S 183123.
 
YEAPLY SOCIRL CO-T OF VIOL IS $ 461925.
 
TOTAL OF FINE$ IS S 492617.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS S 152431.
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Table 41C 
RA:UMPTIONC: HO SATELLITE
 
7. DfAYZ TO AIPPLANE 
14. DAYS TO MAN IN:PECTION
 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PER PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER 
OF RUNS 
AVERAGE 
LENGTH 
OF PUMU 
NUMBER 
DETECTED 
PRIOR 
AVEPRGE 
LENGTH 
F 
GPADING 
REVEGETRTION 
DRAINAGE 
WATER 0. 
1.08 
0.27 
0.77 
2.98 
12.43 
22.90 
4.53 
1.00 
b.69 
3.16 
1.68 
0.46 
23.13 
42.95 
27.98 
1.00 
it 
YEARLY CLOUD-FREE SAT. PA&SES = 0.0 AT C07T OF s 0. 
I 	 YEARPLY 52 AIPPLANE PASSES IN:PECTING 6448.0 MINES AT COST OF L 115817, 
YEARLY 1483.0 MAN INSPECTION$ AT COST OF S 42118. 
rYEARLY 	 OF VIOL IS $SOCIAL CoT 463888. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS s 74347. 
t TOTAL YEARLY COT IS S 547476._. 
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3. Aerial and Satellite Policies Under Adjusted 1971-74 Inspection Rates 
In Section 4 of Chapter V, we have given estimates of violation 
frequencies and social costs when the 1971-74 inspection rate is once 
every 18.72 days. In this section we give tables defining the simulated 
costs of aerial and satellite policies under these adjusted parameters. 
The seven day unit of time used in the simulations of Section Z 
must be shortened. The adjusted rate of drainage control violations given 
none the previous week is 
P1 = l.Z683perweek. 
This is not a probability. Also, the adjusted model for water quality 
violations uses a duration of three days after detection. Thus, neither
 
drainage control nor water quality violations can be simulated using a 
seven-day unit of time. In the simulations, to minimize the total number 
of simulations, a 3. 5 unit of tme is used. 
(In retrospect, the simulations were not expensive. A unit of time 
of one day for all simulations would have been better. This would have 
avoided many technical problems as well as given more accurate compar­
isons with the theoretical man inspection policies of Chapter V. The simulated 
social costs for high inspection rates are low by thousands of dollars because 
detected water quality violations have durations of 3.5 days. Under one-day
 
simulations, these durations would be significantly higher because detections
 
would not occur on the first day of the violation. There is a continuous 
methodology for generating start and end times for violations which are 
independent of the unit of time. This methodology should be used in 
future cost analyses. However, the simulations which are used'in this 
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section are sufficiently accurate to define the optimal policy within 
the errors made by cost and frequency estimates of the parameters 
involved.) 
All of the simulations were run for 4000 units of time (14000 days, 
Z000 weeks, 38.46 years, or 0.31 year per 124 permits.) Tables 4Z, 47, 
53, and 59 summarize the simulation results. 
a. Satellite Policy Simulations 
When the only detectable violations by satellite are rei~egetation 
violations, the social costs for violations under either satellite-air-man 
or satellite-man policies are very high. The only violation frequencies 
which are substantially reduced are, as expected, revegetation violations. 
All of the tables use a cloud-free access frequency of 0.30. (The 0.70 
cloud-cover probability is a misnomer. This frequency, estimated from 
historical data includes not only cloud-covered accesses but any accesses 
to western Kentucky for which satellite data was unavailable for any 
reasons such as malfunctions.) Satellite-man'inspections are less costly 
than satellite-air-man inspections. Ignoring the satellite, which in 
practice only influences the rate of follow-on inspections, theoretical 
reasons why man-only inspections are better than air-man are explained in
 
-Appendix A. When violation frequencies are high and costly, best inspection 
policies in order are man, air-man, satellite-man and satellite-air-man. 
The benefits of frequent detections outweigh the costs of inspection. 
Fifty-six days is the estimated current minimal turn-around time 
from satellite to follow-up inspection. Misclassifications occur so 
frequently, however, that relatively few follow-ups are made even if the 
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little competition with other types of photography. While other photography 
may be of a high value, time is not the essence. 
When airplane-man inspections and nan-only inspections are compared,
 
This is, in fact,
the total costs for man-only inspections are slightly less. 

incorrect. An effective enforcement policy requires that permit areas 
Fines arewhere violations are detected should be inspected twice. 

collected only on the second or third detections. Thus, in practice, ground
 
inspections are actually ,man-man' inspections where the first inspection
 
serves only as a pointer for the second inspection. (This is not quite
 
true - no generalizations are true). The first man inspection, unlike air
 
or satellite inspections, decreases social costs by starting the clock for
 
measuring durations after detection. This discrepancy is, however, trivial.)
 
Since airplanes cost only $17.96 per permit and man inspections cost 
$28.40, airplane-man inspections are optimal. 
The optimal rate of inspection is probably less than seven days 
between airplane coverages. The exact optimal value can not be determined 
by the use of a 3.5-day simulation. Also, other factors not considered 
in the model, such as the interaction between start frequencies and detections, 
must be determined before a more accurate optimal rate is determined. 
Probably, a more accurate rate can not be determined except through 
experimentation, using varying policies on subpopulations of the mines. 
PRECDINGOPAGE BLANK 
NOT FILMM
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Table 42. Satellite Policy Costs 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Revegetation 
violations only 
detected 
by satellite 
No airplane 
misclassifications 
Man inspections 
cost 28.40 
Airplane inspections 
cost 739.25 + 12n 
per flight 
Satellites Cost 
$2000 per pass 
Social costs defined 

by option 6 

INSPECTION 

FREQUENCY 

9 days between Sat. 
56 days to airplane 
7 days to man 
9 days between Sat. 
No airplane 
56 days to man 
9 days between Sat. 
No airplane 
7 days to man 
9 days between Sat. 
7 days to airplane 
4 days to man 
INSPECTION COSTS 
SOCIAL COSTS 
FINES 
TOTAL COSTS 
35, 112
 
697, 714
 
1,369
 
731, 45-7
 
25, 478
 
712, 336
 
4, 125
 
733,689
 
Z6,094
 
699, 938
 
I 4, 107
 
72, 9Z5 
35,884
 
699, 938
 
4,107
 
731, 715
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Simulations for 3. 
Table 43. 
5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
A:IAJMPTIONZ: 9. DAY'- BETWEEN -AT. PASSES 
56. IAY- TO AIRPLANE 
7. lAY: TO MAN IN:PECTION 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PEP PEPMIT 
VIOLATION NUMBER 
OF RUN-
AVERAGE 
LENGTH 
OF RUNW 
NUMBER 
DETECTED 
PP I OP 
AVERAGE 
LENGTH 
GRADING 
PEVEGETATION 
DRAINAGE 
IFITEP 0. 
'1.12 
0.24 
1.06 
3.28 
45.40 
49.89 
45.63 
2.08 
0.2Dl 
0.46 
'0.18 
10.02 
45.40 
66.89 
52.73 
2.10 
I 
YEARLY CLOUD-FPEE EAT. PA-$E-, 11.9 AT COST OF $23556. 
EARPLY 11.8 AIRPLANE PA-ES INCPECTING 80.6 MINE: AT COST 
YEARLY 70.9 MAN INEPECTION' AT COWT OF $Z014. 
YEARLY :OCIAL CO:T OF VIOL I3 S 697714. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 1369. 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS S 731457. 
OF $9542. 
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Table 44.
 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
ASIJNPTIOWH: 9. DAYS BETWEEN -EAT. PAZC_.E&
 
NO RIPPLANE
 
56. DAYS TO MAN IN:PECTION
 
YEAPLY ETIMflTE5 PER PERMIT
 
VIOLATIOn IUMBEF AVERAGE NU...E PRIOR 
OF RUN- LENGTH DETECTED AYEPAGE 
OF Pull LENG1TH 
GPADIN'- 1,08 44.88 0.18 45.40
 
REVEGETATION 0.24 48.3 3 0.42 66.G9
 
DPAIHAGE I.06 49.63 0.18 52.73
 
II Q. 1.06 2.08 0.08 2.10WATER 
YERPLY CLOUD-FPEE SAT. PA7ZES 11.9 AT COST OF S 23556. 
YEAPLY 0.0 AIPPLANE PASSES INEPECTING 0.0 MINE; AT COT OF S 0. 
YERPLY 67.7 MAN IH:PECTIONz AT COiT OF S 1922. 
YERPLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 71ZZ36.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS 5 4125.
 
. TOTAL YEAPLY COST IS S 733689.' 
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Table 45. 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
tEP ODUCIBILI'y 	Vj' j1.ILbRGNLPAGE 	ISPOOR 
A.XUMPTIONS? 	 9. !RiY BET61EEN EAT. PA:EcO 
NO 	 AIPPLAtiE 
7. 	DAYS TO MAN INIPECTION
 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PEP PERMIT
 
AVERAGE 	 UMBEr
VIOLATION lUMBEP 	 N I PPIOP
 
OF PUNS 	 LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF RUN:- LENGTH 
6PRIING I.IZ 44.12 0.20 45.40
 
PEVEGETATIOI 0.Z4 36 .67 0.78 66.89
 
DRAINAGE I.06 4 .68 0.16 52.73
 
d1FTER 0. 3.28 2.06 0.08 2.10
 
YEARLY CLOUB-FPEE SAT. PASSES = 11.7 AT CUCT OF S 23348. 
£ 	YEARLY 0.0 AIRPLANE PAS-ES INtPECTING 0.0 MINES AT COST OF S 0. 
YEAPLY 96.7 MAN INSPECTIONS AT COST OF S 2746. 
I"YEAPLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 699938.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 4107.
 
TOTAL YERPLY COST IS $ 7219Z5.
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Table 45.
 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
A-IJ1MPTIrNS: 9. DAYE BET1lEENI SAT. PRSES 
NO AIRPLAHE 
7. DAY' TO M1AN INCPECTION 
YEARLY Ez.TIMATES PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER VEPAGE HUMPEP PR IOP 
OF PUNZ LENGTH IETECTED AVERAGE 
OF RUN- LENGTH 
GRRDING ,1.12 44.12 0.20 45.40 
REVEFETATION 0.24 36.67 '0.78 66.89 
DPAIINAGE .o.06 48.68 0.16 52.73IJATEP Q. 3.Z8 2.06 0.08 2.10 
YEARLY CLOUD-FREE SAT. PASSES = 11.7 AT COST OF S 23348. 
YEARLY 0.0 AIRPLANE PASSES INXPECTING 0.0 MINES AT CUST OF $ 

'EARLY 96.7 MAN INSPECTIONS AT COST OF S Z746.
 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 699938.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS $ 4107.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS $ 7Z19Z5.
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Table 46.
 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
FSsUMPTIOHr _ : 9. DAY7_ BETIJIEEN -RT. PACCES 
7. DFAYz TO AIRPLANE 
4. DfA' TO MAN IW'PECTIUN 
YEARLY EZTIMATES PEP PEPMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBEP AVERAGE NUMBER PRI P 
OF PUN: LENGTH DETECTED AYERAGE 
OF PUN5 LENGTH 
GPRflIfSG -1:12 44.12 0.20 45.40 
REVEGETRTION 0.24 3h.67 0.78 66.89
 
DPRAINAGE \ 0.56 48.68 S0.16 52.73 
SIATEP o. 3.28 2.06 0.08 2.10 
YEARPLY CLOUD-FREE 'FIT. PAS-ES = 11.7 AT CoDT OF $ 23348. 
YEARLY 11.7AIPPLANE PASSES INSPECTING 96.2 MIHES AT COT OF s9790.­
'EARPLY 96.7 MAN IN"PECTION- AT COST OF _, Z746. 
YEARPLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL I- $ 699,938. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 4,107.
 
-
TOTAL YEARLY COOT I $ 731,715­
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Table 47. Airplane Policy Costs 
ASSUMPTIONS INSPECTION INSPECTION COSTS 
FREQUENCY SOCIAL COSTS 
FINES 
TOTAL COSTS 
No Misclassifications 7 days between airplanes 189, 066 
3.5 days to man inspection 343, 738 
Airplane Cos ts 
739.25 + 12n 
-131! 514 
401, 290 
Man Inspection 3.5 days between airplanes 309,098 
Cost $28.40 7 days to man inspection 387,808 
-113,664 
Social Costs 582, Z43 
Defined by 
Option 6 14 days between airplanes 
3.5 days to man inspection 
99,569 
413,150 
- 9z, 050 
420, 669 
17. 5 days between airplanes 77, 915 
3.5 days to man inspection 443, 492 
- 65,031 
456,376 
21 days between airplanes 65, 34Z 
3.5 days to man inspection 467,472 
- 53,706 
479,108 
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Table 48. 
Simulation for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
RSSUIPTIOM: NO SATELLITE 
4. DAY, TO RIPPLANE
 
7. DAY- TO MAN INc.PECTIOM 
YEARPLY EETIMATEC PEP PEPMIT 
VIOLATION NUMBEP RVEPASE NUMBER PPIOP 
OF PUNE LEHGTH DETECTED AVEPAGE 
OF PUN- LENIGTH 
GPADIN6 1.12 21.9 12.02 45.40 
REVEGETATIOH 0.24 73.44 4.46 6 .1.-9 
DPAINAGE 
MATER 0. 
1.06 
3.28 
8.43 
1.50 
4.40 
2.16 
52 .,3 
2.10 
YEARLY CLOUD-FPEE "AT. PAE = 0.0 AT C0T OF $ 0.
 
YEARPLY 104 ARPPLAHE PARSES INSPECTING iZ896.0 MINEZ AT COT OF s231634.
 
YEARLY Z7Z7.7. MAN INSPECTION: AT C0-2T OF $ 77464.
 
YEARPLY SOCIAL CMT OF VIOL IS $ 387808. -
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 113664. -
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS S 583, 243. 
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Table 49. 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
A:SuMPTIONC-: NO EATELLITE
 
D7.AY- TO AIPPLAHE 
4. DAYil TO MAN IW PECTION
 
'EAPLY ESTIMATES PER PEPMIT
 
VIOLATI OI NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBER PPIOF 
OF PUN- LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF RUIC LENGTH 
GPRADING I1.12 21.?2 12.36 45.40 
" PEVEGETATION O. 4 38.11 4.48 66.89
 
DRAINAGE 1.06 8.02 4.ZZ 52.73 
IATEP Q. 3.28 1.29 Z.50 2.10 
YEA LY CLOUD-FREE :AT. PASSE 0.0 AT COT OF S 0.
 
YEAPLY 5Z AIPPLANE PASE- IN:PECTING 6448.0 MINE- AT COT OF $115817.
 
YEAPLY 2579.2 MAN IPUPECTIONS AT COST OF S 73249.
 
YEARLY SOCIRL COST OF VIOL IS S 343738.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS $ 131514.
 
LTOTAL YEARLY COST IS $ 401290. 
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Table 50. 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
RESUMPTIONt: MO ;ATELLITE 
14. DAY-, TO AIRPLANE 
4. DnFcv TO MAN IN-PECTION
 
YEARLY ESTIMATE- PEP PEPMIT 
r 
L 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBER PPioP 
OF PUN: LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
-F O PUN, LENGTH 
, GPADING258PEISETAIO. iZ 25.86 7.44 I5.fl
 
0.Z4 2PEVEGETATION 66.89
.78 1.96 
DRAINAGE t 1.06 10.05 2.60 52.73 
I WATER Q. 3. 28 1.57 1.74 Z.10 
r­
[ YEARLY CLOUD- FPEE SAT. PASSES = 0.0 AT COZ.T OF S 0. 
YEARLY -260 AIRPLANE PASSES IN,PECTIrG3224.0. MINE: AT CO3T OF $ 57908. 
YEARLY 1467 MAN INSPECTIONS AT COST OF $ 41661. 
I, 
-
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS $ 413150. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS $ 92050.
 
I,TOTAL YEARLY COST IS $4Z0, 669. ,x 
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Table 51. 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
ASSUMPTIONS: NO SATELLITE 
18. DAYS TO AIRPLANE 
4. lAYS TO MAN IN PECTION
 
YEARLY ECTIMATE- PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBER PRIOR 
OF RUN- LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF PUNS LENGTHA 
GPRDINC 1.12 22.0?- 4.94 45.40 
PEVEGETATION 0.24 31.22 j1.48 66.E"? 
DRAINAGE 1.06 10.98 2.44 52 .73 
WATER 0. 3.28 1.74 1.24 2.10 
YERLY CLOUD-FREE SAT. FA'CSES = 0.0 AT CW-T OF ,. 0. 
YEARPLY 20.8 AIRPLANE PR-ESE IN:PECTING 2579.2 MINES AT COCT OF $-46327. 
YEARLY 1112?. MAN IMSqPECTIONM AT CO$T OF S 31588. 
'EARPLY SOCIAL COT OF VIOL IS S 44349Z.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS 1. 65031. 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS 'S 456376. 
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Table 52.,
 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
A:SUMPTIONS: NO SATELLITE
 
21. DAYS TO AIRPLRNE
 
4. DAY- TO MAN IN;PECTION
 
YEARLY ESTIMATEC PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBER PRIOR 
OF PUN: LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF RUN: LENGTH 
GRADING 1.1 23.0 R2.20 45.40 
REVEGETATION 0.24 39.67 4.42 66.89 
DRAINAGE 1.06 11.39 4.16 52.73 
WATEP 0.' 3.Z8 1.83 2.56 2.10 
YEARLY CLOUD-FREE 'AT. PASSES 0.0 AT CO:T OF $ 0.
 
YEARLY 17.33 AIPPLANE PASVES INSPECTING 2149.3 MINES AT COST OF S 38606. 
YEARLY 941.4 MAN INSPECTIONS AT COST OF $26736. 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 467472.
 
TOTAL OF FINES IS $ 53706.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS $ 479108.
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Table 53. Satellite Policy Costs 
If No Misclassifications 
ASSUMPTIONS 
All violations 
correctly classified 
Man inspections 
cost 28.40 
Airplane Inspections 
cost 739. 25 + 12n 
Satellites Cost 
82000 per lass 
Social Costs 
Defined by 
Option 6 
INSPECTION 

FREQUENCY 

9 days between Sat. 
56 days to airplane 
7 days to man 
9 days between Sat 
56 days to airplane 
4 days to man 
9 days between Sat. 
No airplane 
56 days to man 
9 days between Sat. 
7 days to airplane 
4 days to man 
9 days between Sat. 
No airplane 
7 days to man 
INSPECTION COSTS 
SOCIAL COSTS 
FINES 
TOTAL COSTS 
47,918
 
552,868
 
11,278
 
589,508 
45,480
 
526, 386
 
Z4, 784
 
547,082
 
34,422
 
563,206
 
- 8,403
 
589, Z25
 
63,120
 
480,840
 
39,804
 
504, 155
 
42,402
 
505,930
 
25,155
 
523,176
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Table 54.
 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
ASUSMPTION-: 9. DAYS BETWEEN :AT. PRSES
 
56. 	DAYE TO AIRPLANE
 
DY7. TO MAN INtPECTION
 AS
No Satellite Misclassifications 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PER PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBER PPIOP 
OF PUN- LENGTH DETECTED AYEPAGE 
OF PUNS LENGTH 
GPADING 	 1.12 25.91 I1.08 45.40 
REVEGETATION 0.24 36.56 0.38 66.8*9
 
DRAINAGE 1.06 D0.17 0.98 52.73
 
IWATEP 0. 3.Z8 2.06 0.22 2.10
 
' 	 -i 
YEAFLY CLOUD-FREE SAT. P_SES = 1Z.? AT CE]T OF s 24440. 
A 
YEARLY Z.2 AIRPLANE PASSES INCPECTING 509.4 MINES AT COST [IF $15146. 
YEARLY Z93.4 MAN INSPECTION AT COST OF $833Z. 
YEARLY SOCIAL CDIT OF VIOL IS S 552,868. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 11,278." 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS $589,508.1 
1-49
 
pIEPRODUOIBILITY OF THE 
QRIGINAL PAGE IS POOR 
Table 55. 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
A3CUMPTIONS: 9. DAYS BETWEEN -AT. PA=SES 
56. DAY- TO AIRPLANE 
4. DAYS TO MAN INSPECTION 
No satellite misclassifications 
YEARPLY EZTIMATES PEP PEPMIT 
VIOLATION NUMBEP AVERAGE HUPIBEP PRIOR 
OF PUHS LENGTH DETECTED AYEPAGE 
OF PUN-' LENGTH 
GPRADING 1.12 28.65 11.50 45.40 
PEVEGETATION 0.24 .33 0.40 6.73 
* DRAINAGE 1.06 17.01 :0.88 52.73 
2.10WATER Q. 3.28 1.97 0.48 
%'EAPLY CLOLID-FPEE '-AT. PASCES, = 11.8 AT COT OF ; 23556. 
YEARLY 11.8 AIRPLRNE PAEES INSPECTING422.4 MINES AT COST OF 13776. 
YEARLY 286.9 MAN IN:PECTIONS AT COST OF -1 8148. 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS $526386. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS $ Z4784.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS $ 54708Z. 
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Table 56.
 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
ASSIJMPTIOtED 9. IAY- BETIEEN SAT. PR-ACCES
 
NO AIRPLANE
 
56. IIAYt TO MAN INCPECTIOH 
No Satellite Misclassifications 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBEP AVERAGE NUMBER PPIlp 
OF PUN! LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF PUNS LENlGTH 
GRADING 1.12 25.42 i1.z6 45.40
 
REYEGETRTION- O.Z4 47.56 0.48 66.89
 
DPHINAGE 1.06 22.00 0.98 52.73
 
WATER . 3.28 2.06 0.6 2.10
 
YEARPLY CLOU-FPEE SAT. PASSES 12.0 AT CO:T OF S24076. 
YEARLY 0.0 AIRPLANE PASES INCPECTING 0.0 MINES AT COST OF $ 
YEARLY 364.3 MAN INSPECTIOINS AT COST OF E 10346. 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF YIOL IB $ 563Z06. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 8403.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COST IS S 589225. 
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Table 57. 
Simulations for 3. 5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
ASUMPTION: 9. DAYS BETEEN -AT. PA -3ES 
7. DAYS TO AIPPLAIE 
4. DAYS TO MAN INZPECTION 
No Satellite Misclassifications 
YEiPLY EETIMATES PER PERMIT
 
VI LRTID HUMBER VEPRAGE NUMBER PPlIP 
OF PUrr LENGTH DETECTED AVEAGE 
OF PLINS LENGTH 
GPADING i.12 21.40 2.7Z 45.40REVEGmE-[T 1ON 0.Z4--'.0I.7 C-6 .89
 
DRAINAGE 1.06 11.68 1.66 .2.73 
IATER c.. 3.Z8 1.90 0.76 2.10 
YEARPLY CLOUD-FREE SAT. PAS&ES = 11.8 AT CO-T OF $ 23660.
 
YEARLY 11.8 AIRPLANE PRESES INSPECTING 980.0 MINES AT COC-T OF $ Z0506
 
YEARLY 667.4- MAN INSPECTIONS AT COZT OF $ 18954.
 
'EARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS $ 480840.
 
TOTAL OF FINES_. IS $ 39804.
 
LPTOTAL YELY COST IS S 504155. 
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Table 58. 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters 
RS'CUMPTIONZ: 9. DAYS BETIEEN SAT. PA-ES
 
HO AIRPLANE
 
7. DRY. TO MAN IN-PECTION 
No Satellite Misclassifications 
YEARLY ESTIMATEz PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVERAGE NUMBEP PRIOR 
OF Puri: LENGTH DETEC TED AVERAGE 
OF PUN:S LENGTH 
GRADING j.1I 2G.63 -8' 45.40 
* PEVEGETTIriH 0.24 28.3 5 .8901
 
DIRAINAGE .06 13.2? !1.58 52.?-3 
IIRTER C1. 3.28 1.97 0.48 2.10 
i'ERPLY CLOUD-FPEE SAT. PASSES 11.9 AT COST OF $23816. 
YEARPLY 0.0 RIPPLANE PAS'ES IHE-PECTIG 0.0 MINES AT COT OF S 0. 
YEARLY 654.4 MAN INSPECTIONS AT COST OF t 18586. 
YEARLY :OCIAL COZT OF VIOL IS $ 505930. 
TOTAL OF FINES I_ s Z51"55. 
TITL YEARLY COST 13 $ 523176.
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Table 59. Ground Inspection Simulated Costs 
ASSUMPTIONS INSPECTION 
FREQUENCY 
INSPECTION COSTS 
SOCIAL COSTS 
FINES 
TOTAL COSTS 
All violations 
correctly classified 
Man Inspections 
Cost $28. 40 
Social Costs 
Defined by 
Option 6' 
Every 7 days 
Every 17.5 days 
183, 124 
343,124 
-130,036 
396, 826 
73,250 
443, 49Z 
- 65,178 
451,564 
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Table 60.
 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods With Adjusted Parameters
 
ASIUMPTlri;': 	NO ;ATELLITE
 
HO AIRPLANE
 
7. DAYS TO MAN INSPECTION
 
YERPLY E TIMATES PEP PEPMIT
 
PPI npN1IiMBER AVEPAGE NUMBEPVIOLATION AVEPRAE
DETECTED 

LENGTH
LIF 
RUM: LENI3TH 
OF P.UIZH 
1.20 45.40
4ZiGPDING 	 21.72 
4.42 66 .%S490.24 	 38.11PEVESETHTION 
 4. 16 	 52.7 3
8.02
1.06
DPRINAGE 
 2.10
2.56
1
WATER 0. ,.38 

AT CUBT OF

','ERPLY CLUDIJ-FPEE SAT. PASES 00 
0. 
AIPPLANE PA$SES Ir'PECTING 0.0 MINES AT COST OF S YEAPLY 0.0 
YEARLY 6448.0 MANH IHSPECTION- AT COT OF183124. 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS $ 343738. 
TOTAL OF FINES IS S 130036. 
TOTAL YEARLY 	COTT IS S 396826. 
Table 61.
 
Simulations for 3.5 Day Periods with Adjusted Parameters
 
Ai:uM'lTIuNS: NO SATELLITE
 
HNO AIPPLANE
 
18. DAY- TO MAN IN-PECTION
 
YEARLY ESTIMATES PEP PERMIT
 
VIOLATION NUMBER AVEPAGE NUMBEP PRIOR 
OF rUN: LENGTH DETECTED AVERAGE 
OF PUN LENGTH 
GRADING LZ 22.07' 4.96 45.40 
REVEGETATION 0.24 31.22 1.48 66.813 
DRAINAGE iL06 10.98 2.44 52 .73 
WATER 0. 3.28 1.74 1.24 2.10 
YEARLY CLOUD-FREE -SAT. PRE'SzES = 0.0 AT _OU]T OF S 0.
 
YEARLY 0.0 AIRPLANE PRSiES INSPECTING 0.0 MINES AT COWT OF $ 0
 
YEARPLY Z579.2 MAN IH:PECTIOHS AT CO-T OF S 73Z50.
 
YEARLY SOCIAL COST OF VIOL IS S 443492.
 
TOTAL OF FINES I $ 65178.
 
TOTAL YEARLY COLST I-S 451564.
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4. Future Satellite and Computer Technology
 
Of the four (4) violation categories considered in this report, only
 
revegetation can be treated adequately by a routine application of data as it
 
is now available in the Landsat program. At this point, spectral resolution
 
does not appear to be-a critical factor. The major difficulties encountered
 
'were: 
a 	 inability to observe the ground on a frequent and routine
 
basis (due primarily to cloud cover);
 
* 	 inadequate spatial resolution;
 
* 	 delays in obtaining Landsat imagery.
 
As indicated in Section VI.3.a., good quality, 70% cloud-free, satellite
 
imagery of the ground in the western Kentucky coal field is obtained in only
 
about 30% of the satellite accesses to the area. For a given satellite an
 
18-day return frequency would result in about six (6) successful accesses per
 
year, an average reinspection time of about two (2) months. This time can be
 
reduced to approximately one month by including imagery from both Landsat-I
 
and Landsat-2. Although the strategy of using the cloud-free portions of all
 
Landsat-imagery has not been tested, in principle the approach should yield an
 
average reaccess period of less than one month, but greater than nine (9) days.
 
Thus, with the existing satellites, an effective reinspection rate limit of
 
perhaps once every 18 days might be obtained by classifying all useable Landsat
 
imagery for the west Kentucky coal field. Under this approach, some of the
 
imagery would not be purchased because of poor image quality or because of 100%
 
cloud cover, thus the cost would not quite be twice that of a straight 18 day
 
satellite coverage. Some additional savings might be realized by reference to 
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NOAA-weather satellite data as an aid in selecting useable Landsat-data. Further
 
reduction in the time between inspections might be obtained if radar were in­
cluded on some future Landsat. Since radar is not affected by clouds, fog,
 
haze, snow cover or nighttime, a considerable increase in the rate and the
 
reliability of reinspection could be expected.
 
In the Western Kentucky coal field, the principle method of mining is by
 
area stripping. To be considered current, grading and backfilling must not be
 
more than two spoil ridges behind the pit being worked. The width of a given
 
spoil ridge depends on characteristics of the mine operation; however, a sub­
jective estimate based on observing a limited number of mines suggests a width
 
of about 33 meters. On that basis, to detect grading violations it is necessary
 
to recognize the width of three, 33-meter spoil ridges to within one ridge
 
width. This resolution may approximate an upper bound to the detection of water
 
quality, drainage plan, and wildcat strip mining violations.
 
Spoil ridges usually are linear elements, extending for much greater
 
lengths than their widths. If an extended region of k x n, with k<<n, pixels
 
for a spoil ridge is observed on a recognition map, misclassification errors
 
of boundary pixels might limit the detected width of k t 1 pixels. Thus the
 
successful detection of a grading violation requires a pixel width of about
 
33 meters. This is approximately one half the present Landsat pixel size. An
 
increase of resolving power by a factor of 2 would give 4 times as much data
 
and 4 times as much square footage of recognition maps (unless line printer
 
symbols could be reduced or some alternative graphic device were used). The
 
above resolution of 33 meter pixel widths or less is a possibility in the near
 
Black and white imagery from the return beam video sensors of Landsat-C
future. 

will come close to this size 'andmay prove to be adequate for most 
violations
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except for those involving water quality. This would reduce misclassifi­
cation costs and could prove to be cost effective if the elapsed time between
 
satellite coverage and ground inspection were reduced to a week or less.
 
The other important cost considerations are inspection costs -­
the computer plus labor costs. An intriguing aspect of Landsat data is
 
the potential for programming a computer in such a way as to reduce the
 
costs of photointerpretation.
 
One advantage of computer programmed maps is that all areas which
 
lie in a category of noninterest could be printed out as blanks. The re­
maining areas could hardly be missed by a photointerpreter. Lakes and
 
rivers could be used as reference points.
 
In the future, cluster analysis packages could include a routine
 
which precisely defines the coordinates of the pixels using known ground
 
truth area. A computer could be programmed to do the interpretation,
 
with less error than a human interpreter. In place of costly recognition
 
maps, summary printouts of the computer photointerpretation results could
 
be made. The computer could also be programmed to review historical tapes
 
to pinpoint any changes which have occurred and to ignore consistent past
 
misclassifications at specific areas.
 
Thus through automation, many costs connected to photointerpretation
 
could be dropped. The dominant cost, however, is in the computer cluster
 
analysis routines to recognize ground truth. Recent research has shown
 
that such routines may not be necessary. Satellite data have been used,
 
(26) and (27), successfully over a span of two years to classify and map
 
surface mined areas and to measure the successfulness of reclamation
 
practices without use of repetitive clu'ter analysis routines.
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Cluster analysis routines using ground-truth routines are necessary
 
because the categories of channel voltages corresponding to ground-truth
 
categories change with each new satellite pass. The biggest fluctuations
 
are due to seasonal reflectance properties. If all voltages within a single
 
season are assumed to change by a random constant plus a random scale
 
factor for each channel, simple linear adjustments can be used each year
 
for recognition mapping after the initial decision rules have been obtained
 
once 	and for all each season.
 
The process used in (27) was very simple, probably very inexpensive,
 
and apparently very accurate to tithin the limits of the pixels. Band­
ratioed data and linear regression analysis were used to extend Landsat
 
signature analysis of September 1972 to two further analyses of September
 
1973 and July 1974.
 
In (27), misclassification did occur in the analysis. For example,
 
the town of Keyser, Maryland was classified as a strip mine. Another false
 
alarm was a railroad yard.
 
Th'(27), eight mines were selected to estimate the accuracy of area
 
meansurements from Landsat data. While the accuracy was found to average
 
7%, the following must be noted:
 
o 	 Landsat data was trained for the 1972 data. 
The sum of
 
residual errors was constrained to be zero -- clearly
 
minimizing the average possible error. If the data were
 
extended to untrained areas -- the errors could be expected
 
to be 	larger.
 
o 	 Landsat errors for 1974 were 12%,with five of the seven
 
areas underestimated. While the claim is made that the
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underestimation is "due to natural revegetation around
 
the edges of the mine" and overestimation due to "increased
 
mining area," it is conceivable that the large errors are
 
simply "proof" that trained signatures lose precision
 
both spatially and temporally.
 
0 The eight mine areas were large, ranging from 31.4 acres
 
to 243.8 acres. Misclassified pixels occur on the boundaries
 
between different area categories. For large areas, a
 
smaller percentage of the pixels lie on the boundary, thus
 
giving lower misclassification errors. Indeed, the residuals
 
in (27) were as large for the small mines as for the large
 
mines.
 
The problems encountered in misclassification errors in (26) and
 
(27) were similar to those observed in Madisonville. The misclassifications
 
are probably due more to resolution than to the decision rules. If resolution
 
can be decreased in the future, it is important that simple procedures such
 
as (27) do exist for extending signatures temporally and thus reducing costs.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this project was to estimate the costs and benefits of 
using satellite or airplane photography for the inspection of surface coal 
mining-violations in western Kentucky. New inspection processes are cost 
effective if either the net increase in inspection costs is exceeded by the 
benefits in reduced social costs of mine violations and increased fines or 
if the net decrease in inspection costs exceeds any increase in social costs 
and decrease in fines. 
The alternative policies considered in this report were satellite­
air-man, satellite-man, air-man, and man only inspection policies. In 
each of these policies: satellites and airplanes serve only as a pointer for 
follow-up inspections. The benefits of detection of surface coal mining 
violations are assumed to occur only when a ground inspection is made. 
The cost of an inspection policy has several components. We first 
summarize the inspection costs. Airplane color IR photography of n 
active coal mines in western Kentucky costs approximately S739 + $1Zn 
This estimate applies when only active coal mines are photographed. In 
this case, only one roll of film is required to photograph all of the estimated 
124 permit areas which cover a total of less than twenty square miles. If 
the entire coal mining region including farms and towns lying in the area 
were photographed, an estimated area of 4300 square miles requiring nine 
rolls of film at a total cost of $6, 11.0 would be required. 
Estimates of the costs of satellite photography and interpretation 
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are less accurate thanthose for airplane inspection. Total costs depend 
on the elaborateness of the computer decision rules for interpreting the data 
and on the computer itself. Since the computer would be state-owned, the 
costs would probably be less than the use of time-sharing facilities. Our 
estimate of a satellite inspection of the entire active coal mining area in 
western. Kentucky is $2, 000. 
A lower bound for the cost of manned inspection is $28.40 per permit 
area. This gives a total cost of $3, 522 to inspect the estimated 124 permit 
areas. The figure of $28.40 may be low. This estimate was made by as­
suring ten inspectors make 400 inspections per month. During 1971-74, 
about 207 inspections were made per month. (An average of only 57. 5 in­
spection reports were filed each month. See Section 4, Chapter V for an 
explanation of the adjusted estimate of 207 inspections per month. Inspec­
tion reports are now required to be written for each inspection. Because 
this is an extra burden on the inspector, future inspection rates could be 
less than the 207 inspections per month per ten inspectors.) At 207 inspec­
tions per month per ten inspectors, the cost is $46. 72. We have used the 
values $28.40 and $50 as two alternatives in our study. 
A means of reducing the costs of manned inspections is to inspect 
only those mines where violations are occurring. This is the basis for 
analyzing policies where satellites or airplanes serve as pointers. 
Although satellites and/or airplanes cost less than manned inspec­
tions, they are sufficiently expensive to require a study to determine if they 
are beneficial. They are cost-effective under the following conditions: 
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* 	 Misclassification probabilities are not large. That is, 
violations are detectable. 
* 	 The elapsed follow-up time after either a satellite or air­
plane detection is not large. That is, the social costs 
accrued by violations during the elapsed time are small 
relative to the total social costs during the period which 
they exist. 
0 Violations do not start frequently. 
All of the above refer to the efficiency of the satellite or airplane to serve 
as a pointer. Thus, to be efficient, the pointer must detect violations and 
manned inspections must be made in a sufficiently short period of time. 
Furthermore, the pointer is not efficient if it is known a priori that a viola­
tion is occurring with high probability. 
While this study is for satellite and aircraft inspection policies, we 
begin by examining the frequency and costs of violations at the surface coal 
mines because these parameters are required in the cost effectiveness study. 
2. Social Costs and Frequencies of Violations 
Our first task for this project was to categorize surface mining viola­
tions and estimate their costs and frequencies using inspection data for the 
period 1971-74. There is at present insufficient data to obtain accurate esti­
mates of the social costs of coal mining violations. Our method of estima­
tion was to scale up scores assigned by the ten inspectors from western Ken­
tucky to each of the violations. The scale factor was determined by using a 
figure of $50 per acre per year for revegetation violations. Costs per week 
were then determined by dividing the estimated total costs by the average 
duration of a violation.
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The only social cost estimate which is not entirely subjective is the
 
'estimated cost of revegetation violations ($24.04 per week). A sensitivity
 
,analysis was made by varying the other three violation costs. The costs
 
were varied by using three difference average durations. These durations
 
were! (1) best estimated duration, (2) longest possible duration as re­
stricted by the one-year permit renewal and bond release regulations, and
 
(3) shortest possible duration when inspections are made daily.
 
The conclusions about the cost effectiveness of various inspection
 
policies depend on the amount which inspection policies reduce the social
 
costs. If a social cost cannot be reduced, then the value of the social
 
cost is irrelevant. For example, it is not known with certainty that
 
detections of water quality violations have any effect on water quality
 
violation duration or frequency. If there is no shortening effect, then
 
the only benefits of detection of these violations are fines.
 
The total amount of fines collected for water quality violations in
 
1974 was approximately $60,000. If, as our original estimates showed, in­
spections were made only once per 55 days, then at a daily inspection rate,
 
the total collected fines per year would grow to over $1,000,000, assuming
 
water quality violations did not decrease. Inspectors believe that the
 
figure of $1,000,000 for fines is far too high. Indeed, indications from
 
the increased inspection rate of 1975 are that the total amount of fines
 
collected per year remains constant independent of the increased detection
 
rate.
 
If the total amount of fines remains constant, and if the duration and
 
frequency of water quality violations remain constant, then clearly there
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is no benefit in the detection of water quality violations. If this is the case, 
then airplane and satellite policies can be very cost-effective. The other 
three violation types (drainage control, revegetation, and grading) last for 
longer periods of time and their social costs per week are lower. The 
longer lengths increase the maximum elapsed time between satellite or 
airplane inspections and follow-up manned inspections vhich can occur to 
have a cost effective inspection policy. Also, it would not be necessary to 
correctly classify water quality violations. 
That there will be no future benefits in detecting water quality 
violations is not expected. It is assumed that there will be a benefit. The 
benefit could be from either fines or a decreased duration after detection. 
Two complete analyses were made under two different assumptions. 
Case 1. Inspections during 1971-74 were once every 55 days. 
Inspection reports were filed during 1971-74 at a rate of once per 
55 days per permit area. It was assumed that a constant rate of fines per 
detection of water quality violations would be levied independent of the 
inspection rate. Under this assumption, total fines for a year at the daily 
inspection rate would be $520, 232 if water quality violations last seven days 
and $1, 133, 874 if water quality violations last three days. The total cost 
of water quality violations per year was estimated to be between $691, 916 
and $1, 384, 173 depending on the social cost option. Although the"maximum 
estimated total of fines collected under these assumptions would be less 
than the social costs of water quality violations, inspectors concluded these 
estimates were too high. A second analysis using "adjusted" parameters 
was called for. 
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Case 2. Inspections during 1971-74 were once every 18 days. 
The number of inspection reports filed is less than the total number 
of inspections during 1971-74. This causes ambiguity in the estimates for 
rates of violations, detections, and fines. We have made the assumption 
that all inspections whether reported or not, have identical characteristics. 
This implies that the decision to not report or to report is made independ­
ently of violations. Serious violations therefore have odds of (55-18)-18
 
of not being reported. Case 1 assumes that inspections which are not re­
ported count as no inspection.
 
Many more detections are occurring under Case 2 than under Case 1. 
This has two effects on the estimated violation parameters: 
o 	 The overall frequency of violations is the same in both 
cases. However, in Case 2, the.estirnated average length 
is shorter and the frequency of starts is higher. 
o 	 The overall rate of fines per year is the same in both cases. 
That is, twelve fines averaging $500 each were collected 
each year. However, in Case 2, the estimated rate of 
fines per detection of water quality violations is lower 
because the detection rate is increased. 
In Case 2, it is assumed that water quality violations last an average of 
seven days under no inspections and an average of three days under daily 
inspection. The decrease in the benefits of fines per detection is, therefore, 
offset by the benefit of a decrease induration. 
The conclusions of the next section are based on Case Z assumptions 
and social costs defined in the table below. Conclusions for Case 1 and for 
other cost options can be found in the previous chapters.
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Table 62. Violation Parameters
 
Average Average 
Duration Duration 
Frequency Under No Under Daily Social 
of Starts Inspection Inspection Cost Per 
Violation Per Year (Weeks) (Weeks) Week 
Grading 1.544 26.00 13.00 $ 26.64 
Revegetation 0.376 34.67 17.33 $ 24.04 
Drainage Control 1.940 26.00 4.00 $ 60.67 
Water Quality 0.489 1.00 0.50 $997.73 
3. Cost/Benefit Analysis
 
Two methods of analysis were used. For ground inspection analysis
 
exact mathematical formulae were derived. These were used to obtain exact
 
optimal inspection rates and costs. (Exact only within the model used and
 
the values of the parameters. The model and the values are, of course, only
 
ideal and do not represent exact real-world conditions.)
 
Computer simulations were used to analyze satellite and airplane
 
policies. A shortcoming of these simulations was caused by the extreme dif­
ferences among the durations of the violation types. For reliable simulations,
 
it was necessary to simulate random combinations of all four violation types.
 
Discrete blocks of time were used. Within each block, random number generators
 
determine all of the conditions present at that time. As the length of the
 
time unit is decreased, the number of simulations must be increased in
 
order to adequately simulate drainage control, revegetation, and grading
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violations. The unit of time must be no greater than the 3.5 day average
 
duration of water quality violations after they are detected. This unit
 
was used.
 
The 3.5 day unit set limitations on the results. For example, de­
tected water quality violations last exactly 3.5 days in the simulation. In
 
reality, and under our mathematical formula, the average duration is closer
 
to seven days under low inspection rates because water quality violations
 
would not be observed on the first day. Also, when inspection rates are
 
once per 3.5 days, all water quality violations are detected in the simu­
lation. In practice, some water quality violations endure for less than 3.5
 
days and would not be observed,
 
Thus, there is a discrepancy between the simulation and formulae 
for man only inspections. At high inspection rates, fines are higher and 
social costs are less under simulations than under the formulae. Thus, for 
comparisons of costs, the satellite and airplane policy costs are compared 
only with the simulated manned inspection costs and not with the theoretically 
estimated' costs. 
Table 63 lists the costs of those inspection policies which were simnu­
lated. Costs when manned inspections are $50 were not given earlier in 
this report bit are simply derived from calculations using the number of 
inspections listed in the previous tables. These costs are given in Table 64. 
Before summarizing the table, some explanations are necessary. 
In the simulation, a decision had to be made as to whether or not a violation 
occurring in a 3. 5 day unit of time which was detected by satellite would 
result in a follow-up detection if the elapsed time were 3. 5 days. The choice 
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Table 63. Summary of Inspection Policy Cost, 
Ground Inspection Costs $29. 40 
Assumptions r 
Satellite 
:nspection Poliy Lag Times 
Airplane Ground Inspection Social Pinos Total 
Revagetatlon 
violation only 
detectable by 
satellite 
9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
56 days 
NO AIR 
NO AIR 
7 days 
NO AIR 
7 days 
56 days 
7 days 
3.5 days 
3. 5 days 
35, 11Z 
25,478 
26,094 
35,884 
697,714 
712,336 
699,938 
699, 938 
1,369 
4,125 
4,107 
4,107 
731,457 
733. 689 
721, 925 
731,715 
No 
Mi.clssflcation 
9 days 
9 days 
56 days 
56 days 
7 days 
3.5 days 
47,918 
45. 480 
552,868 
5Z6, 386 
11,278 
24,784 
589,508 
547,08Z 
-. 
0 
9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
NO AIR 
7 days 
NO AIR, 
56 days 
3.5 clays 
7 days 
34.422 
63, 126 
42,402 
563,206 
480,840 
505,930 
8,403 
39,804 
25,155 
589.Z25 
504, 155 
523, 176 
Airplane 
roticien 
No Sat. 
No Snt. 
7 days 
14 days 
3 5 days 
3.5 days 
189,066 
99,569 
343,738 
413, 150 
131,514 
92, 050 
401, Z90 
420. 669 
No Sat. 
NSat. 
No Sat. 
L. 5 days 
23 days 
3.5 days 
3 5 days 
3.5 days 
7 days 
77.915 
65,342 
309,098 
443.492 
467,472 
387, 808 
65,031 
53.706 
113,664 
456,376 
479. 108 
582, 243 
Ground Inspection 
Only 
No Sat. 
No Sat. 
NO AIR 
NO AIR 
7 days 
[7, 5 days 
(1974 rate) 
183, 124 
73,250 
343, IZ4 
443,492 
130,036 
65, 172 
396,8Z6 
451,564 
was that it would be. Thus, a 3. 5 day follow-up inspection lag is identical 
to no lag. Similarly, a seven day lag represents a lag greater than 3. 5 and 
less than seven. Under zero misclassification probabilities all satellite 
detections are detected in the follow-up if the lag is 3.5 days. 
In the tables, in some cases when the follow-up lag after a satellite 
is held constant, s-a-m policies are better than s-rn policies and in other 
cases the reverse is true. These cases are neither due to random errors 
nor errors in the computer program. A complete justification for the order­
ing of the costs has no effect on our conclusions. However, the ordering 
is explained by the following: 
o 	 Airplane costs include fixed as well as per unit costs. When 
very few follow-up inspections are required, airplanes are 
less cost effective. This occurs when only revegetation viola­
tions are detected by satellite. 
Q When several follow-up inspections are required, the effec­
tiveness of airplanes depends on the number of satellite detec­
tions which result in follow-up detections. S-a-rtis optimal 
when no satellite misclassifications occur (high follow-up rate), 
the follow-up lag is at least seven days (several areas have 
water quality violations ending with no new ones starting), 
and the lag between airplane and ground inspection is 3.5 days 
(the airplane selects precisely those violations which still 
exist.) 
It is clear from the tables that satellite policies are not cost effec­
tive. There are several reasons. 
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* 	 The frequency of satellite coverage is limited by the orbital 
path, the period of revolution, and the frequency of cloud­
cover. 
The satellite costs of inspection are approximately equal to 
low-altitude airplane costs,. 
0 
* 	 At present, there is an approximate two-month minimum lag 
between satellite inspection and follow-up inspection. 
I 	 At present, the resolution is too low to detect violations other 
than revegetation violations. 
* 	 At present, water quality violations are of short duration, 
occur frequently, and have high social costs. 
Under the assumption of no misclassifications and no elapsed time 
between airplane and manned inspections airplane-man inspection is definitely 
optimal. This is not indicated by Table 63. The explanation of our conclu­
sion is made clear, however, by pointing out other shortcomings of our model. 
We have assumed that a follow-up ground inspection is made after 
every -iolation detection. In practice, this is not necessary. It is known 
that a revegetation violation cannot be corrected until the next seeding season. 
A grading violation, once detected by a ground inspector, lasts an average 
of three months independently of the total number of inspections made. Thus 
permit areas having only these violations need not be inspected every week. 
A one-to-one follow-up inspection need be made only for water quality and 
possibly drainage control violations. Thus, the costs of airplane-man inspec­
tions can be considerably reduced with no increase in social costs. The opti­
mal rate of airplane inspections is therefore, under our assumptions, less 
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Table 64. Summary of Inspection Policy Costs 
Ground Inspections Costs $50.00 
Assumptions 
Satellite 
rnspoctIton Policy Laa Times 
Airplane Ground Inspectlon Social 
costs 
Fines Total 
Revagetation 
violation only 
detectable by 
satellite 
9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
56 days 
NO AIR 
NO AIR 
7 days 
7 days 
56 days 
7 days 
3,5 days 
36,644 
Z6,940 
28, 183 
37,973 
697,714 
712,336 
699, 938 
699, 938 
1,369 
4,IZ5 
4,107 
4,107 
73Z,989 
735, 151 
724,014 
733,804 
No 
MIclassficatlon 
9 days 
'9 days 
56 days 
56 days 
7 days 
3.5 day, 
54,255 
51, 677 
552, 868 
526,386 
11,278 
24, 784 
595,845 
553.279 
H 9 days 
9 days 
9 days 
NO AIR 
7 days 
NO AIR 
56 days 
3.5 days 
7 days 
42,291 
77, 952 
56,537 
563, 206 
450, 840 
505,930 
8,403 
39, 804 
Z5, 155 
597,094 
518, 788 
537,311 
Airplane 
Policies 
No Sat. 
No Sat. 
7 days 
14 days 
3.5 days 
3.5 days 
244,777 
131, 256 
343,738 
413, 150 
131,514 
92,050 
457,001 
452,356 P 
No Sat. 
No Sat. 
No Sat. 
[7. 5 days 
21 dava 
3.5 days 
3.5 days 
3.5 days 
7 days 
101,939 
85,676 
368,o16 
443,49Z 
467,472 
387,808 
65,031 
53,706 
113.664 
480,400 
499, 442 
641,161 
Ground hspectLon 
Only 
No Sat. 
No Sat. 
NO AIR 
NO AIR 
7 days 
17.5 days 
32Z,401 
128,961 
343, 124 
443, 492 
130,036 
65, 172 
536, 103 
507.275 
than seven days. 
If, however, the elapsed time between airplane and ground inspec­
tion is greater than 3. 5 days, then our model indicates that ground inspec­
tion is optimal. 
Under the parameters listed in Table 62, the optimal number of inspec­
tors,which minimizes manned inspection only costs, is ten. This value is 
independent of inspection costs over the range of $28.40 to $50. 00 per inspec­
tion. This invariance under inspection costs occurs because, for a fixed 
number of inspectors, the inspection costs are proportional to the average 
number of days between inspection. At SZ8.40, ten inspectors make 400 
inspections per month or one inspection per permit each 9.4 days. At $50.00, 
ten inspectors make 207 inspections per month or one inspection every 18 
days. The optimal rate of inspection, from mathematical formulae, are 
approximately once every 9. 5 days if inspections cost $28.40 and once every 
18 days if inspections cost $50. 00. 
The fact that the optimal inspection rate is equal to the estimated 
1971-74 rate is fortuitous. This result is consistent with a definition of costs 
(or utility) which assumes rational people choose policies which maximize 
a utility function. Thus, we might have adjusted the social cost estimates 
in such a manner that the 1971-74 inspection rates were optimal. Fortunately, 
this is unnecessary. 
The optimal number of inspectors is proportional to the number of 
permits. Since ten inspectors should inspect 124 permit areas, an additional 
inspector should be hired for every additional 12 permits. 
If inspections cost $28. 40, recommended policy is air-man with 
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airplane inspections once per week and follow-up manned inspections within 
three days. From Table 49, this implies that 2579 manned inspections will 
be made per year. As we have already explained, this number can be decreased. 
If an inspector makes 480 ground inspections per year, then at most five 
inspectors are required. 
If inspections cost $50. 00, then an air-man policy with airplane inspec­
tions on a biweekly basis and follow-up manned inspections within three days 
is approximately optimal. From Table 50, this implies that 1467 manned 
inspections will be made per year. If each inspector makes Z50 inspections 
per year, then six inspectors are required. 
There are other benefits of satellite and airplane inspections which 
have not yet been considered. These are discussed in the next section. 
4. Recommendations for Future Analysis 
The fundamental result of our study is that water quality violations 
are a problem in western Kentucky. Other conclusions rest on a less firm 
foundation. Our estimates of the social cosis of water quality violations are 
purely subjective. Better estimates of these costs should be made. Unfor­
tunately, this requires a rigorous study beyond the limits of the time and 
cost constraints for this project. 
The occurrence of water quality violations may be very different from 
that assumed in our model. They probably do not occur randomly. Since 
the source of these violations is due either to ground water or surface runoff, 
the violations could be highly correlated with specific permit areas or with 
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rainfall conditions. If problem areas can be pinpointed, then these violations 
can be detected with high efficiency without high inspection rates. 
Our ground truth data did not include water quality. The ability to 
classify water quality violations by low altitude color IR is therefore unknown. 
We recommend that water quality violations be studied more thoroughly. 
Better estimates of the social costs should be made. An analysis using ground 
truth data together with color IR should be made to estimate airplane mis­
classification probabilities. 
But more important, a study of enforcement policies should be con­
ducted. Better means of controlling water quality should be researched. 
If mine operators continue to violate water quality standards in the presence 
of high penalties, then the control of water quality must either be expensive 
or impossible. 
Theoretically, there is an optimal rate for fining violations or sus­
pending operations. The optimal inspection policy and optimal penalty rate 
should be solved simultaneously. The solution depends on an unknown. This 
is the behavior of violation frequencies under varying enforcement policies. 
This can be modelled as a two-person game. 
The opinion of some inspectors is that the present penalties are so 
low that increased inspection rates will not decrease the frequency of starts 
of new violations. (This was, in fact, the assumption used in our cost/benefit 
study.) This suggests that fines should be increased. It is possible that 
the costly water quality violations would disappear under an optimal average 
fine. If this were the case, then inspection rates could be substantially de­
creased and satellites would be more effective. 
176
 
If water quality violations can be eliminated, the second most costly 
violation is drainage control. Such violations start when mining is shifted 
to a different drainage area. The area in which mining is being conducted 
is observable from satellite. The geometry of the sedimentation pond and 
drainage area is observable in airplane photography. Precise measurements 
of the turbidity of the influent and effluent from the sedimentation pond are 
feasible by ground inspection. The question of whether color IFl is suffi­
ciently precise for measuring sediment yield is also unknown. A ground truth 
study of color Ii. should be conducted to answer this question. At present, 
airplane photography is definitely better than satellite photography in all as­
pects of physical and chemical water quality measurements or predictions. 
The study in [ 20] seems to indicate that observations on the geometry 
of sedimentation pond (i. e. dimensions and sideslope properties) are 
snuffcientfoy the dqtect~on ons 
Grading violations are easily detectable by airplane phoography nid, 
witl better rebolation (see Chapter VI) by satelliW. Rovegutation viclations 
are dtetcLable by uiic'atLlliLuor airplanLu. Thu-niu t soriunls viol Iaii, 
occurs when mined, areas end up as nrpha land. Theg~onnxunwaalhxuat 
then bearthe hirden of rehabilitatiqn.,, ,Our assqmption, is that ej,hPr this,, 
doe q pnot qqcv,?4 ipirg~p ga4f yi,91 a9 n4 W? fL ,yea 
or thatjth9 fpce iir ,of bppz qgves.t14s, adct~ionaloa e~pse. There. are 
two possibilities when this need not be the case: 
e Wildcat strip mining 
e Corrupt n1hle inspectors 
Hopefully, the second case dues not occur. Throughout this reporL we have 
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assumed an ideal case of perfect ground inspections with no errors (on which
 
our estimates of violation frequencies are based). There is a probability
 
that an error may be made which simultaneously results in a bond release
 
and orphan land. Reference (4) makes allegations that support this point
 
of view. Satellite photography on a semiannual basis could be used to verify
 
that land is graded (under a presumed future improved resolution) and revege­
tation is taking place. If semiannual inspections prevent one or more permitted
 
areas from becoming unrehabilitated orphan land, the inspections are exceed­
ingly cost effective.
 
The question of whether wildcat strip mining is either prevalent or
 
serious in Western Kentucky is debatable. During the past several years,
 
according to communications with inspectors, only two wildcat strip mines
 
have been detected in Western Kentucky. The present frequency of strip
 
mining without a permit is unknown becahse the entire active coal mining
 
area of 4300 square miles is not inspected as a whole.
 
It is believe that if any wildcat strip mining exists in western Ken­
tucky, it'is well camouflaged. Apparently, not only is the mining area graded
 
and revegetated, but so are the roads leading to the mining area. Thus,
 
wildcat strip mining social costs may be trivial (if so, perhaps wildcatting
 
should be ignored when detected to minimize costs!). Satellites cannot be
 
used effectively to detect wildcat strip mining under present resolution.
 
Airplane costs for coverage of the entire 4300 square mile active coal mining
 
area are probably too large. No accurate assessment of the benefits of com­
plete airplane coverage or future satellite coverage can be made without
 
experimentation.
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Finally, the total benefit of satellite inspection of coal mines de­
pends on how much of the inspection costs can be outlayed to other benefits
 
not related to strip mining. Besides coal mining inspections, satellite
 
photography can be used in Kentucky for other purposes such as forestry,
 
land use, and agriculture. The cataloguing of the amount of acreage of
 
resources varying from tobacco crops to surface water is extremely valuable.
 
Knowledge of crop acreage is important to farmers because of its influence
 
on costs and profits.
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